' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---This appeal has been directed against the judgment of the High Court, dated 31-71999, whereby the writ of quo warranto filed against respondent No,7 who was appointed as Comptroller of Assembly was dismissed.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the appointment of respondent No,7, Tariq Mehmood Mughal, as Comptroller of Assembly on the ground that he did not possess the requisite qualifications to hold the office; he was overage and did not have the experience required for the appointment under the relevant rules. The High Court after taking necessary proceedings dismissed the writ petition on the grounds that he appellant was also a candidate for the appointment of Comptroller of Assembly, was not qualified for appointment and the writ petition was hit by laches. The High Court further opined that the appellant resorted to political pressure for his appointment. On the aforesaid facts, the High Court expressed the view that the writ petition was actuated by malice. The learned Judge in the High Court did not resolve the points on the basis of which the writ of quo warranto was sought against respondent 'No,7.
3. The appellant has contended that the High Court was not justified to make inquiry in a writ of quo warranto as to whether the appellant was eligible to the appointment in view of the relevant rules, i,e,, whether he served in Sheraton Hotel, Karachi, or not for prescribed period. He has further argued that the finding of the High Court that the certificate produced by the appellant for having served in Sheraton Hotel was a fake document, is without any substance. He has contended that even otherwise, while dealing with legality of the appointment of respondent No,7, the question of the eligibility of the appellant for his appointment as Comptroller was not a relevant factor. The appellant has submitted that the High Court was also not correct in holding that a writ of quo warranto can be dismissed for laches. He has maintained that it is a well-settled principle of law that the question of laches does not arise in a writ of quo warranto. The appellant has also submitted that the High Court has committed an error in inferring that the writ petition was filed by the appellant, herein, was mala fide, because the appellant was himself a candidate for the appointment to the office in question or that he attempted to get his appointment to the office on the ground that he had obtained more marks as compared with respondent No,7 in interview held by the Selection Committee. The appellant has cited following authorities in support of his contentions:--- ' In ease reported as Azad Government v. Sahibzada Ishaq Zafar (1994 SCR 323), it has been held that a writ of quo warranto cannot be dismissed on the ground that the same was filed after inordinate delay and, thus, suffered from laches. While discussing the case reported as Syed Manzoor Hussain Gillani v. Sain Mullah (1992 MLD 2424), in the aforesaid authority, it was observed that the writ petition, in that case was not dismissed on the ground of laches but on the ground of mala fide; the delay in the circumstances of that case was considered as one of the supportive factors for drawing the inference of mala fide against the relator.
' In case reported as Muhammad Ali v. Muhammad Bashir (PLD 1962 Lah. 230), it was observed in paragraph 27 of the report that as there was no proof that disqualification urged on behalf of relator was unfounded, the Court cannot refuse to hear the writ petition on the ground that relator was a history-sheeter. It was also observed that even if the relator was a history-sheetor or of bad character, that could not debar him from filing a writ of quo warranto and that the antecedents of the relator were not relevant for judging his competency to file the writ petition.
' In case reported as Muhammad Yaqoob Khan v. Secretary, Forest/Toursim (1999 MLD 1862), it has been held by this Court that a writ of quo warranto can be filed by any person even if he is an aggrieved person. It was observed that only condition in case of writ of quo warranto is that the petitioner cannot get any relief for himself.
4. In reply, Mr. Muhammad Farid Khan, Advocate, the learned counsel for respondent No,7, has controverted the arguments advanced by the appellant. He has referred to the contents of the writ petition filed by the appellant and has maintained that the appellant has incorrectly challenged the proceedings taken by the concerned Selection Committee. He has submitted that in fact the Selection Committee to which the appellant has referred to in his memo. Of writ petition was a different Committee, as is evident from the relevant notification. According to the learned counsel, the proceedings were taken by a different Selection Committee from one mentioned by the appellant in his writ petition. Thus, the learned counsel has contended that the ground that the Selection Committee committed illegalities is not sustainable. He has further argued that the appellant was not recommended by the concerned Selection Committee but he kept mum for more than two years, is one of Ale reasons which weighed with the High Court while holding that the writ petition filed by the appellant was mala fide. The learned counsel for the respondent has also contended that the certificate with regard to the 'experience' issued by the management of Sheraton Hotel, Karachi, produced by the appellant was found to be a fake document but despite that the appellant has been making attempts to get himself appointed in place of respondent No,7.
According to the learned counsel for respondent No,7, the said conduct of the appellant debars him from seeking any relief by filing a writ of quo warranto.
5. Raja Shiraz Kayani, the learned Advocate-General, also supported the impugned judgment. He has contended that the mala fide of the appellant, herein, in filing the writ petition is to be inferred from all the attending circumstances of the case, including the fact that the appellant kept mum for more than two years in filing the writ petition and that he produced a fake certificate from the management of the Sheraton Hotel with regard to his 'experience'. The learned counsel has submitted that the principle enunciated in Manzoor Hussain Gillani's case, referred to above, is fully applicable to the case in hand.
6. We have given due consideration to the arguments raised at the Bar. It may be observed that the High Court did not deal with moot points, especially the question of age and absence of 'experience' which was required under the relevant rules for being appointed as Comptroller of the Legislative Assembly. The writ petition was dismissed on the grounds of laches, the conduct of the appellant in producing an incorrect certificate and his attempts to get himself appointed as Comptroller by manoeuvring the political influence in his favour. It may be observed that it is well- settled principle of law as has been held in Ishaq Zafar's case referred to above, that the question of laches is not relevant in case of writ of quo warranto in the aforesaid case, Manzoor Hussain Gillani's case, relied upon by the respondent, was also discussed and it was observed that the question of laches was only considered along with other circumstances in the context of the mala fide of the relator. In the instant case, the finding of the High Court that as the appellant was himself a candidate, he A produced a fake certificate from Sheraton Hotel and he has been seeking his appointment as Comptroller of the Assembly are sufficient to attribute mala fide to him, is not sustainable. As is evident from the authorities, referred to above, the appellant is not debarred from filing a writ of quo warranto on the said grounds and no inference of mala fide can be drawn from the said facts. ,The High Court did not deal with the grounds on which the appellant seeks the writ of quo warranto against respondent No,7. Thus, we cannot go into the question as to whether respondent No,7 possesses the requisite qualification for being appointed as 'Comptroller of the Assembly or not; this question is to be decided by the High Court.
In the light of what has been stated above, we accept the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remand the case to the High Court with the direction that it shall re-hear the parties in light of the observations made above and dispose of the writ petition afresh according to law.