' Z. A. CHANNA , J.-These two Constitutional petitions, which are directed against the proceedings taken by the Junior Labour Court, Karachi, under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, after the promnlgation of the Labour Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 (hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as the Principal Ordinance and the Amending Ordinance respectively), and the U/O letter addressed to Secretary, Government of Sind, Labour and Transport Department, dated 8-1-1976, in regard to pending proceedings before the Junior Labour Courts, have been heard. Together, as they raise a common point, namely the interpretation of the provisions of the Amending Ordinance, and are being disposed of by this judgment.
2, In Constitutional Petition No. 8/76, the petitioner is the manager of a proprietorship firm, with the name of Messrs Satter Trading Company. This firm is stated to have been closed with effect from 29-3-1975. Ills alleged in this petition that despite the fact that respondent No. 3, Muhammad Yaseen son of Allah Rakha, was never an employee of the petitioner's firm, he filed an application in Junior Labour Court No. IV at Karachi under section 25-A of the principal Ordinance, claiming re- instatement in service and also seeking recovery of past dues from 1971, when he was allegedly working for the petitioner's firm in East Pakistan (Bangladesh). During the pendency of the proceedings before the Junior Labour Court, the Amending Ordinance was promulgated on 23-12- 1975, introducing various amendments in different Labour Laws, including the Principal Ordinance.
According to section 3 of this Ordinance, all matters under section 25-A of the Principal Ordinance pending before the Junior Labour Courts immedia'ely before the commencement of the Amending Ordinance stood transferred to the Labour Courts. Despite the above provision, the Junior Labour Court, before whom respondent No. 3 had filed his application, proceeded with the same on 29-12- 75 and again on 5-12-1976. Subsequently, on 8-1-1976, a U/O letter was addressed by the Secretary to Government of Sind, Labour and Transport Department, to the Chairman, Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, to the effect that the effect of section 1(3) read with section 3 of the Amending Ordinance was to leave the jurisdiction of the Junior Labour Court undisturbed until the notification is issued by the Federal Government under section 1 (3) of this Ordinance, and consequently the Junior Courts should continue to handle the cases under section 25-A of the Principal Ordinance till they are replaced by the Labour Court through a notification.
3. In C. P. No. 62/76 the petitioners are Messrs Pakistan Paper Corporas Lion Limited. Respondent No. 3 in that petition was appointed by the petitioners as a temporary Marketing Officer, vide letter dated 25-8-1973, on one year's probation. His services were terminated by the petitioners firm with effect from 27-6-1974, on the ground that his services were no longer required as he had become surplus. On 5-11-1975, this respondent filed an application under section 25-A of the principal Ordinance before the Junior Labour Court Not 2 at Karachi, praying for his re-instatement. During the pendency of this application, the Amending Ordinance was promulgated. Despite the promulgation of the said Ordinance, Junior Labour Court No. 2 proceeded with the matter on 30-12- 1975 and by its order dated 31-12-1975 allowed the same, holding that the termination of this respondent's services by the petitioner was illegal, and directed that he be re-instated with full back benefits.
4. Mr. Hassan A. Shaikh, the learned counsel for the petitioner in C. P. No. 8/76, has assailed the impugned proceedings before the Junior Labour Court and the U/O of the Labour Secretary, Government of Sind dated 8-1-1976, on the grounds-
(i) that Immediately upon the promulgation of the Amending Ordinance, the matters under section 25-A of the Principal Ordinance pending before the Junior Labour Courts stood transferred to the Labour Courts, and consequently the proceedings taken in this matter by Junior Labour Court No. IV on 29-12-1974 and 5-1-1976 are invalid and without jurisdiction ; and
(ii) that in any case the Labour Courts at Karachi had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of respondent No. 3-since according to the latter's own contention he was employed in East Pakistan (Bangle Dash) and not within the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts at Karachi.
5. Mr. S. M. Saved, the learned counsel for the petitioners in C. P. No. 62/1976, has supported the contention of Mr. Hassan A Shaikh that after the promulgation on 23-12-1975 of the Amending Ordinance the Junior Labour Courts ceased to have jurisdiction to deal with matters under section 25-A of the principal Ordinance. Additionally, he has submitted-
(i) that the grievance application submitted by respondent No. 3 to the Junior Labour Court was hopelessly time-barred, inasmuch as it was filed one year, four months and eleven days after the termination of his services;
(ii) that no notice was given by respondent No. 3 to the petitioners in regard to the termination of his services, and that all he had done was to submit an application to the petitioners claiming some amount as his dues.
6. Respondent No. 2 in Petition No. 8/1976 appeared in person and opposed the petition on the twin grounds that the petitioner had no locus standi to file the petition that the contention that he was never in the employ of the petitioner's firm is wholly incorrect. He relied upon his counter-a f t davit, wherein he has asserted that he was employed by the petitioner's firm at Karachi and sent to the Petitioner's branch offices In East Pakistan and after the fall of East Pakistan he came over to Karachi and resumed his duty with the petitioner's firm at its head office at Karachi, when on 10-6- 1974 he was deputed to work at its Lahore branch, but on his return from Lahore he was verbally informed on 16.8-1974 that his services were no longer required.
7. Mr. M. M. Pirzada, the learned counsel for respondent No. 3 in C. P. No. 62/1976, submitted that the petitioners in this petition had filed an appeal against the decision of the Junior Labour Court, but had subsequently withdrawn the appeal. He contended that the petitioners having sought an alternate remedy were not entitled to discretionary relief in the exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court.
8. Since the main point in the two petitions is whether after the pro-. Mulgation of the Amending Ordinance, the Junior Labour Courts still had jurisdiction to proceed with matters under section 25- A of the principal Ordinance pending before them, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Amending Ordinance in this behalf. Subsection (3) of section 1 of that Ordinance reads as follows "It will come into force at once, except the provisions of the Schedule relating to amendments in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969), which shall come into force from such date as the Federal Government may, by notification in the official Gazetta, specify in this behalf, and different dates may be so specified for different provisions."
9. The other section in the Amending Ordinance, which is important, is section 3. It reads as follows "Transfer of pending cases.-Any matter under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969), pending before a Junior Labour Court immediately before the commencement of this Ordinance shall on such commencement, stand transferred to the Labour Court."
10. It Ras submitted by Mr. Hassan A. Shaikh, who was supported in this behalf by Mr. Syed Iqbal Ahmed, that the effect of section 1 (3) of the Amending Ordinance was that whereas the amendments in the principal Ordinance specified in the Schedule to the Amending Ordinance were to come into force with effect from the date when the notification enforcing such amendments was issued by the Federal Government, the other provisions of the Amending Ordinance, including section 3 thereof, were to come into force at once. In my humble opinion, there is considerable substance in this contention. A bare perusal of the Amending Ordinance shows that only the amendments in the principal Ordinance, which have been specified in the Schedule to the Amending Ordinance, were to come into force on the issuance of a notification in this behalf by the Federal Government, while the other provisions of the Amending Ordinance, including the provision contained in section 3 thereof relating to transfer of cases to the Labour Courts, were to come into force at once. The result is that on the very day that the Ordinance itself came into force, that is on 23-12-1975, all matters under section 25-A of the principal Ordinance pending before the Junior Labour Courts stood transferred to the Labour Courts and the Junior Labour Courts ceased to have jurisdiction to deal with the same.
11. On the basis of the view that I have taken of the import of section 1(3) of the principal Ordinance, Petition No. 62/1976 must be allowed and the proceedings taken by the Junior Labour Court on 30- 17-1975, and its decision of 31-12-1975 must be set aside as without jurisdiction. The case has- therefore to be referred to the Labour Court' for proceeding with the same from the stage at which it was immediately before 23-12-1975. The fact that the petitioners had filed an appeal against the decision of the Junior Labour Court to the Labour Court and then withdrawn the appeal, would, in my opinion, not disentitle the petitioners to the relief claimed, for the action of the Junior Labour Court in proceeding with the matter after the promulgation of the Amending Ordinance and then deciding the matter, was wholly without jurisdiction. In such a case, an appeal would not, in any view, be an equally efficacious remedy. Moreover, in view of the U/0 letter of the Secretary Labour, Government of Sind, dated 8.1-76, in regard to jurisdiction of Junior Lobour Courts, the petitioners may have reasonably believed that the appeal would be illusory.
12. Mr. S. M. Sneed, the learned counsel for the petitioner, also submitted that I should also consider his contentions that the grievance application under section 25-A of the principal Ordinance, filed by respondent No. 3, was time-barred and that the respondent had given no proper notice of his grievance to the petitioners. These, however, are questions of fact, and can properly be decided only by the Labour Court on the basis of the evidence produced before it, keeping in view the provisions of section 25-A of the principal Ordinance and any cause shown by the respondent No. 3 under section 65-B of that Ordinance for the delay in preferring his grievance application.
13. So far as Petition No. 8/1976 is concerned, as already pointed out, it has not been filed by the Petitioner-firm or its Proprietor, but Abdul Majeed, who claims to be the Manager of the firm. This firm, as stated in para. 1 of this petition, stood closed with effect from 29-3-1975. The said Manager has produced no powerof-attorney from the Proprietor of the petitioner-firm authorising him to file this petition. As such, he cannot be considered to be a person 'aggrieved' for the purposes of Article 199(1) (a) of the Constitution. Consequently, notwithstanding the fact that the Junior Labour Court before which the respondent No. 3 in the said petition had filed his grievance application was not in law entitled to proceed with the application on 29-12-1975 and 5-1-1976, this petition cannot be allowed as it has not been filed by a person 'aggrieved'. It is also un-necessary, on the view that I have taken of the status of the petitioner, to consider the question whether the Labour Courts in Karachi had jurisdiction to entertain the grievance application of respondent No.
3. It may only be mentioned that this is a disputed question of fact, which cannot be gone into in this petition, for whereas the petitioner has denied that respondent No. 3 was its employee, respondent No. 3 has claimed that he was engaged by the petitioner's firm at Karachi, whereafter he was made to serve in various branches of the petitioner's firm in East Pakistan, and after the fall of East Pakistan he was again employed by the petitioner-firm in Karachi and Lahore. These obviously are questions which have to by decided by the Labour Court which will now be seised of the matter in view of the provisions of section 3 of the Amending Ordinance.
14. The result is that Petition No. 62/1976 is allowed with costs, the Impugned proceedings taken by the Junior Labour Court after 23-12-1975 and the order passed, by it on 31-12-1975 are quashed, and proceedings in the matter from the stage they were on 23-12-1975 would be taken by the Labour Court. So far as Petition No. 8/1976 is concerned, it is dismissed with coats. {{FOOTNOTE}} J)