' IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, J.---These petitions for leave to appeal have been filed against judgment dated 5-3-2002 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore whereby F.A.O. No,17 of 1999 was partly allowed.
2. Succinctly stating facts of the case are that M/s. Ascon Engineers (Pvt.) Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the "Company") being approved contractor was granted contracts of "Pilot Project of UpGradation/Reclamation of Karachi Pumpwali Pond" including earth work at Gujranwala vide letter dated 26-10-1992. Time for completion of work was fixed as one year, to be reckoned from the issuance of the acceptance letter. It was averred that the respondent i.e, Government of Punjab, Housing and Physical Planning Department (hereinafter referred to as the "Department") failed to perform various parts of the contract and extended the period of contract. Subsequently difference arose between the parties as well as Director-General Project Management Unit, Lahore and Project, Director Gujranwala, which resulted into arbitration proceedings as per clause 65 of the Contract Agreement. Both the parties nominated two Superintending Engineers of the Department of the respondent as their Arbitrators. The Arbitrators after conducting proceedings made their award on 15-6-1997 and granted an amount of Rs,45,83,555 payable by the Department to the Company. The said award was submitted in the Court of Civil Judge, Lahore. The Civil Judge directed the parties to submit objections to the award. The department submitted objections against the award. However, learned Civil Judge rejected the objections and made the award as rule of Court vide judgment dated 10-12-1997. The department being aggrieved from decree of the Civil Judge preferred F.A.O. No,43 of 1998 in Lahore High Court, Lahore which was accepted by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by means of Order dated 21-4-1998 and remanded the case to the trial Court for framing of issues with regard to misconduct of the Arbitrators and non- payment of stamp duty on award. The trial Court on remand of the case framed following issues:--
(1) Whether the objection is time-barred? OPR
(2) Whether the Arbitrator is guilty of misconduct while passing the award in hand, if so, its effect?
(3) Relief.
' After framing of issues learned Civil Judge directed the parties to produce evidence. The Department produced own witness in, support of its claim whereas company produced no evidence. However, learned trial Court decided both the issues against the Department and once again made the Award as rule of the Court vide judgment dated 20-10-1998 and also awarded interest @ 10% per annum from the date of award.
3. The Department being aggrieved from the judgment/decree of trial Court preferred F.A.O. No,17 of 1999 which has been partly allowed by means of impugned order dated 5-3-2002. The concluding para. Is reproduced hereinbelow:-- "8. As a result of above discussion, this F.A.O. Is partly allowed inasmuch as the award dated 15-6- 1997 of the Arbitrators is modified inasmuch as Claim No,9 is rejected. The amount of the award thus stands reduced to Rs,31,39,035. The interest at the rate awarded by the learned trial Court shall be payable on the said amount w.e.f, the date of decree of the learned trial Court i.e, 22-10-1998 . "
4. As such instant petitions for leave to appeal have been instituted by both the parties.
5. Learned counsel appearing in C.P.L.A. No,1200-L of 2002 contended that the Civil Judge entertained time-barred objections filed by the Department contrary to law and the learned High Court in the impugned judgment illegally considered this objection.
6. It is important to note that learned trial Court framed a specific issue in this behalf "whether the objection petition is time-barred?" Both the parties led evidence in support of their respective pleas and the Civil Judge in its judgment dated 22-10-1998 declined to accept these objections, therefore, A to the extent of order of Civil Judge no objection in this behalf can be raised. Undoubtedly learned High Court also endorsed such findings of the Civil Judge but simultaneously observed that this does not debar the trial Court from taking into consideration the objections, therefore, the High Court has examined the award as to whether, it suffers from any defect within the purview of section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), or not There is no cavil with the proposition that objection to the award must be filed within 30 days from the date of notice under Article 158 of the Limitation Act for instance if there is no award but the Court seized with the matter i.e, Appellate Court exercising jurisdiction under section 39 of the Act or revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. Has noticed that there is error apparent on the face of record, or award suffered from infirmity or legal defect and an error can be seen without substituting the opinion then to remove such defect or infirmity Court can exercise jurisdiction to correct the error. It may also be noted that although the Appellate Court has very limited jurisdiction to interfere in the award but such limited jurisdiction can be exercised primarily with a view to save the award from remitting to the Arbitrator once again so the parties may not suffer rigors of proceedings either before the arbitrators or the Court. Therefore, we are of the opinion that even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that there was no objection but the Court had the authority to correct the error by modifying the award. Reference in this behalf may be made to the judgment of Messrs Awan Industries Limited v. Executive Engineers, Lined Channel Division and another (1992 SCMR 65).
Relevant para. Therefrom is reproduced hereinbelow:-- "17. But, in his submissions, he ignored the provisions of section 17 of the Arbitration Act, which imposes a duty on Courts to see that there is no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award. This can be done by the Court suo motu, apart from the application which a party may make for either remission of the award or its reversal. Where, therefore, an award is found to be nullity because of the invalidity of the arbitration agreement or, for any other reason, or the award is prima facie illegal and not fit to be maintained, the Court has power under section 17 of the Act to set it aside without waiting for an objection to award being filed or without considering any application for setting it aside, if there be any, and irrespective of the question whether the objection, if filed, was not within time. In such cases section 30, clause (c) of the Act is also attracted. Another example can be where a party appoints a sole arbitrator without prior notice to the other party, the award would be prima facie illegal and may be set aside. See Abdul Khaleq v. Province of East Pakistan and another PLD 1994 Dacca 166 and M/s. S.M. Fazail & Company v. M/s. Overseas Cotton PLD 1959 Karachi 739."
' Above dictum of this Court was reiterated in the case of Muhammad Tayyab v. Akber Hussain (1995 SCMR 73) and M/s. Abdullah Traders through Partner Nisar Ahmad v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan Limited (1999 CLC 2047). Thus we feel no hesitation in holding that the Appellate Court while exercising jurisdiction under section 39 (1)(iii) of the Act had lawful authority to modify or correct the award notwithstanding the fact that objections filed by the respondent were barred by time.
7. Learned counsel then contended that Appellate Court exceeded its jurisdiction in holding that the work was not suspended, therefore, company was not entitled for the grant of Rs,14,44,520 being Claim No,9 noted in the award. In furtherance of his argument he stated that the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to sit over the award as Court of Appeal for the purpose of examining the case on merits.
8. It may be noted that the trial Court as well as Appellate Court enjoy limited jurisdiction to modify or correct an award keeping in view the provisions of section 17 read with section 30 of the Act. This Court in the case of M/s. Joint Venture KG/RIST through D.P. G.M. Bongard Strasse v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Food, Agricultural and another (PLD 1996 SC 108) laid down principles to test validity of award. Relevant para. Therefrom thus reads:- "We may mention here that the Court while examining the validity of an award does not act as a Court of Appeal. Therefore, a Court hearing the objection to the award cannot undertake reappraisal of evidence recorded by the arbitrator in order to discover the error or infirmity in the award. The error or infirmity in the award which rendered the award invalid must appear on the face of the award and should be discoverable by reading the award itself."
' Above principles for testing the validity of the award are now being followed consistently in judicial hierarchy of this country. Reference in this behalf may be made Messrs World Circle Ltd. v. State Cement Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. (1997 CLC 212) and Ghee Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited v. Braken Hill Proprietary Company Limited (PLD 1999 Karachi 112).
9. In view of above dictum laid down by this Court contention of the learned counsel was examined to ascertain whether to the extent of Claim No,9 learned High Court has rightly modified the award in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under section 39(1)(iii) of the Act. A perusal of the findings recorded in this behalf in the impugned judgment indicates that Claim No,9 was awarded to the company without reference to the terms of the contract at all. It is also important to note that learned counsel appearing for the. Company before the High Court categorically made statement at bar that work was never suspended, therefore, in view of such statement the High Court had no option but to correct the error which was apparent on the face of the record and reversed this portion from the decree in accordance with the provisions of section 39(1)(iii) of the Act, therefore, the impugned order being unexceptionable in this context admits no interference by this Court.
10. No other point was argued by the learned counsel for the company.
11. Now turning towards C.P.L.A. No,1524-L of 2002 filed by. Province of Punjab it is to be noted that learned counsel argued that the High Court was not competent to award interest to the company.
Reliance was placed on the case of Ghulam Abbas v. Trustees of the Port of Karachi (PLD 1987 SC 393).
12. It may be noticed that learned trial Court in its judgment dated 22-10-1998 awarded interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of announcement of award whereas section 29 of the Act authorizes the Court to award interest in the money suit from the date of decree at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum as adjudged by the award and confirmed by the decree. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel that the trial or appellate Courts have no jurisdiction to grant interest in the money suit is devoid of force. As far as the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel in the case of Ghulam Abbas (ibid) is concerned the same is not applicable to the facts of the instant case because it was observed therein that under section 29 of the Act interest for the period prior to the date of the suit may be awarded if there is an agreement or it is payable by the usage of trade having the force of law or entitle the plaintiff to recover interest etc. whereas in the instant, case there is no such clause in the agreement, therefore, the High Court ratified these errors by awarding the interest from the date of decree onward with effect from 22nd October, 1998. The findings so recorded by the High Court in this context are in consonance with the provisions of section 29 of the Act. Thus, no interference is called for in this behalf as well.
13. Learned counsel appearing for the department did not argue any other point.
As in the instant case the points raised from both the sides have already been dealt with by this Court and other Courts as it has been pointed out hereinabove, therefore, in our opinion no substantial question of public importance has been raised to make out a case in terms of Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, therefore, leave to appeal is declined.
Resultantly both the petitions are dismissed.