1. ' The applicant is an employee of the Civil Aviation Department, Government of Pakistan, and is posted as a First Aid Crew at the Civil Airport Fire Station, Karachi. The applicant alongwith other members of the Department formed a Union with Headquarter at Karachi. The applicant was elected as Finance Secretary which office he is still holding. There was litigation between the Civil Aviation Department and the Union and it is the case of the applicant that he was pursuing the cause of the Union before N I. R. C. These activities of the applicant were not liked by the Management and consequently on 10-6-1977, the applicant was transferred to Hyderabad in an attempt to victimize him and to cripple the Union activities. The applicant sent a grievance petition to Airport Manager, Karachi, but with no amiss. On 20-7-1977, the applicant approached this Court with an application under faction 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. An application under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. Was also moved on behalf of the applicant with a prayer that the operation of the transfer order be stayed till the decision of the main applications. On 25- 7-1977, I had passed an ad interim order staying the operation of the transfer order with Notice to other side. On 9-8-1977, the respondents filed their Reply statement. The jurisdiction of this Court was also challenged and it was contended that Department of Civil Aviation being in Ministry of Defence is excluded from the operation of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, by virtue of section 1(3) of the said Ordinance. The application for stay was also contested and this order of mine shall dispose of the said application.
2. ' I have heard Mr. Muzaffar Hassan, the learned counsel for the respondents. Mr. Nizam All Khan, the learned counsel for the applicant has preferred to remain absent.
3. ' It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the Department of Civil Aviation is under the Ministry of Defence, and as such, this Court has got no jurisdiction to decide the present matter.
4. Section 1(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which is relied upon by Mr. Muzaffar Hassan, the learned counsel for the respondents, reads as follows :- "Section 1(3).-It shall not apply to any person employed in the police or any of the Defence Services of Pakistan and any services or installations connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan including an Ordnance Factory maintained by the (Federal Government) or to any person employed in the administration of the State other than those employed as workmen by the Railways, Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Departments or to any person employed as a member of the Security Staff the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation "
5. ' This subsection is divided in two parts. The first part deals with the persons employed in the Police or any of the Defence Services of Pakistan and any services or installations, connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan, including Ordnance Factory, while the later part excludes the persons employed in the Administration of the State. There is nothing before me to show that Civil Aviation is controlled by the Ministry of Defence, but even if it is accepted for the sake of arguments, then also the applicant is not employed in any of Defence Services of Pakistan or any services or installations connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan. The employment under Ministry of Defence cannot be equated with the employment of any of the Defence Services of Pakistan which includes Army, Navy and Air Force. This point was in tact examined by my learned predecessor in Registrar of Trade Unions v. Pakistan Civil Aviation Employees' Union. The learned Presiding Officer finally held that the provision of subsection (3) of section 1 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, do not apply in such a case.
6. ' Again the applicant is not a person employed in the administration of the State. He is working as First Aid Crew and at no stage of imagination be can be said to be an employee in the administration of the State. The case of the General Secretary, Provinical Buildings Employees'
7. Union, Hyderabad v. Executive Engineer, Provincial Buildings Division and another, can be usefully referred here. The Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal after analysing the history of Labour Laws held as follows :- "Keeping in view the intention of the Legislature to confer the benefit of Labour Laws on as many persons as would be covered by the definition of "workmen", the phrase "employed in the administration of the State" must be strictly construed. In this connection it is noteworthy that the Legislature did not say "any person employed in Government Service." The intention of those who framed subsection (3) of section 1 of the Ordinance was not to deprive the benefit of the Ordinance to all persons who are serving the Government. Had it been so they would have said so. The phrase "employed In the administration of the State" therefore, must be given a moaning other than."persons employed in Government service."
8. ' This view was followed in Sind Road Transport Corporation and 2 others v. Staff Union and 2 others, wherein a Division Bench has interpreted the word "administration", and finally affirmed the view taken earlier by the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal.
9. ' The cases reported in 1976 PLC 13, 1916 PLC 200, 1976 PLC 377, 1976 PLC 476, 1976 PLC 480 and 1976 PLC 519, are again relevant in this regard. The ratio decidendi of the above decision is that all Government servants are not excelided from the purview of the Industrial Relations Ordinance under section 1(3) but only those persons, employed in the administration of the State.
10. ' In view of the above law as laid down by the Labour Courts, Labour Appellate Tribunal and the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, I am cleat in my mind that the applicant is not a person employed in the administration of the State.
11. ' Mr. Muzaffar Hasan, the learned counsel for the respondents has also contended that the applicant is not a workman within. The meaning of section 2(28) of the Industrial Relations1 2 3 Ordinance, 1969, and he is a civil servant within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and as such the present application before the Labour Court is not competent. The case is at the primary stage and there is nothing on record from either side to know the terms and conditions of the employment of the applicant. This point, therefore, cannot be examined at this stage. Even otherwise in view of my above finding, the Labour Court has got jurisdiction to try this case as the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, are not excluded in respect of the present applicant.
12. ' The power of the Labour Courts to pass order in the nature of interim injunction under Order XXIX, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. Is no more in controversy. The case reported in PLD 1975 SC 32 provides the following guide Ilnes :- "It was observed in the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving, that a right of appeal where it exists, is a matter of substance and not mere procedure. It is not disputed that the Social Court, on an appeal brought before it under the above section can set aside the order appealed against in its entirety or may grant even partial relief depending upon the facts of a particular case. The question therefore, would really be, whether there is any limitation on the power of jurisdiction of the Social Security Court to grant partial redress. This partial redress may he as respects the quantum of liability or may be in point of time, when the liability under order made by the Institution may have to be discharged. In other words, whether when the Social Security Court can reverse the order appealed against, in its entirety and thus grant complete redress to the appellant before it, which ordinarily would happen at the final stage in the appeal, the Court will have no power to suspend the operation of the order during the pendency of the appeal, even if the circumstances of the case would eminently justify it ?
13. ' To accept any such proposition, would indeed be to whittle down the substance of the Court's appellate jurisdiction, which would be scarcely just or reasonable. Strictly speaking, the matter does not fall to be governed by Order XXXIX, rule 1, C. P. C. In our opinion, the power to grant interim relief by suspending wholly or partially, the operation of the order appealed against is reasonably incidental or ancillary to the main appellate jurisdiction. It would be wrong to regard the exercise of this incidental or ancillary power u enlargement of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. Mr. Sarwana's argument, that in the absence of any provision In the Ordinance, corresponding to Order XXI, rule 20 or Order XXXIX, rule 1 and 2, C. P. C. The Social Security Court will have no power to suspend the recovery of the amount of contribution either wholly or partly, also overlooks the true nature of the 1965 Ordinance which is essentially a substantive law and is not designed to lay down the procedure in detail to be followed by the institution or the Social Security Court. If the argument of the appellants' learned counsel was to be stretched to Its logical conclusion, then it would lead to a number of absurdities. For instance, there is no provision corresponding to Order XVII, rule I, C.
14. P. C. Or section 344, Cr. P. C. To enable the Social Security Court to adjourn the case to a future date.
15. It would indeed, be absurd to suggret that in the absence of any provision, the Social Security Court will have no power to adjourn a case. This Is sufficient to demonstrate the futility of the arguments."
16. ' This point was again examined by Mr. Justice Mushtak All Kazi, in a case PLD 1975 Kar. 858, in which it was held that it was within the province of the Labour Court to pass an interlocutory order to maintain status quo. While deciding the above case his Lordship took into consideration the authority of the Supreme Court and finally observed as follows :- "The same principle was enunciated earlier in the case of Zafar lqbal v. The Province of Sind PLD 1973 Kar. 383 that 'where a Court has power to pass an order finally it will generally have the power to do so by way of interim measure unless such a power is either expressely or by necessary implication excluded." I am in respectful agreement with the proposition laid down in Brooke Bond's case PLD 1973 Kar. 189 by the Division Bench of this Court that Labour Court has such powers of a civil Court as are required for the purpose of adjudication and determination of any industrial dispute. The adjudication as of necessity will involve the passing of an effective order because the Labour Court has also the power and a duty to enforce its own orders as remarked by my learned brother, Abdul Hayee Kureshi, J., while dealing with this case at an earlier stage. If a Labour Court cannot keep a cause of action itself alive, or permits a party to act in such manner that the purpose of proceeding is defeated, certainly there would be nothing left to adjudicate upon. Under such circumstances an interim order to ensure due implementation of any final order, that may be passed, would appear to be necessary and incidental and it cannot be said that the Labour Court can have no power to pass such an order and in doing so it would be acting beyond its jurisdiction."
17. ' The case reported in PLD 1976 Lah. 1392 is also relevant in this regard. A Division Bench of the Lahore High Court held in the above case that making of interim order is part of working of judicial system and no separate or specific provision is necessary to empower a Court to issue an interim order.
18. ' The applicant has challenged his transfer order on the ground that it was issued in order to curb the Union activities. The applicant claim to be an officer-bearer of registered Trade Union and is pursuing a case before the N. I. R. C. On behalf of the Union. Undoubtedly section 8-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is not attracted in the instant case but the remedies provided by section 25 (a) and section 53 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Are concurrent and can be availed of at the same time. Reference may be had to the cases reported in 1975 L L C 69, 1974 L L C 4, 1976 PLC 353 and 1975 PLC 781. The applicant has thus a prima jack case. The object of the present application is likely to be frustrated if the operation of the transfer order is not stayed till the decision. The applicant is likely to suffer irreparable loss, whereas no prejudice will be caused to the respondents if the order is stayed for few days.
19. ' Taking all the above circumstances into consideration, I confirm the ad interim order passed on 25-7-1977. 1976 PLC 652 1972 PLC 285 1975 PLC 361