1. ' S. AHMED SARWANA, J.---On 1-12-1999 the petitioner filed Application No,3 of 1999 before Sindh Labour Court. No,VII, Sukkur against (1) Chief Executive, Liberty Power Limited, Mirpur Mathelo (respondent No,1), (2) Manager Administration, Liberty Power Limited (respondent No,2), (3)
2. Technical Director, Liberty Power Limited (respondent No,3) and (4) General Manager, Liberty Power Limited (respondent No,4) under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 (I.R.O., 1969), inter alia, for his reinstatement in service with full back benefits. In the application, the petitioner alleged that he was initially appointed as Site Supervisor with effect from 1-1-1996 on three months' probationary period on monthly gross salary of Rs,5,000 and posted at Liberty Power Plant at Mirpur Mathelo (The letter of appointment attached with the petition and also referred to in the application under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969 appears to have been issued by I.C.G. Infrastructure Capital Group Ltd.). By letter dated 9-9-1996 Liberty Power Limited (LPL) offered the petitioner a one-year contract effective 1-9-1996 to supervise the land acquisition for the company on the terms stated therein. The offer was accepted by the petitioner on 15-9-1996 and an agreement of employment thus came into existence. It is further alleged that the respondents extended the contract of the petitioner from time to time without break. By letter dated 30-8-1999 (apparently wrongly typed as August 13, 1998) he was informed that his contract of service with Liberty Power, which was going to expire on August 31, 1999 would not be renewed. After serving a grievance notice to Liberty Power, the petitioner filed Grievance Application No,30/1000 under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969 before the Sindh Labour Court No,VII, Sukkur.
3. ' LPL filed its written statement to the application taking various legal objections relating to its maintainability and on merits took the defence that the petitioner was a contractual employee who had been engaged for the purpose of supervising land acquisition for the company which was a work of temporary nature and filed various documents in support thereof. On 5-5-2000 the respondents also filed an Additional Legal Objection that the respondents-establishment was governed under the provisions of Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 and requested the Court to dismiss the grievance application.
4. ' From a perusal of the Order Sheet of Application No,3 of 1999 (Abdullah v. Chief- Executive, Liberty Power and others) of Sindh Labour Court No,VII, Sukkur, it transpires that in spite of several chances/opportunities given by the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, the petitioner failed to produce his evidence and consequently after hearing the parties" counsel on the legal objections and perusing the record and proceedings of the case, the Grievance Application was dismissed by Order dated 14-10-2000 holding, inter alia, that he was not inducted as a worker/workman connected with the operation of the Liberty Power Plant and that the job for which he was contracted had already been completed and as such his services had become surplus and redundant, therefore the respondents were not under obligation to regularise his service like any other employee of the establishment.
5. ' The petitioner filed Appeal No,Suk-114 of 2000 before Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal Camp at Sukkur against the Order of the Labour Court which was dismissed by decision dated 30-3-2001.
6. ' Being aggrieved by the decision of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, the petitioner filed this Constitution petition requesting the Court, inter alia, to quash/set aside the Order dated 30-3-2001 passed by Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and Order dated 14-10-2000 passed by Sindh Labour Court-WI, Sukkur and direct respondent No,3 to reinstate the petitioner with full back benefits.
7. ' Mr. Shafique Qureshi, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted as follows:--
(i) The petitioner was doing the work with his hands, measuring land to be acquired, calculating the cost of land and doing other clerical work and therefore he was a workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. He referred to the following cases in support of his contentions 1998 SCMR 644, 1992 PLC 424, 1977 SCMR 103, 1979 SCMR 304, PLJ 1975 Kar. 25 and PLD 1982 Kar.
8. 913.
(ii) Under the Standing Order 12(3) the service of a workman could not be terminated without a letter in writing assigning the reason therefor, which was not done in the present case and further the letter which is alleged to have been sent to the petitioner does not state that the land acquisition proceedings had come to an end and therefore the termination was illegal and d the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated as prayed. He referred to 2001 SCMR 565 = 2001 PLC (C.S.) 368 in this connection.
(iii) The Labour Court should have recorded evidence of the parties as there were conflicting allegations which were placed on the record.
9. ' In reply Mr. S.S. Jehangir Khan, learned counsel for the respondents submitted as follows:--
(i) The petitioner was employed in a supervisory capacity and represented LPL at several meetings with the Land Acquisition Officer and therefore the Grievance Application before the Labour Court was not maintainable in view of the definition of worker given in section 2(xxviii), I.R.O., 1969 which excludes persons employed in managerial or administrative capacity or supervisory capacity drawing wages in excess of Rs,800 per month.
(ii) When read in conjunction with other lette s issued by LPL, the termination letter dated 30-8-1999 indicates at the land acquisition exercise had come to an end as Liberty. Pow had clearly stated that his services would not be extended further a er the last extension on 1-3-1999 which was up to 31-8-1999.
(iii) Ample opportunity was provided to the petitioner to adduce evidence but he failed to do so.
(iv) Further, the Grievance Application was deci ed on legal grounds on the basis of undisputed documents filed by both parties and therefore it was not necessary to record any vidence. He referred to the following cases in support of his argum ts: PLD 1980 SC 323, 1990 SCMR 1539, 2000 SCMR 879 and 2 1 PLC (C.S.) 249.
10. ' We have considered the arguments of Mr. Shafiq Qureshi, learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the petition and of Mr. S.S. Jehangir Khan, learned counsel for Liberty Power Ltd., for dismissal of the same.
11. ' The assertion of the petitioner that he was appointed by respondent No,3 by letter dated 31-12- 1995 is incorrect. The copy of the said letter filed before the Labour Court as well as in, the petition clearly indicates that he was appointed by a company, by the name of "Infrastructure Capital Group Ltd." as Site Supervisor with effect from 1-1-1996 at a monthly gross salary of Rs,5,000. The letter states that he was appointed on probation of three months whereafter his services were to be regularized on the satisfactory report of his Site Incharge. It appears that the employment with the group came to an end on 31-8-1995 because the petitioner has filed a copy of another letter dated 9-9-1996 issued by Acting Chief Executive Officer of LPL offering him a one year contract effective 1-9-1996 to supervise the land acquisition for LPL, inter alia, on the following terms and conditions:-- "(1) A service charge of Rs,10,000 per month will be paid to you. Tax will be deducted at source.
12. Ultimately you are responsible for tax.
13. (2)
(3) You will take care of your own transportation. The Company will only reimburse the transportation expenses for the assignment outside the office and any other out of pocket expenses incurred in the performance of your services.
14. (4).
(5) .
15. (6)
(7) .
16. (8)
(9) This contract is valid only until 31st August, 1997, until it is renewed by the Company. The Company can terminate the contract without notice. If the contract terminates during the contract period, the company will only pay the service charges of the current month."
17. ' The petitioner accepted the offer and thus became an employee of LPL for .a period of one year on the terms and conditions stated in the letter of offer. The one year contract was extended from time to time for specified number of months stated in the extension letters and was lastly extended on 1-7-1999 for a period of two months clearly stating therein that "this contract is valid until 31st August, 1999". On 30-8-1998 (this appears to be a typographical error of date) LPL addressed a Memorandum to the petitioner in the following terms:- "Your contract of service with LPL will be expiring on 31st August, 1999. We regret to inform you that your contract with Liberty Power Limited will not be renewed.
18. ' We thank you for your services over the past three years. Please accept our best wishes and good luck for the future.
19. ' You are requested to kindly hand over all document(s) in your custody to the General Manager.
20. Your final settlement will be processed at the site."
21. ' It is therefore evident from the copy of the first appointment letter dated 9-9-1996, various extension letters including the last extension dated 1-7-1999 and Memorandum dated 30-8-1999 that he was employed on contract to supervise land acquisition which apparently came to an end on 31-8-1999.
22. ' Mr. Qureshi, learned counsel for the petitioner, strenuously argued that the petitioner was working with his hands, measuring land to be acquired, calculating the cost of land and doing other clerical work and therefore he was a workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.
23. ' Assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner is a workman under the W.P. Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, we must determine whether the petitioner is a permanent workman or a workman whose services could be terminated on the expiry of the contract period without assigning any reason. The petitioner by producing his appointment letter has himself admitted that he was appointed on contract to supervise land acquisition for LPL. It is common knowledge that land acquisition proceedings is not a job of permanent duration and comes to an end when the land has been acquired and payments in respect of the acquired land has been made to the land acquisition authority. It is therefore obvious that any person employed for the purpose of land acquisition cannot claim to be a permanent workman.
24. ' Workmen have been classified in the W.P. Employment in the Standing Order No,1 as (i) Permanent,
(ii) Probationers, (iii) Badlis, (iv) Temporary and (v) Apprentices. The distinction between a permanent workman and a temporary workman whose services can be terminated on completion of the job for which he has been employed has been very elaborately discussed in the case of PIA v. Sindh Labour Court and others, PLD 1980 SC 323. In the said case PIA awarded a contract for construction of their Training School to a contractor and clause (2) of the contract specifically stipulated that the school had to be constructed in fifteen working months from the commencement of the contract period. Although the construction work was entrusted to a contractor. PIA decided to engage its own staff for supervising the construction by the contractor; therefore on various dates in 1973 it appointed several persons to supervise the construction work on its behalf. PIA not being satisfied with the contractor's performance cancelled its agreement with him and informed all the supervisors "since the work on this project has been suspended indefinitely your services are no longer required with effect from 27-7-1974". The employees challenged the termination and contended that because they had been in PIA's employment for more than one year, they had become permanent workmen and filed an application under section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969 in the Junior Labour Court, Karachi for their reinstatement with back benefits. The matter was hotly contested and went up to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. While considering the statutes of the construction supervisors, the learned Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-- "We are constrained to observe with regret that the definition clauses (b) and (c) are difficult to construe, therefore, we are conscious that the task of the High Court was not easy, but in any view of the matter, we are unable to agree with the construction placed on clause (e) by the learned Single Judge. According to the learned Single Judge, the respondents had become permanent workmen solely, because they had been in the appellant's employment for more than nine months.
25. But, as submitted by. Mr. Sarwana, this view ignores the words 'likely to be' which precede the words 'finished within a period not exceeding nine months'. Redundancy is not to be attributed lightly to the Legislature and the words 'likely to be' were inserted because given the nature of human beings 'work' expected to be finished within nine months sought not be finished serving that period, because of human error, miscalculation, negligence or any other cause. And, the insertion of . The words 'likely to be' makes it clear that a workman cannot become a permanent workman if the work for which he was employed was expected to be finished within nine months but was in fact completed after the expiry of nine months. This is obvious and Mr. Mohsen Ali did not even attempt to defend the sweeping observations of the learned Single Judge."
26. ' After exhaustive discussion the Honourable Supreme Court concluded as follows:- "The result of this discussion is that the concept of employment of permanent nature is an essential ingredient of the definition of a permanent workman. But, the respondents had not been employed on a permanent basis, because they had been employed to supervise a contract which was of limited duration. Therefore, the High Court and the Labour Court erred in law in holding that they were permanent workmen. Accordingly this appeal has to be allowed."
27. ' The above principle was confirmed by the Supreme Court it the case of Muhammad Yaqoob v.
28. The Punjab Lahore Court No,1 and others, 1990 SCMR 1539 in the following words:-- "In order to get the benefit of the Standing Orders Ordinance in the matter of termination of service, the petitioner had to show that he was a permanent workman. A permanent workman has been defined in the Standing Orders Ordinance by reference to the nature of the work on which he has been engaged or employed. If the work is not of a permanent nature, then howsoever long may be his employment, he cannot be taken to be a permanent workman. The length of the period of employment by itself has not been made the ground or a test for determining the nature of the work keeping in view the nature of the work on which the petitioner was employed, namely, an addition to the regular strength of Malis for the maintenance of the gardens and the grounds on daily wages or on work-charge basis, it cannot be said that such additional work being done by him was of a permanent nature necessarily. As regards the stigma attaching to the permanence of his services, the petitioner has as witness admitted that the termination order was oral and not in writing."
29. ' Again in the case of WAPDA and others v. Khanimullah and others, 2000 SCMR 879, the Honourable Supreme Court in respect of work-charged employees reiterated as follows:- ' If the work is hot of a permanent nature, then howsoever long may be his employment, he cannot be taken to be permanent workman. The length of the period of employment by itself has not been made the ground or a test for determining the nature of the work."
30. ' That the respondents were employed on work-charged basis against a specific project , i,e, "Mardan Scrap". Therefore, on completion of work on the said project, their appointments -were rightly terminated by the competent authority."
31. ' The law is therefore now well-settled that a work-charged employee irrespective of the period of service does not enjoy the same rights as those of a permanent employee and his services come to an end on completion of the job he is employed for.
32. ' It cannot be disputed that the work of land acquisition is not work of permanent duration. From by the appointment letter by the petitioner it is very clear that the petitioner was appointed on work- charged basis i,e, for the work of acquisition of land which lasted more than nine months as his contract was extended from time to time and ultimately came to an end in August, 1999 whereafter his contract of employment was not extended by LPL and consequently came to an end automatically. The petitioner was informed by LPL letter dated. 30-8-1999 that this his contract which was expiring on 31-8-1999 would not be renewed. The letter of 30-8-1999 substantially complied with the legal requirements. No further written communication of termination was necessary.
33. ' The argument regarding recording of evidence is misconceived and mala fide. We have seen the Order Sheet of the Labour Court File and are satisfied that more than sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner to produce his evidence but on his failure to do so the Court was constrained to pass an order based upon the pleadings of the parties and the undisputed documents filed by both of them. Further, the petitioner did not object to the same at that time. He cannot now raise any objection after the Labour Court decided the matter against him.
34. ' In light of the evidence placed on record and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we are of the confirmed view that the petitioner was employed on work-charged basis i,e, for supervising the land acquisition proceedings which is not a work of permanent nature or duration and therefore LPL was justified in not extending his contract after the land acquisition proceedings were completed.
35. ' In view of the above discussion, we find no merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed with costs.