' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.---The present appeal, filed by the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, proceeds against order, dated 27-3-1995, whereby the then Chairman, Banking Tribunal, while disposing of , an application filed by the respondents, under section 6(5) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, amended the decree and simultaneously disposed of the execution petition.
2. Brief facts leading to the filing of the present appeal are that pursuant to passing a decree for the recovery of Rs, 1,99,789 against the respondents, by the then Banking Tribunal, the appellant filed an execution petition, wherein orders for attachment of the mortgaged properties were issued and the case was fixed for awaiting the result of notices, issued by the learned Banking Tribunal, under Order 21, rule 66, C.P.C. It has been narrated in the appeal that while the execution petition was under process, the respondents filed a belated application for setting aside the judgment and decree, under section 6(5) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance (since repealed). The same was taken on 27-3-1995 and the statement of the respondents was recorded, through which, he stated that he has paid the entire amount under the incentive scheme and is still ready to pay the legal expenses etc. After recording the said statement, the learned Banking Tribunal, finding that the case of the respondents falls within the purview of Prime Minister Scheme, allowed the amendment of the decree, directed the respondents to pay further amount, if found due, including the costs of suit/execution application and other legal charges, and disposed of the application under section 6(5) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, vide order, dated 27-3-1995 and simultaneously disposed of the execution petition vide order of the even date. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant Bank has filed appeal, challenging both the orders, dated 27-3-1995.
3. Despite service of notice upon the respondents, nobody has entered appearance on their behalf, to defend the appeal hence, they are proceeded ex parte.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that after the passing of the decree and during the pendency of the execution petition, the learned Banking Tribunal had no jurisdiction to amend the decree, more so, when there was no application to that effect filed on behalf of any of the parties. He has further contended that impugned order was passed by the learned Banking Tribunal in complete oblivion of the law on the subject and facts on record, thus not sustainable in law.
5. We have examined the impugned order and find that the learned Banking Tribunal, after recording the statement of respondent No,1, came to the conclusion that the respondents are entitled to the benefits of the Prime Minister Incentive Scheme, and thus finding that nothing is due against the respondents, proceeded to allow the amendment of the decree to that extent. The learned Banking Tribunal has further held that the admitted amount has been paid by the judgment-debtor, thus he disposed of the application, filed under section 6(5) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, and simultaneously dismissed the execution petition. We are of the view that the contention raised by learned counsel has some substance, as the learned Banking Tribunal, while executing the decree and processing an application for setting aside an ex parte decree, could not have amended the decree, especially when there was no application on behalf of either of the parties seeking amendment of the decree. However, we feel that the learned Banking Court after coming to the conclusion that the decretal amount has been paid, instead of recording the satisfaction of the decree, proceeded to amend the decree under some bona fide misconception.
As the matter of fact, what the Banking Tribunal meant was that as the case of the respondents falls within the purview of the Prime Minister Incentive Scheme and the amount falling due against the respondents had paid, therefore, nothing is outstanding against them. In the present scenario, what learned Banking Tribunal, should have done, is to record the satisfaction for the decree and then instead of amending the decree, should have dismissed the execution application having borne fruit. Although the net result arrived at by the learned Banking Tribunal is the same that he has dismissed execution application, but without recording the satisfaction of the decree.
6. As the net result arrived at by the learned Banking Tribunal is the same, what would have been the natural consequence of such an eventuality and in pith and substance the impugned order is correct, therefore, without going into technicalities of law, we are not inclined to interfere in the impugned judgment and decree, as under the present set of circumstances, we feel that the impugned order has been passed in accordance with law and record of the case and furthermore, when the same is towards the advancement of justice.
7. In view of the above, we are not inclined to re-open the matter after the lapse of seven years and to invite start of another round of litigation. We feel that the interest of justice would be substantially served and the appellant-Bank is also not at loss, if the impugned judgment is not interfered and that too after the lapse of more than seven years.
8. Upshot of the above discussion is that the appeal is devoid of any merits, thus the same is dismissed while maintaining the impugned judgment and decree with no order as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.