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PLD 1978 Lahore 291

Mr. YUSUF ALI KHAN, BAR-AT-LAW vs MUHAMMAD DAVID IQBAL CEEEMA, ADDL.

CitationPLD 1978 Lahore 291
CourtLahore High Court
Case No.Intra-Court Appeal No. 2/C of 1975
Date1975-03-30
Judge(s)K. Muhammad A. Samadani, Karam Elahi Chauhan
ResultAppeal dismissed

ORDER

KARAM ELAHEE CHAUHAN, J.-This is an Intro-Court appeal against or order of a learned Single Judge dated 17th March, 1975, which can be reproduced with advantage as follows : "Mr. Yusuf A.I Khan relies upon PLD 1970 Pesh.

169. But it is open to the petitioner to file a writ petition. In this view of the matter I will not like to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 203. The petitioner, if he so likes, can convert this petition into a writ petition on p.I meat of the deficient court-fee. He is granted period of two weeks to convert this petition into a writ petition failing which the petition shall stand dismissed."

Actually the facts are that feeling aggrieved by certain order(s) of the learned Additional District Judge, Lyallpur (Mr. Mohammed Javed Iqbal Cheema, respondent No. 1)-passed in "revision" the petitioner filed a petition under Article 20 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973.

The, matter related to framing or non-framing or deletion or retention of certain issue or issues in a suit filed by the appellant which was pending before a Civil Judge in Lyallpur. The learned Single Judge, as is evident from his order, in view of the fact that a regular writ petition on the facts and in the circumstances of the case could be instituted, did not like to exercise his jurisdiction under Article 203. As a matter of fact, the appellant did avail of the concession given to him of converting the earlier petition into a formal writ petition and paid the necessary court-fee whereafter the earlier petition stands registered in this Court as Writ Petition No. 554 of 1975 which is still at motion stage but in which record of lower Courts has been called for by the learned Single Judge and the whole matter is thus sub judice in this Court in that form. However, feeling aggrieved from the refusal of the learned Single Judge to exercise jurisdiction under Article 203 the petitioner bee come up in this Intro-Court appeal. We have asked the appellant, who himself argued the case, as to how this appeal was maintainable ? He referred to subsection (1) of section 3 of the Law Reforms (Amendments) Act VIII of 1975 which reads as follows : "3. Appeal to High Court fn certain cases.-(1) An appeal shall lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of High Court from a decree passed or final order made by a Single Judge of that Court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction."

A perusal of the aforesaid provision of law will show that an Intra-Court appeal thereunder is available only from a decree passed or final order made by a Single Judge of High Court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. According to our view jurisdiction conferred in the Con6titutron under Article 203 is not original civil jurisdiction. It has, as the marginal beading of Article 203 will show, authorised the High Court to "superintend subordinate Courts'". In outer words this is a supervisory and controlling jurisdiction and not an original civil jurisdiction. Except the bare contention of the appellant no precedent was cited before us to show that this jurisdiction is original civil jurisdiction or that orders passed thereunder are appealable in the form of any Intro- Court appeal. For the aforesaid reason we hold that the present appeal is not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed in limine.

2. At this stage the appellant prayed that be may be granted a certificate under Article 185 (2) (f), because, according to him, the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. From what has been written above it will be clear that primarily the interpretation involved is of subsection (1) of section 3 of the Law Reforms (Amendments) Act, 1972 and not of Article 203 of the Constitution. However, be that as it may, the question with reference to Article 203 cannot be called to be a substantial one of the facts and in the peculiar circumstances of the present cage especially when it can be clearly answered with reference to the bare reading of that Article and also when no case-law to the contrary has been produced before us. The certificate is refused.

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