1. DORAB PATEL, J.-The appellant is the grand daughter of one Faqir Muhammad, who was a Minister in Kalat State about 90 years ago. He was however shot dead in 1893 on the orders of the then Ruler of Katat. He died leaving behind considerable landed property which was inherited by three legal heirs. These were his widow, his daughter-in-law and his daughter Mst. Mah Ganj, and the appellant---s the daughter of the said Mst. Mah Ganj. Faqir Muhammad's widow married the Nawab of gharan, whilst his daughter-la-law and daughter married other members of the family of the Nawab of Kharan. Mst. Mah Ganj settled in Quetta in 1909, and, her properties were managed by her uncle Arbab Muhammad Wafa, but in 1913 these properties were taken over and managed by the Government of Kalat State. Mat. Mah Ganj died in 1920 and as the appellant was her sole heir, she claimed the properties of her mother but the collaterals of Faqir Muhammad deceased claimed these properties as well as the said Aftab Muhammad Wafa. The State of Kalat also claimed these properties on the ground that the State had inherited them on Faqir Muhammad's death, both under custom and under the Shariak as Faqir Muhammad was a slave of the Ruler of Kalat. All these claims were referred to a Jirga consisting of the Sardars of the Jalawan and Sarawar Tribes and by this award or 23-2-1923 the State was entitled to inherit ail the properties left behind by Faqir Muhammad. The Jirga further observed that the appellant being a woman did not have any right under custom to inherit property, bus it recommended that she should be given a gift of Rs. 20,000. Accordingly, the Ruler of Katat gifted a sum of Rs. 20,0u0 to the appellant, who accepted it. Now although the appellant was deprived by this award of all the properties claimed by her, she took no steps to challenge it because according to the petition for leave, it was not possible for her to assert her rights in the conditions then prevailing in the State of Kalat.
2. In 1952 the, respondent filed a suit against Kalat State for possession of some or all of the landed property of Faqir Muhammad on the ground that these properties had been purchased by his late father (Arbab Muhammad Wafa), from the legal heirs of Faqir Muhammad. Although this suit was decreed, the Government did not file an appeal against the decree. Then because the Shariat had been promulgated in the State of Kalat by a Farman of 1948, the appellant made a representation to the Wazir-i-Azam of Kalat that she was entitled to succeed to her share of the properties of her mother Mst. Mah Ganj. But before the Wasir-i---Azam could decide this representation, the Province of West Pakistan was created with the result that the appellant' representation to the Wazir-i-Azam was treated and heard as a Revision by the High Court of Wont Pakistan. This Revision was dismissed by the High Court with the observation that the appellant could, if she so wished, file a suit to establish her alleged rights, therefore, the appellant filed a suit in 1957 in the Courts of the District Magistrate against the respondent for a declaration that the decree obtained by him was illegal, because the alleged sale deeds in favour of his father (on which he had relied in his suit) were forged documents. The appellant also prayed in the suit, which was filed in forma paupers for possession of the properties decreed in the respondent's favour and for accounts of the produce of the property from the respondent. This suit wet decreed in 1963, therefore, the respondent filed an appeal before the Majlis-i-Shoora, which was board by the Chairman and another member.
3. The Chairman of the Majlis-i-Shoora was of the view that the award of the Jirga of 1923 against to appellant had become final, the more so, as she had accepted the gift of Rs. 20,000 which had boon recommended in that award. The Chairman also held that the appellant's cause of action arose in 1923 when her claim had been rejected by the Jirga, but as she had filed her suit after 34 years in 1957, it was time-barred. Finally the Chairman observed: "She claims her right according to Shariat under the Firman of 1948 on the basis of which Shariat enforced in the State but the Firman clearly lays down that cases decided before 1948 could not be reopened.
4. Accordingly, by his judgment dated 17-7-1964, ho allowed the appeal and dismissed the appellant's suit. However, Mr. Abdul Samad, the other member of the Majlis-i-Shoora, was of the view that the appeal should be dismissed, therefore, in the events that happened, the appeal was referred to a third member nominated by the Chairman of the Majlis-i-Shoors, Mr. Bashir Ahmad.
5. As Mr. Bashir Ahmad agreed with the Chairman's judgment, the respondent's appeal was allowed and the decree passed against him by the Kazi of Mastung was set aside.
6. The appellant filed a second appeal against the majority judgment of the Majlis-i-Shoora in the High Court of West Pakistan, and as she had no mom to pair court-fees on the appeal she sought permission to file the appeal under Order XLIV of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Judges held that the appellant wag a pauper within the meaning of Order XLIV, but as they agreed with the view of the Majlis-i-Shoora that the appellant's suit was time barred, they bold that the appellant had failed to bring her claim within the ambit of rule 1 of Order XLIV, accordingly, by their order dated 1-7-1959, they dismissed the appeal in limine.
7. The applicant challengers this order in a petition for leave in this Court on the ground the: the appellate Courts had erred in applying the of the Limitation Act, to the appellants suit, because the Act had been extended for the first time to the Kalat Division of the Province of Went Pakistan by the Central Law (Statute Reforms) Ordinance, 1960. The learned Judges held that there was force in this contention and, therefore, granted leave by their order dated 12-1-1970.
8. Both the learned counsel were agreed what the Limitation Act had been applied for the first time to the territories of what is now the Kalat Division of the Province of Baluchistan by the Central Law (Statute Reforms) Ordinance, 1960, but as the provisions of the Limitation Act were extended by section 3 of this Ordinance to the Kalat Division with retrospective effect from the 14th of October 1955, Mr. Memon'e submission cuss that the appellate Courts bad rightly dismissed the appellant's suit as time-barred, whilst Mr. Akhtar Mahmood's submission was that the appellate Courts had misread section 3 of this Ordinance.
9. The submission that the appellant's suit was time-barred assumes that she had a cause of action on which she failed to sue within the statutory period of limitation. But as we pointed out the finding given by the Jirga in its award of 23-2-1923 was that the estate of Faqir Muhammad had, we asked learned counsel of this award which she had share of her grand father's or of her mother's estate.
10. Learned counsel stated that the appellant's claim was based on the Shariat and the cause of action for the claim accrued on the promulgation of the Shariat under the then State of Kalat. But learned counsel was not able to produce the Farman of the Ruler by which the Shariat had been contented to the state of Kalat. Anti on the other hand, the Chairman of the Majlis-i-Shoora who presumably had the advantage of examining this Farman had given a finding that the Farman "clearly lays down that cases decided before 94 could not be re-opened." As Mr. Ahhtar Mahmood admitted that theca observations are correct, the promulgation of the Shariat could not confer any rights on the appellant to her mother's estate as her mother had diets long before this change in the law.
11. Mr. Akhtar Mahmood, however, also relied on the fact that the respondent's suit had been decreed, but it is yet possible to understand how the circumstance that this suit was decreed can help the appellant's case, because the respondent's cause of action in his suit vas not based on the Shariat and had nothing to do with the Shariat. Conformed with this difficulty, learned counsel submitted that the fact that Oho respondent's suit was decreed against the estate inherited by the legal heirs of Faqir Muhammad, was inconsistent with the finding of the Jirga in its award of 23-2-1923, that the estate of Faqir Muhammad had devolved by the Ruler of Kalat. It is true that at first eight the respondent's claim in his suit was inconsistent with the said finding of the Jirgs, but, whilst the Jirga rejected the appellant's claim, in view of its finding that the estate of Faqir Muhammad had devolved noon the Ruler of Kalat, despite this finding, it observed that the respondent's father was free to prosecute his remedies is the civil Court to enforce his claim for the purchase of properties from the legal heirs of Faqir Muhammad. Therefore, the award of the Jirga was not fatal to the respondent's claim, but it was fatal to the appellant's claim, the more so, as she elected to take a benefit from it by accepting the gift of Re. 20,000 from the Government of Kalat. In any view of the matter, the respondent's suit is not relevant to the appellant's claim.
12. It' the result the satdi filed by the appellant was only fit to be dismissed, as it did toot disclose any cause of action. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed . . . . . But se leave the parties to bear their own costs.