1. The appellant through this appeal has assailed the judgment dated 22-5-1998 passed by learned VIIth Rent Controller, South Karachi whereby the Ejectment Application No,465 of 1997 filed by respondents against the appellant was allowed and the appellant was ordered to hand over the vacant possession of demised premises to the respondent within two months. The facts leading to the present appeal are that respondents owned Shop No,12 situated on ground floor of Tareen Manzil, Khajoor Bazar. The appellant was tenant of the shop at the rate of Rs,240 per month. The ejectment application was filed by the respondents on the ground that the appellant has opened an entrance for his flat No,2 from the demised premises i,e, Shop No,12 without the consent of respondents. The second ground on which the ejectment was sought was the personal bona fide requirement of the shop for running their business by respondent No,2. Appellant filed his written reply wherein he stated that he was also tenant of Shop No,12 and its connected Cabin No,17. He was tenant of Flat No,2 in the first floor of Jalbani Manzil (present Tareen Manzil). The appellant pleaded that the ejectment proceedings were motivated by mischievous and dishonest designs. The ejectment proceedings were collusive and were launched at the behest of elders of the respondents. It was further averred that every possible mischief was made to eject the appellant from tenement and the intention behind it was to destroy business of the appellant. The appellant denied having caused any damage to the landlords. The plea in regard to personal requirement was emphatically denied. The tenement was situated in high Pugri area and that the proceedings were filed to cause wrongful financial loss as well as mental torture to the appellant. He pleaded that the litigation regarding ownership of demised premises was also pending in the Court with one Gul Moosa, the original owner.Who used to issue rent receipts of tenement in the name of Atta Muhammad & brothers. The respondents were residing with their uncle and his son at Naveed Hotel. Muhammad Rasool relative of respondents obtained friendly loan of Rs,15,000 from appellant for the period of one month but he failed to pay the same. The appellant and respondents were on inimical terms due to the abovementioned loan. The respondents were causing harassm ent to the appellant in order to achieve their illegal designs. At the trial the respondent No,1 namely Ghulam Muhammad filed affidavit-in-evidence in which he reiterated the same facts as disclosed in the main rent case. The respondent No,2 namely Shah Muhammad also filed his affidavit and reiterated the facts mentioned in the ejectment application. The appellant Shah Muhammad filed his affidavit-in-evidence on the basis of averments made in the written statement. In support of his case he produced certain documents including copy of Civil Suit No,900 of 1995, General Power of Attorney, copy of complaint to S.H.O., compromise application in abovementioned suit, copy of notice to appellant, copy of F.I.R. No,2 of 1986 etc. Out of pleadings of the parties, the following points were determined by the trial Court:--
(1) Whether the case premises is required by the applicant for their . Personal bona fide use?
(2) What should the order be? The learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the respondents needed the demised premises for their personal use in good faith and allowed their ejectment application which is impugned in this appeal. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the impugned order is improper and unjust and is not sustainable under the law. The evidence has not been properly appraised by the learned Rent Controller. The testimony of respondent No,2 for whom the demised premises was required has not been discussed. It is submitted that the evidence of appellant has not been considered and discussed properly which has caused a serious prejudice to the case of appellant. The reasoning on issue No,1 given by the learned Rent Controller is perverse and illogical and is not borne out from the record. The application under section 20(1)(d) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 was dismissed by the Rent Controller and as such the appellant was condemned unheard. The ejectment proceedings were prompted by malice and the plea of personal need did not exist to the respondents. The fact that the respondents were in occupation of one shop in the same building but the same was suppressed and they did not disclose in the Court as to how it was not suitable for their personal need. The reliance is placed up on the cases reported as Qamuruddin through his Legal Heirs v. Hakim Mahmood Khan 1988 SCM R 819; Abid Masood and others v. Dilshad Khan 1995 SCM R 146; S.M. Nooruddin and 9 others v. Saga Printer 1998 SCM R 2119 and Muslim, Commercial Bank Limited, Karachi v. Haji Shaikh Yaqinuddin and 2 others PLD 1992 Kar.314. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that the shop in question was purchased by respondent on 8-12-1996. Notice under section 18 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance was served upon the appellant. He has neither denied the tenancy nor the rate of rent. The application under.
2. Section 20(1)(d) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance was moved to call the P.Ws. To produce certain documents. It is argued that said documents were already produced on record. Out of these witnesses two P.Ws. Namely Ishaque and Waheed were examined. The procedure for examining the evidence is defined under section 19(3) of the Ordinance. Affidavit of appellant and his witnesses were already filed on 7-11-1997 and they were examined. The alleged application was filed on 26-2-1998. The said application was rejected on 3-3-1998. He has stated that the paras.5 and 6 of the ejectment application are manifest and clear for the personal bona fide use of the premises in good faith. The reliance is placed upon the cases of Sabu Mal v. Kika Ram alias Heman Das 1973* SCMR 185; Haroon Kassam and another v. Azam Suleman Madha PLD 1990 SC 394; Edulji Dinshaw Limited v. Income Tax Officer PLD 1990 SC 399; Jehangir Rustom Kakalia v. State Bank of Pakistan 1992 SCM R 1296 and Abdul Karim v. Abdul Karim 1992 SCM R 1300.
3. The respondents filed their affidavit-in-evidence and stated that they required the premises for their own business of cloth. They have stated that there was no other tenement for them to run the abovementioned business. The respondents were cross-examined. The respondents have stated on oath that they need the disputed premises for their own personal bona fide use in good faith.
4. They have been cross-examined at length but the appellant has failed to shake their testimonies.
5. The original burden of personal bona fide need in good faith of the landlord lies upon hitt, but when the same is deposed through a tangible evidence by the landlord on oath, and the same is in line with pleadings, then the burden is shifted to tenant to rebut the same. In the instant case it is borne out from the record that the respondents were in need of their shop for running their own business.
6. The need and the choice of the landlord is not to be judged by the tenant if the evidence adduced by the landlord is in conformity with the pleadings. Similarly the requirement of landlord cannot be determined by the tenant. The reference can be made to a case of Bashir Ahmed v. Muhammad Shafi 1989 SCM R 538 wherein their lordships have observed as under:-- "It is the judgment and the need of the landlord about which he is the best Judge. Regarding status also, the primary consideration is choice about the need and comforts of the landlord. The Court can only interfere in this field when the claim of the landlord is visibly extraordinary. In this case, it is obvious that the status wise and need wise the landlord has not at all made an extravagant claim." Similar view was taken by the apex Court in the case of Sabu Mal v. Kika Ram alias Heman Das 1973 SCM R 185 wherein it is held as under:-- "If a landlord possesses more than one house in the same urban area, the choice as to the house in which he would like to live himself is surely a matter within his prerogative and discretion, and the law does not give either to the tenant or to the Rent Controller the power to determine where the landlord should personally reside. The law, however, provides an adequate safeguard by stipulating in subsection (4) of section 13 of the Ordinance, that the tenant, may be put back in possession if the landlord does not occupy the premises himself after getting them vacated on the ground of personal need. Subsequent litigation in respect of another house owned by the respondent is thus irrelevant to the present dispute." The appellant has stated in cross-examination as under:-- "It is correct to suggest that I have filed any document alongwith the affidavit-in-evidence which shows that the applicants is Manager in Naveed Hotel. It is fact that I have not filed any documentary proof which shows that the applicants are also owner of other properties/buildings situated in Karachi. It is fact that I have not mentioned deed of above property in my written statement as well as in affidavit in-evidence. It is fact that I have not filed any documents which shows that any shop of case premises is lying in occupation of the applicant. It is fact that I have not filed any title documents which shows that the applicant's father is owner of Naveed Hotel. It is fact that I have not produced any certificate which shows that present value of Pugri of case premises is Rs,50,00,000. It is fact that I have not filed any document which shows that applicants have filed this rent case on mala fide intention."
7. It is manifest from the cross-examination of the appellant that there is no other property owned by the landlord. The allegations of mala fide levelled by the appellant against the landlord is based upon no documentary evidence and does not appear to be tangible. The alleged application under section 20(1)(d) of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance was moved at a belated stage.
8. Moreover, some of the witnesses whom he desired to examine were already examined by him. The documents which the appellant wanted to produce through them were already produced on record, hence it cannot be said that any prejudice was caused to him. The procedure for examining the evidence in rent cases is mentioned in the Ordinance itself but it appears that the said application was only moved to prolong the matter and make an additional ground for appeal.
9. From the above discussion and evidence brought on record it cannot be said that the respondent has failed to establish the factum of bona fide need of demised premises in good faith. The view taken by the trial Court is borne out from the record and is based on sound reasoning. The law cited at the bar by learned counsel for the appellant is distinguishable on the facts and circumstances of instant case. Consequently the ejectment order calls for no interference and the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.