MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J. -- Through the invocation of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court, u/s. 115, CPC the petitioner/plaintiff has called in question judgment and decree dated 9.7.2001, whereby the learned District Judge, Jhang, dismissed the appeal, filed by the petitioner and confirmed the judgment and decree dated 15.12.2000, passed by the learned Civil Judge, through which he rejected the plaint in the suit for preemption, filed by the petitioner.
2. Facts in brief leading to the filing of this revision petition, are that the petitioner filed a suit for possession of land (elaborately described in the plaint) in exercise of his right of preemption. On 11.10.2000, the learned Trial Court, in exercise of its powers u/s. 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, ordered the petitioner to deposit 1/3rd of the sale price and to make good the deficiency in court-fee within 30 days. On 13.11.2000, the petitioner placed on record a receipt showing the afore-noted deposit made on 11.11.2000, to which an exception was taken by the defendant, who asserted that the deposit has not been made in accordance with law.
Consequent to the above, the respondent filed an application for dismissal of the suit, whereupon, the learned Civil Judge rejected the plaint in exercise of his powers under Order VII, Rule 11, CPC vide judgment and decree dated 15.12.2000. Obviously, the petitioner felt aggrieved and thus, challenged the said judgment and decree before the higher forum, but without any success, as the learned District Judge, Jhang, dismissed the appeal and maintained the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge vide judgment and decree dated 9.7.2001, hence, the present revision petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has although, admitted that the deposit of 1/3rd of the sale price could not be made by the petitioner within the stipulated period, yet has asserted that there is only one day's delay in making the deposit of the said amount. He, while placing reliance on Malik Hadayat Ullah and 2 others Vs. Murad All Khan (PLD 1972 S.C. 69), submits that the Court is competent to extend time for the deposit of the said amount.
4. Admittedly, the requisite deposit was made on 11.11.2000, that is one day after the time fixed for the deposit of the such amount. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also conceded that the said amount was not deposited within the stipulated period. According to first proviso to Section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, the period for the deposit of 1/3rd amount of the sale price shall not exceed beyond 30 days of the filing of the suit. In the present case, the suit was filed on 11.10.2000 and the learned Trial Court ordered the petitioner to deposit 1/3rd of the sale price uptill 10.11.2000. Admittedly, the direction of the Court was not complied with, within the stipulated period.
There cannot be any cavil to the proposition that under the first proviso to Section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 time for the deposit of 1/3rd of pre-emption money has statutorily been fixed, therefore, I am of the considered view that the same cannot be extended or enlarged even by the Court. Section 24 is the mandatory provision of law. I am fortified in my views by subsection (2) of Section 24, wherein the consequences of noncompliance have also been provided to the effect that if the plaintiff failed to make deposit under sub-section (1) within the period fixed by the Court, the suit, shall be dismissed. It is the basic principle of the interpretation of the statutes that when certain provision of law is couched with the consequence of the non-compliance, such a provision is always considered to be mandatory provision of law. The petitioner has violated the mandatory provision of law and has delayed the payment of 1/3rd of pre-emption money within the period, which is fixed by the statute itself therefore, he had to face the consequences in shape of rejection of the plaint.
5. Another factor, which cannot be ignored at this juncture is that the petitioner was aware, even before the filing of the suit for pre-emption, that under the law he will have to deposit 1/3rd of the pre-emption money within 30 days from the date of the filing of the suit, meaning thereby that he should have been ready with the money and mentally prepared to deposit the said amount within the fixed period. Not only this, but when the Court directed him, he calmly slept over the matter for full 29 days and on the last day, according to him, he made his efforts to deposit the amount. If at all the case as made out by the petitioner, is to be believed even then it can safely be presumed that the conduct of the petitioner, if not contumacious, surely it was indolent. The petitioner was not vigilant, and had to suffer the consequences.
6. So far as the reliance of the learned counsel on Malik Hidayat Ullah's case (supra) is concerned, suffice it to say that the said judgment was rendered in different set of= circumstances. In the said case a pre-emptor, prior to the last date for the deposit of 1/5th of the pre-emption money, filed an application for furnishing a security instead of cash deposit, which application was not decided by the learned Trial Court before the expiry date and it while rejecting the application suo motu extended the time for another one month. It was held that the Court was competent to extend time because the Court by its on conduct made it impossible for the pre-emptor to comply with the original order. All the factors which persuaded the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court for extension of time are not present in the case in hand, therefore, the principle laid down in Hidayat Ullah's case (supra) is not attracted at all and reliance of the learned counsel is erroneous and mis-placed.
7. Another important factor, to .Which the learned counsel for the petitioner appears to be completely oblivious is that Hidayat Ullah's case was based on the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, whereas in the present case the provisions of Punjab Preemption Act, 1991, are applicable. In Act 1913, a Court can order for the deposit of 1/5th of the pre-emption money, u/s. 22 of the said Act, as no period for the deposit of the such amount was provided in the statute itself, but on the other hand it was left to the discretion of the Court to order a pre-emptor to deposit 1/5th price "within such time as the Court may fix in such order". However, u/s. 24 of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, the position has been changed and first proviso to Section 24 provides that such a period shall not extent beyond 30 days of the filing of the suit and in case of non-compliance penalty has been provided under sub-section (2) of Section 24. On this count too Malik Hidayat Ullah's case (supra) is not at all applicable in the present case.
8. As observed above, in the present case as the period has been prescribed under the statute, therefore, it cannot be extended and no discretion vests with the Trial Court to extent the time.
9. In view of the above discussion, I am not inclined to exercise my revisional jurisdiction in this case, both the judgments and decrees are in accordance with law, thus, do not call for interference by this Court. The revision petition is devoid of merits, thus the same is dismissed in limine.