This is a petition under section 22-A(8)(g) of I.R.O., 1969 alongwith an application under Regulation 32(2) of the N.I.R.C. (P&F) Regulations, 1973, supported by an affidavit of the petitioner. He has alleged in his petition that due to his lawful trade union activities, he was victimized by the Administration and was charge-sheeted. He filed a petition before this Bench in this regard which was dismissed. He preferred an appeal before the Hon'ble Full Bench of the Commission against the dismissal of his petition by the Single Bench, wherein order has been passed that adverse order shall be passed against him. It is further alleged in the petition that the respondents have again issued another fabricated charge-sheet against the petitioner, regarding obtaining of car loan to the tune of Rs,2,94,000 by concealing the material facts and although the petitioner has been paying the instalments and inquiry has been held against him. The petitioner again has been issued a second show-cause notice, as such he apprehends removal/termination/dismissal from service, and as such act of unfair labour practice is likely to be committed by the respondents. He has prayed through the instant petition that second show-cause notice be declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect against the rights of the petitioners. The respondents be also restrained from removing, retrenching, terminating, dismissing the petitioner from service and also from stopping his monthly wages, especially during the pendency of the appeal of the petitioner before the Full Bench of N.I.R.C.
2. The respondent-Bank vehemently opposed the petition, by controverting averments of the grievance petition. It has been specifically alleged under preliminary objections that the petition is not maintainable, in view of insertion of section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973; that the petitioner has no locus standi and cause of action to file the instant petition, with regard to stopping the disciplinary action initiated against him on the vague ground of unfair labour practice and that the petitioner is guilty of misconduct and the respondents/employers have every right to initiate disciplinary proceedings. Finally, they have prayed for dismissal of the petition, being without any sum and substance.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, regarding preliminary objection of the respondent-Bank as to whether this Commission has the jurisdiction to entertain the present petition and to adjudicate upon it.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank has argued that Habib Bank Limited is controlled, managed and its shares vested in the Federal Government. In view of insertion of section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 on 10-6-1997, the petitioner has been declared to be in service of Pakistan and is deemed to be Civil Servant for the purpose of this Act. He further submits that according to Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and section 3(2) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973; the Federal Service Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction, in respect of terms and conditions of service, including disciplinary matters and the jurisdiction of all other Courts except the Supreme Court is barred, therefore, this petition which pertains to disciplinary action initiated against the petitioners is not at all competent and this Commission has no jurisdiction at all to adjudicate upon it. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank has relied upon 1997 SCM R 2000, 1999 SCM R 197 and 1999 SCM R 1526.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that notwithstanding the insertion of section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973; the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Relations Commission remains intact under section 22 of the I.R.O., 1969, therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction by N.I.R.C. Is valid in law.
6. I have considered the submissions, pressed by the learned counsel for the parties, carefully.
7. Section 2-A was inserted by Act XVII of 1997 on 10-6-1997 whereby the employees of any Authority, Corporation, Body or Organisation establishes by or under a Federal Law or which is owned or controlled by Federal Government or in which the Federal Government, has a controlling share or interest were declared to be in service of Pakistan and every person holding a post under such Authority, Corporations, Body or Organisation shall be deemed to be Civil Servant for the purposes of Service Tribunals Act. The petitioners, being an employee of HBL does fall within such an Organisation and section 2-A is applicable to its employee. The import and effect of section 2-A has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in number of cases concerning employees of different Organisations. In Zahirullab and 13 others v. Chairman, WAPDA, Lahore and others (2000 SCM R 826), it was observed that "section 2-A which was inserted in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 by its own force created a class of Government Servants by fiction for the purpose of allowing them to avail remedy of appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal and does not make any differentiation between the employees working in such Organisation either as regular employees or contract employees or workmen". The view taken by the Service Tribunal in the case was not approved by their Lordships and case was remanded to the learned Tribunal.
8. In Abdul Haq v. General Manager SNGPL, Lahore and another (2000 SCMR 1925), the employee concerned had filed appeal before the Service Tribunal, regarding his dismissal from service, whose appeal was dismissed by the Tribunal on merits and the judgment was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Gulzeb Hussain v. SNGPL and 2 others (2000 SCM R 959) also shows that section 2-A is applicable to the employees of petitioner-Company and the Service Tribunals is the appropriate forum for agitating their grievance. In view of the legal position obtaining in the matter, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no substance and is repelled. Reliance in this regard can also be placed upon 2000 PLC 554. The principles laid down by their Lordships in the aforementioned cases are fully attracted to the instant case.
9. The upshot of my above discussion is that this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the instant petition which is hereby rejected.
Petition rejected.