1. DR. GHOUS MUHAMMAD, J.--- The matter was heard at length on the application for contempt of Court under Article 204 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, bearing Civil Miscellaneous Application No,5350 of 1998. The petitioners through this petition had called into question the vires of the Pakistan Armed Forces (Acting in Aid of the Civil Power) Ordinance, 1998 while an interlocutory application was also moved for suspension of the impugned provisions of the law pending final disposal of the main petition. Admittedly, the notices were served on the respondents, while on 14-12-1998 the respondents sought time. Despite great opposition by the petitioners the matter was deferred to 16-12-1998 and also no interim order was passed on that date. In the present case it was only through orders, dated 11-1-1999 that further execution of death sentences passed by the Military Courts were stayed. The petitioners, however, through the instant application have alleged that even if no ad interim orders were passed, the respondents were expected to maintain a status quo once the petition was filed and pre-admission notices thereon were duly served. In this respect Mr. K.M. Nadeem, the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon Noor Muhammad v. Civil Aviation Authority 1987 CLC 393 wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court i,e, Dr. Tanzil-ur-Rehman, J. As he then was, was pleased to observe as follows:-- #TE## "10. On the basis of the law, referred to above, I am of the view that the principle of the law laid down by the English, American as well as Indian Superior Courts, as referred to above, is applicable to the present case. When the proceedings were instituted by the plaintiff and a notice of the injunction application was issued to the defendants calling upon them to show cause why stay order should not be issued, its practical effect was to lay off for the time being, owing to the Court notice, as it is expected that the Government Institution and their functionaries will assist the Court in administration of justice and they will not try to change the factual position unilaterally to their advance in normal circumstances, particularly when a Court notice is received by the said Authority or functionary and the matter is fixed for hearing in the Court just the other day."
2. ' The above order was challenged in High Court Appeal, however, therein a Division Bench of this Court Civil Aviation Authority v. Noor Muhammad PLD 1988 Kar. 401 (judgment in the High Court Appeal was authored by Ajmal Mian, J., (as he then was) did not disturb the findings of the learned Single Judge as expressed above. Also there is another judgment of this Court authored by our learned brother Rasheed Ahmed Razvi, J., in Royal Foreign Currency v. Civil Aviation Authority 1998 CLC 374 where the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Noor Muhammad's case (cited supra) has been distinguished but on another plane touching upon the concept of licence and lease, however, the principle that Government functionaries once on notice should maintain quo during the pendency of interlocutory applications was not a moot point therein.
3. There appears to be prima facie, force in the contention of Mr.i K.M. Nadeem that while notices of a lis are issued to the other side, the latter is expected to maintain a status quo.
4. ' A Division Bench of this Court in Pakistan Saudi Fertilizer v. Federation of Pakistan Constitutional Petition No, 283 of 1993 (unreported) this Court dealing with an income-tax matter held that while the appeals of the assessee are pending no extreme coercive measures should be taken (reference is invited to the judgment authored by me i,e, Dr. Ghous Muhammad, J.). #TS## However, it is doubtful as to whether the respondents on mere service of notice of a pending lis could be punished for contempt of Court if they choose not to maintain a status quo. The reason for this conclusion is very simple. The concept of contempt of Court necessitates, inter alia, violation of Court orders. The judgment cited by Mr. K.M. Nadeem i,e, Noor Muhammad v. Civil Aviation Authority was also not a case where any contempt action was taken, however, only a status quo ante was granted on the principle of law enunciated therein that during the pendency of a case the defendants, if on notice, should maintain status quo. We accordingly feel that the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Noor Muhammad could better be explained on the plane of reversal of events and the same does not justify contempt proceedings. As regards reversal of status quo, we feel that our hands are tied in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Honourable Supreme Court in Sh. Liaquat Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1999 SC 504 wherein the Honourable Supreme Court while, inter alia, striking down the provisions of Pakistan Armed Forces (Acting in Aid of the Civil Powers) Ordinance, 1998 has been pleased to observe that the actions which have already been taken by the respondents would be considered as past and closed transactions. As Courts of judicature operating under a written Constitution we are bound by the judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court under Article 189 of the 1973 Constitution (see Ashiq Hussain v. The State PLD 1994 SC 879). On the strength of the judgment in Noor Muhammad's case we feel that in the present case reversal of events, especially in cases where the death sentences have already been executed would not be possible, however, some case for "Diyat" or compensation, could perhaps be pitched, which we feel would be outside the scope of present contempt application. Also any relief as suggested could only now be granted by the Honourable Supreme Court in view of its verdict in Sh. Liaquat Hussain as observed above.
5. Apart from the above another reason for the non-maintainability of the present application is the fact that the contemners have not been named specifically. The contemners have only been arrainged as "Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad" and "Government of Sindh through Chief Secretary, Karachi". It is a fundamental requirement of contempt proceedings that the contemners ought to be specifically named. If there is any authority needed for proposition it is the case of Ghulam Sarwar v. Ghulam Rabbani PLD 1992 Pesh.
6. 130.
7. ' The upshot of the above discussion is that the listed application is not maintainable which is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.