DECISION ' The appellant in this case was an employee of the respondent Institution known as the Sind Employees' Social Security Institution. The respondent being dissatisfied with the appellant's work, conduct and reputation, inasmuch as the appellant was involved in criminal cases, placed him under suspension on 13-9-1974, for a period of 3 months in the first instance. However, this period was extended by the respondents from time to time until 1-9-1975 on which date the appellant was removed from service. Aggrieved by this, the Appellant after the usual grievance Notice filed an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in the Labour Court which was rejected by Mr. Iqbal Ahmad Baluch, Presiding Officer, Sind Labour Court No. V, Karachi on 8-8-1977. The learned Labour Court without entering upon the merits of this case, dismissed it on the short point that the Sind Employees Social Security Institution is not an industry nor a commercial or industrial establishment within the meaning of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. In reaching this decision, the learned Lower Court relied heavily upon the judgment of the learned Appellate Tribunal, Punjab in the case of Muhammad Amin v. Punjab Employees' Social Security Institution. The present appeal is directed against this order of the learned Lower Court.
2. I have heard Mr. A. T. Mahmood on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Sarwana Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent Institution.
3. Mr. Mahmood first relied upon section 3 of the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965 (X of 1965) and the headnote thereof reading "An Establishment and incorporation of Employees' Social Security Institution". He argued that this is sufficient for showing that the respondent Institution is an establishment. But it was impossible for me to accept this argument for1 the simple reason that the word 'establishment' is used here as the noun from the verb 'to establish' and this becomes further clear from a perusal of sub-clause (i) of this clause 3.
4. Mr. Mahmood next contended that he relied upon section 2 (11) of this Ordinance, defining the term 'Establishment' as. Meaning an organization whether industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise. However, it seems to me that this argument suffers from the same error as the previous argument and that a distinction has to be drawn between the word 'establishment' when used as a noun in relation to the verb 'to establish' and when used as relating to and connoting an industrial and commercial and agricultural organization.
5. Mr. Mahmood's third contention was that clauses 3(2) and 28(2) of this Ordinance No. X of 1965 support his case, The former sub-clause, merely recites that the Respondent Institution shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal, with power, subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, to acquire, hold and dispose of property, both movable and immovable, and shall by the aforesaid name sue and be sued. Sub-clause (2) of clause 28 states that this Institution may accept grants, donations and gifts from any Government or from a local authority or other body for all or any of the purposes of this Ordinance. It is hardly necessary to point out that neither of these sub-clauses can serve to bring this respondent Institution within the ambit of the West Pakistan Ordinance No. VI of 1968 (Industrial and Commercial Employment Ordinance) or the Standing Orders attached thereto. The big hurdle in the way of Mr. Mahmood as pointed out by Mr. Sarwana appearing on behalf of the respondent Institution is that this Institution is neither a profit making nor an industrial or commercial establishment within the meaning of the Standing Orders so as to entitle its employees to the privileges conferred by these Standing Orders.
Mr. Sarwana also invited my attention to clause 1(3) of Ordinance VI of 1965 wherein it is provided that this Ordinance shall apply to such areas, classes of persons, industries or establishments as Government by notification may specify on this behalf.
6. I have had the advantage of closely studying the Ruling mentioned above and reported in 1976 PLC 905. It is there held that "it cannot be said that the object of the Institution is production, distribution and consumption of wealth, or the production or provision of material services." Its sole object is to give effect to a scheme of Social Security for providing benefits to certain employees or their dependents in the event of sickness, maternity, employment injury or death. Having, regard to the definitions contained in section 2 (b) and (f) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, it is clear that the Social Security Institution does not fall within the definition of industrial and commercial establishments. From this it would follow that an employee of a Social Security Institution is not a workman who can lay claim to the benefits conferred by the Standing Orders and hence he is not entitled to file an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
7. In view, then, of this legal position I find no force in this present appeal which hereby stands dismissed.
1976 PLC 905