' Through the Writ Petition No,12351 of 2001, the appellants impugned the Notification No,F.2/1/2001- CSS-III, issued by the Federal Public Service Commission, reducing the age of the candidates desiring to participate in the CSS competitive examination for the year 2001 from the earlier age limit prescribed for the examination held in the year, 2000 and before. The case of the appellants is that the appellants Nos.1 to 3 are functioning as employees of Provincial and Federal Government, whereas other appellants are not employed anywhere. According to the previous Rules, the appellants Nos.l to 3 were entitled to appear in the CSS Examination up to 35 years of age, while in the case of other candidates, the maximum age limit was 30 years, but by virtue of the impugned notification, the age has been reduced for the Government employees to 30 and for the others to
28. Thus for the next examination, which is to be held in 2001, the present appellants have been rendered ineligible and they have lost their right to appear in the coming examination because of the reduction in the maximum age limit. The appellants asserted that as they had earlier appeared in the CSS Examination and at the relevant time, as per rule 8(vi) had three chances to clear the above examination, thus by reducing the age, the appellants have been denied such chances and this is in breach of their vested right.
2. This writ petition has been dismissed by the learned single Judge in chamber vide impugned judgment, dated 4-7-2001, holding that the rules on the basis of which, the appellants primarily claim their right of three chances are the rules applicable only for the year 2000. These rules do not provide that future competitive examination would also be held under the aforesaid rules. Merely by appearing in the examination 2.000 or before, no vested right in favour of the appellants to appear in the future examination according to the previous rules had been created. The learned Judge also held that the appellants have failed to demonstrate that they have vested right or even have a right of appearing in the competitive examination uptill a particular age, therefore, it was found that the appellants are not the aggrieved persons and could not maintain the writ petition, which was dismissed.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants has reiterated the same arguments and has submitted that according to the rules for the year 2000 and before under which the appellants appeared for the first time, the upper age limit for the participants was 30 and 35 years, respectively thus according to rule 8(vi), a vested right had been created in their favour to clear such examination in three attempts. By relying upon Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore and another PLD 1969 SC 223, it is argued that for the purpose of maintaining a writ petition, it is not necessary that a right must be in strict juristic sense, but it is sufficient, if the petitioner discloses a. Personal interest in the performance of the legal duty, which has not been performed in the manner required by the law.
Further by drawing support from 1999 SCM R 1072, it is submitted that the beneficiary of an executive order acquires a vested right and such right cannot be superseded by a subsequent executive order, though so can be done through a legislative measured, which is conspicuously missing in the present case.
4. The learned Dy.A.-G. Appearing on behalf of the Commission at the very outset has objected to the maintainability of this appeal, based upon the amendment made in section 7 of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance,' 1977 and submitted that the appellants could maintain a representation against the decision of the FPSC within 15 days of the decision impugned and such decision was further subject to a review. Therefore, in view of section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, where a right of review is available, I.C.A. Is incompetent.
5. We have considered this objection and find no merit, for the reasons that it is the decision in individual cases, where the right of representation and review has been provided, but where the rules have been framed in terms of sections 7-A and 10 of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977 (XLV of 1977), such rules cannot be deemed to be a "decision" within the purview of the aforementioned section conferring upon an aggrieved person a right of representation or review, therefore, we hold that the present appeal is maintainable and is not hit by the Law Reforms Order.
1972.
6. Coming back to the merits of the case, we have head the learned counsel for the parties and find no force in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants, because admittedly, for each year, specific rules are framed for the conduct of examinations to be held for that year under Ordinance XLV of 1977. Eligibility/qualifications of the candidates for such examination are defined and determined. The rules are confined to the year for which those are framed, and have no relevance for the subsequent year. Thus neither the provisions of rule 8(vi) of the previous rules have any application for the examinations to be conducted for the year 2001 nor in any manner creates a vested right in favour of the candidates to avail three chances of clearing the CSS in the future examinations. Rule 8(vi) mentioned above, rather places a limitation upon a candidate, who within the prescribed qualification of age for each year can only attempt thrice. For example, if a candidate had appeared for the first time in the year 1998, but failed to clear the examination and at the relevant time, he was of the age-of 22 years, subject to the maximum age limit prescribed in the rules for the next year, can avail the remaining two chances. But by virtue of having once participated in the examination, no right is created in favour of a' candidate that he would essentially be given further chances of clearing the examination, and that the maximum age limit cannot be reduced under the rules.
7. As mentioned above, for each year, separate and independent rules are framed prescribing the age limit and such rules are replaced by the subsequent year rules, therefore, the rules for the year 2000 or previous, under which the appellants appeared for the first time would not be germane for the purpose of enabling them to participate in the future examination to complete three chances.
The learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to show, if the rules framed for the year 2001 are ultra vires of any law.
8. As regards the argument that the executive order. Which creates a .Vested right in favour of a person, cannot be taken away by another executive order, suffice it to say that the impugned rules have been framed under sections 7 and 10 of the FPSC Ordinance, and these are in the exercise of delegated Authority of the Legislature, resultantly those cannot be termed as the executive order of the respondents.
In the light of above, we do not find any substance in this Intra Court Appeal, calling for interference in the impugned order of the learned Single Judge in Chambers, therefore, the same is hereby dismissed.