Pakistan Case Law← Search
2001 PLC 497

SINGER INDUSTRIES LABOUR UNION REGD. AND CBA vs SINGER PAKISTAN

Citation2001 PLC 497
CourtLabour Appellate Tribunal
Case No.Application No,322 of 1998, , 2001
Date2001-04-13
Judge(s)Munawar Ali Khan
ResultOrder accordingly

DECISION ' By its application, dated 3rd October, 1998, Singer Industries Labour Union, hereinafter referred to as the Applicant Labour Union sought interpretation of this Tribunal with, regard to certain clauses of the settlement reached between the said Labour Union and the Respondent Company on 21-7- 1997. Prior to coming into force of the said Settlement the parties exchanged their Charters of Demands with each other round about 1-1-1997 and after the necessary negotiations between them the Settlement referred to above (A/1) came into force. Soon after the said Settlement the Sindh Government by Extraordinary Gazette Notification, dated 21st August, 1997 fixed minimum wage of workers as Rs,2,050 per month which included all allowances excepting conditional payments. The Notification was made effective from 1-3-1997. The Applicant Union interpreted the minimum wage fixed by the Government in the above Notification as 'Basic Wage' .Requesting the Respondent Company by its letter. Dated 13th August:1998 to treat the 'Minimum Wage' of Rs,2,050 as Basic Wage' and make payment of bonus, gratuity and Provident Fund etc. On that basis. The respondents Company, however, in its reply did not agree with the view of the Labour Union with regard to bracketing 'Minimum Wage' with 'Basic Wage' as in their opinion both these expressions carried different meanings. The parties were also at variance with regard to certain benefits/payrnents allowed to the workers Since the difference of opinion between the parties on some vital issues was causing concern and serious labour unrest. The applicant Labour Union made an application to this Tribunal under section 50,'I.R.O., 1969 for interpretation of 'Basic Wage' used in the Settlement particularly in clause 14 thereof and of certain benefits/payments to be allowed to the workers as per clauses 17(d) and (e) of the Settlement.

2. I heard the arguments of the learned counsel for both the parties Mr. Shafiq Qureshi for Applicant Labour Union and Mr. Mehmood A. Ghani on behalf of the Respondents Company and also carefully considered the clauses of the Settlement sought to be interpreted.

3. It was contended at the bar that the Settlement dated 21-7-1997 whose interpretation was being sought was no longer in existence, as it was dead and stood superseded by the second Settlement.

Therefore, the argument was, that its interpretation would serve no useful purpose. As it would be merely for academic interest. To appreciate the above argument reference may be made to section 40 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. It would show that as provided in subsection (1) thereof, a Settlement shall be effective from the date mutually agreed upon by the parties to the dispute and if no such date was agreed upon, then on the date when the Memorandum of Settlement was signed by the parties. Again it is provided in subsection (2) of the said section that the Settlement would be binding for the period agreed upon by the parties to the dispute and if no such period was agreed upon, then it would be valid for one year from the date on which it was signed and further that it would continue to be binding on the parties even after expiry of the said one year. Until expiry of two months from the date on which either .Party informs the other in writing that it was no longer bound by it.

4. As is clear from clause (19) of the Settlement referred to above, it came into force on the date of signing the same i,e, 21-7-1997. It was made valid and binding for 2 years with effect from 1st January, 1997 to 31st December, 1998 and continued to be effective even after expiry of the said period until expiry of two months from the date when either party informed the other party of its intention to be no longer bound by the Settlement. There is no evidence on record that either party informed the other party of its intention not to be bound by the Settlement. The learned counsel for the Applicant Union frankly admitted in course of his arguments that though he was unaware if any party gave notice for expiry of the Settlement, yet he knew that another Settlement, dated 21st July, 1999 came into force with immediate effect, superseding the existing Settlement i,e, previous Settlement dated 21-7-1997. According to him the second Settlement was filed on 26-8-1999 alongwith application. Thus, when the application seeking interpretation of the Tribunal was made on 3rd October, 1998, the prior Settlement dated 21-7-1997 was still valid and operative but before the necessary interpretation could be made, it ceased to exist. The question would arise if the Tribunal could still make the interpretation of the said Settlement with any advantage. Of course if the interpretation was made at such belated stage that would be applicable to the period prior to expiry of the said Settlement and may be, it was used to solve the problems that arose during that period.

5. However, the learned counsel for the Respondents Company was quick in inviting my attention to the authority reported as 1994 PLC 183 wherein it was held, "a bare perusal of above section (section 50) makes it clear that Labour Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction to interpret the Settlement or Award if any difficulty or doubt arises out of it which for the-time being is in existence and not a Settlement which has already lost its life...".

6. In view of the above authority the interpretation of the above Settlement or any clause thereof which is no longer in existence but has rather lost its life would be without jurisdiction for this Tribunal. Despite this legal position if interpretation was made as prayed in the aforesaid application, the foremost interpretation that was needed was the interpretation of expression "Basic Wage" used in clause (14) of the Settlement. According to the learned counsel for the Applicant Labour Union, Mr. Shafiq Qureshi, two expressions namely "Basic Wage" and "Minimum Wage" were one and the something and, therefore, as soon as the Sindh Government issued Gazette Notification, dated 21st August, 1997, the Applicant Labour Union wrote a letter, dated 13th August, 1998 (Annexure A/5 page 36) to the Respondents Management, not only informing them about the said Government Notification but also requiring them to treat the Minimum Wage of Rs,2,050 as Basic Wage, as has even previously been done and calculate and make payment of bonus, gratuity. Provident Fund etc. On the basis of said 'Basic Wage'. The Respondents Company, however in its Reply (A/6 page 60) disagreed with the Applicant Union's view that Minimum Wage is one and the samething as Basic Wage. This difference of opinion having arisen between the Applicant Labour Union and the Respondents Company it was referred for interpretation of this Tribunal. In this connection reference may be made to the Supreme Court Authority reported as 1984 SCM R 1135. In the reported case while holding the contention that "Basic Wage" means minimum of the Revised National Pay Scale being without any merit, it was held, "Basic Wages have a fixed identity and it may be different in an individual case from the Minimum of the Revised National Pay Scale. There is no rule of construction whereby an expression used in the Settlement should be altogether ignored and substituted by another expression not used when the meaning of the two expressions is distinct and there is no difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of the expression".

7. I, respectfully agree with the above view and hold that Basic Wage is different from Minimum Wage and, therefore, it cannot be made the basis of calculating or paying Bonus etc.

8. Taking up clause 17(d)(e), it reads as under:-- 17(d). The parties hereby agree that all such existing terms and conditions which have not been modified, altered or covered by this Settlement shall continue to be binding and operative.

(e) The parties hereby agree that all such existing terms ,and conditions regarding payment of various allowances/benefits provided under this Settlement and which have not been specifically mentioned or modified in this Settlement shall continue to remain unchanged."

' The Applicant Labour Union's interpretation of the clauses 17(d) and (e) with regard to providing Canteen, allowing half an hour permission/leave, departmental movement, gate passes for Urine, Dispensary, natural urge etc. Holding of function/festival and allowing .Public Holidays is detailed on pages 6 and 7 of the Application. Their main ground in support of their interpretation is that the benefits/privileges with regard to above items were in force immediately before the Settlement and were not cancelled, modified or in any way altered by the Settlement and therefore, they would continue to be operative even after coming into force of the Settlement.

9. The interpretation made by the Applicant Labour Union with regard to above benefits/privileges cannot be accepted as wholly correct. First of all it has got to be ascertained by evidence oral or documentary, if all or any of the benefits specifically mentioned in the Application of the Applicant Union for interpretation were in existence and operative immediately before coming into force of the Settlement, Further, investigation to be made in this regard would be whether they were allowed by any previous Settlement and were not in any way changed or modified by any subsequent Settlement or in the alternative they came into force and allowed to continue by way of good gesture of the Respondents Management. In the latter case they cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Nevertheless they may continue as before provided the Respondent Management in their discretion do not wish to interfere with their enjoyment. The other benefits which are the result of any Settlement would also continue provided they have not already been cancelled or modified by subsequent Settlement. Since there is no reliable evidence in this regard, I regret my inability to give definite interpretation as to continuation or otherwise of the benefits mentioned in clause (17) of the Settlement. Even the interpretation of Basic Wage as discussed above would be of no avail to the Applicant Labour Union for the reason that by the time the interpretation was given with regard to clause (14) of the Settlement, the Settlement had already ceased to exist.

' The application under section 50, I.R.O. Made by the Applicant Union stands disposed of as above.

For educational and research use only — not legal advice. Verify against the official report before relying on it. See our Disclaimer.
Disclaimer·Privacy·Terms·Search