G. SAFDAR SHAH, J.----The only objection raised in this petition is that for the purpose of contribution under the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance. 1965 (hereinafter called the Ordinance), the respondents could not include in wages the good attendance allowance, efficiency allowance and conveyance allowance paid by the petitioners to their workers. In support of this objection the learned counsel relied upon section 2(30) which in relevant parts reads :---- "Wages means remuneration for service paid or payable in cash or in kind to a secured person . . .
Without taking account of deductions for any purpose, . . . And shall be deemed to include any dearness allowance or other addition in respect of the cost of living and any payment by the employer to a secured person in respect of any period of authorised leave, illegal lock-out or legal strike ; but does not include---
(a) any payment for overtime ; or
(b) any sum paid to the person employed to defray special expenses entailed by the nature of his employment ; or
(c) any gratuity payable on discharge ; or
(d) any sum paid as bonus by the employer."
The opening words of this section, namely; "Wages means remuneration for service paid or payable in cash or in kind to a secured person." are significant. We are of the view that the words "payable" and "paid have different connotation and they must be construed according to their plain term. To us the word "payable" appears to refer to that remuneration which, as a matter of legal obligation, an employer must pay to his worker, while the word "paid" would additionally include all payments made to a worker for the rendition of service to the employer. In this view, the three allowances, which the petitioners paid to their workers, would be covered by the Ordinance, and no exception could be taken to the impugned order. This conclusion finds ample support from the fact that the Legislature, in order not to leave any doubt, expressly excepted four types of payments under clauses (a)-(d) from the purview of section 2(30) of the Ordinance.
2. Mr. Nizam Ahmad, the learned counsel for the petitioner however, argued that these allowances were not paid to the workers as a matter of course and, therefore, they could not properly fall within the purview of section 2(3) of the Ordinance. However, he admitted at the Bar that if the workers were regular in attendance and performed their duties efficiently they would be entitled to receive these allowances just as they would be entitled to their wages. Obviously, therefore, these allowances are paid to the workers not for any other consideration but in connection with their employment. It seems that the Legislature was conscious precisely of such a situation and desired that all "remuneration" not only "payable" but also "paid" to a worker would be the subject-matter of contribution under the Ordinance. This appears to be the only construction, which can be placed upon the language of section 2(30) of the Ordinance and particularly when the policy of the Ordinance is to secure the welfare of the worker. After all whatever payments are made by an employer by way of contributions are meant to cater to the welfare of the worker, and we have no doubt that this is the object of the Legislature for which provision is made in section 2(30) of the Ordinance.
3. Mr. Nizam Ahmad next contended that the Government has failed to constitute a Social Security Court as envisaged by section 59 of the Ordinance and, therefore, necessary directions may be issued to the Government for that purpose. Under the circumstances this contention appears to be academic as, in the absence of the Social Security Court, we have heard the learned counsel on merits.
4. Mr. Nizam Ahmad next argued that the amount of contribution, which the respondents desired the petitioners to pay, was determined without any evidence and, therefore, it was not binding upon the petitioners in terms of section 22(3) of the Ordinance. We see no force in this contention either. The report of the respondents, which is before us shows that the figure of contribution was arrived at on the data supplied by the petitioners. The report has not been contradicted by the petitioners except that it has been challenged orally. In any case, the requirement of section 23(3) of the Ordinance was that the figure of contribution could be arrived at on basis of such evidence as the respondents might find satisfactory. The data supplied by the petitioners was certainly an admission and, therefore it was sufficient evidence for arriving at the figure of contribution.
5. Mr. Nizam Ahmad next argued that before the figure of contribution was fixed by the respondents, the petitioners, were not heard and therefore, they were not bound by that figure. In substance the argument appeared to be that the principles of natural justice had been violated, but upon the facts of this case that is not the correct position. As already pointed out, the petitioners submitted the required data to the respondents and their conclusion in regard to the contribution figure is based on their own admissions. We, therefore, do not agree that the question of the principles of natural justice could at all be raised in this case much less that they had been violated.
6. Mr. Nizam Ahmed next argued that the data, which the petitioners had supplied to the respondents, related only to the regular pay of the worker and did not include the allowance and, therefore, the demand of contribution from the petitioners was excessive. Apart from the fact that there is nothing on the record to support this contention, -we are of the view that if the petitioners have really paid an excessive amount they could secure its refund by making an application under section 25 of the Ordinance and we have no doubt that the respondent would consider their claims on merits and according to law.