SABIHUDDIN AHMED, J.-- This appeal is directed against the order, dated 17.8.1998 of the learned Rent Controller declining his earlier order, dated 29.4.1998 whereby the appellant's defence was' struck of on account of non-compliance with the rent order, dated 2.4.1998. Basically the facts appear to be that the respondent filed an application for ejectment of the appellant in 1994 on the ground of default in payment of rent. The respondent filed a written statement alleging that he was in possession of the premises as tenant, but since there were disputes about ownership he was depositing rent regularly in M.R.C. 309 of 1995 in the Court of VIth Rent Controller, Karachi (South).
He further denied landlord-tenant relationship on the ground that no notice under Section 18 was served upon him.
2. The learned Rent controller on an application by the respondent passed an elaborate order, dated 11.4.1998 directing the appellant to deposit arrears and future .Rent after deducting amounts deposited under the M.R.C. The appellant, however, failed to comply with the same and eventually by an order, dated 27.4.1998 his defence was struck of.' Instead of preferring an appeal, however, the appellant chose to file an application for review which was dismissed by the Rent Controller on 17.8.1998. Thereafter, he filed this appeal on 2.10.1998. Apart from the fact that the application for review. Was patently misconceived as indeed conceded b Mr. Mubarak Ahmed and an appeal against the order 'rejecting the- appellants' defence stands barred by limitation. The appellant it does not even have a prima facie case on merits. The only plea taken is the the appellant was not a tenant of the respondent but a landlord in his own right. Such plea. I am afraid patently contradicts the stand taken by the appellant in his written statement and could not be allowed to be raised at the appellate Ievel. Mr. Mubarak has relied on the observations of the Honourable Supreme Court in Attaullah Jan v, Abdullah Jan (PLD 1984 SC 222) and contended that when a plea as to fact is raised at an appellate level the Court should grant an opportunity to parties to lead evidence before, the Trial Court. In this case a new plea as to application of the Rented Premise Ordinance to ascertain property was raised which had not been raise earlier. In my humble view, however, the law declared in the above precedent does not apply to the facts of the present case: It may well be that in a proper case where an additional question of fact and law is raised in appellate proceedings the appellate Court may direct that evidence be led which would not- prejudice any of the party. In the present case, however, a plea that the appellant was the owner of the property in his own right is patently contradicted by his stand before the Rent Controller in respect of premises. A party obviously cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold and keep on experimenting with different factual pleas at different stages of the proceedings. To allow them to do so would destroy sanctity of the judicial 'system. For the foregoing reasons I find no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same in limine.