Petitioner and respondent No,1 are real brothers. Respondent brought a suit for recovery of 100 tolas of silver of its price Rs,4,500 against the petitioner on the ground that he handed over the silver, apparently for safe custody. The suit was returned by learned Senior Civil Judge, Johar Abad, for presentation before Conciliation Court under the Conciliation Courts Ordinance (XLIV of 1961). The latter Court entertained the suit and as is apparent from the impugned revisional order, after recording of evidence and holding of proceedings, decreed the suit. Petitioner filed a revision, which was dismissed by Additional District Judge on 15-3-1989. Hence this Constitutional petition.
2. It is urged that claim is false; that suit before the Conciliation Court was barred by time; that Conciliation Court had no jurisdiction and finally that the decree is the result of undue influence brought by respondent No, I plaintiff. These grounds have been resisted by urging that these were not raised at the appropriate time in the Courts below and further that at one stage the issue was decided on oath and a decision thus arrived at cannot be challenged.
3. The perusal of the revisional order shows that the grounds being urged do not seem to have been urged before that Court. Even in the grounds of revision the objection as to the jurisdiction of Conciliation Court does not seem to have been taken. As for the ground of limitation, it has been mentioned in passing that due to political rivalry a time-barred claim has been decided against the petitioner. No detail as to how the claim is barred by time has been stated. As the learned revisional Court has not dealt with this question, the presumption is that it was never urged during the course of hearing. There is no affidavit of the counsel to the effect that this question was raised during hearing. Even in this Court, apart from a bald assertion, it has not been shown as to how the claim is barred by time. It is equally not denied that at one time the parties agreed to have the matter resolved on oath by one Muhammad Hayat on Holy Qur'an. Such an oath was administered and in terms of the agreement, the amount of silver was to be delivered to respondent-plaintiff.
Learned counsel again miserably failed to show that having agreed to decision of dispute by administration of oath, how could the petitioner turn around and agitate the same controversy? In fact this conduct alone would suffice to deny the writ to the petitioner, even if he was to succeed on all other grounds.
4. I find this petition to be without merit and hereby dismiss it with no order as to costs.