' ZIA MAHMOOD MIRZA (CHAIRMAN)---This appeal under section 22-D of the I.R.O., 1969 is directed against the order of Single Bench of this Commission dated 3-1-1998 whereby the appellant's petition filed under section 22-A(8)(g) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 to challenge the order of his dismissal from service, was dismissed on the ground of laches. It was observed by the learned Member that the dismissal order of the appellant was passed on 29-7-1982 but he filed the petition under section 22-A(8)(g) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 on 4-4-1995 which it was held "badly suffers from principle of laches which is fatal to the petition". Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has not controverted the factual position that the appellant was dismissed from service on 29-7-1982 and he filed the petition under section 22-A(8)(g) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 to challenge his dismissal on 4-4-1995 i,e, almost 13 years after his dismissal. The appellant's petition, therefore, clearly suffered from gross laches for which he offered no reasonable explanation. In the circumstances, the petition filed by the appellant with the delay of 13 years was rightly dismissed by the learned Member on the ground of laches.
' Apart from what has been said above, we find that this appeal is also hopelessly barred by time.
The order impugned in the appeal was passed on 3-1-1998 but the appeal is shown to have been filed on 29-5-2000 i,e, about two and a half years after the impugned order was passed. Copy of the impugned order itself was applied for on 30-5-2000. It is so mentioned in the attested copy of the order, placed on the record. It may be stated that the appeal is accompanied by an application for condonation of delay in which it is stated that the appellant came to know of the impugned order on 29-5-2000 when his application for fixation of the case was dismissed. This statement is belied not only by the order-sheet but by the impugned order itself. Perusal of the order-sheet shows that the appellant's petition came up for hearing before Mr. Bahadar Ali, the then learned Member on 9-12-1997 when the counsel for the parties were present. Order passed on that date shows that the respondent Bank had filed the reply copy whereof was supplied to the other side and the case was adjourned to 31-12-1997 on which date, presence was recorded "as before" and the case was adjourned to 3-1-1998 for arguments/order. Mr. H.R. Haider, Advocate (now counsel for the appellant) was marked present for the petitioner in the impugned order, dated 3-1-1998. It does not, therefore, lie in the mouth of the appellant to contend that he came to know of the impugned order on 29-5-2000. It is quite significant that the appellant in his application for condonation of delay has not denied the presence of his counsel Mr. H.R. Haider before the Single Bench on 9-12-1997, 31-12-1997 and 3-1-1998.
3. The upshot of the above discussion is that this appeal is dismissed on merits as also being time- barred.