Through the instant civil revision petition, the petitioners Saadullah Khan and two others have called in question the judgments and decrees dated 19-1-1998 and 25-1-1999 passed by the learned Civil Judge I and the learned Additional District Judge, D.I. Khan respectively, whereby the former while accepting the review application of respondents had extended the time for depositing the pre-emption money to 20-2-1998 which by the initial decree of 12-6-1996 and the short order of the same day was required to be paid within two months. The appeal filed by the present petitioners, however, failed.
2. The epitomized background of this case is that Sheikh Ghulam Qasim, the predecessor of present real respondents, filed a pre-emption suit against the petitioners which passed through various stages i,e, firstly it was decreed but on appeal it was remanded to trial Court and due to the repeal of old law of pre-emption, the suit was dismissed under the new law on 23-2-1991. The appeal and revision petition of the pre-emptor were dismissed and the matter was taken before the august Supreme Court of Pakistan and the august Supreme Court was pleased to remand the case to the trial Court for its decision according to the repealed Pre-emption Act of 150. On such remand, the suit was decreed in favour of the respondents on 12-6-1996 and the pre-emptor was directed to deposit the pre-emption money within two months.
3. The petitioners being aggrieved of the judgment and decree preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, D.1. Khan while preemptor filed a cross appeal regarding the market value, however, no stay order regarding the deposit of outstanding pre-emptive price was obtained by respondents from the Appellate Court. The pre-emptor failed to deposit the remaining amount within the time fixed by the trial Court which expired on 12-8-1996. It appears that the pre-emptor subsequently arranged to deposit the outstanding amount i,e, Rs, 758.40 on 20-8-1996 an unextended date.
4. On 1-9-1996, the pre-emptor/respondent filed an application for review of the judgment and decree dated 12-6-1996 which also contained a request for the extension of time for deposit of pre- emptive money. The review was sought on the ground that the judgment and decree were fraught with various visible defects but no specific error was pointed out so as to justify the reviewing of the judgment. It was, however, stated that the preemptive amount could not be deposited as at the time of announcing the order, the Court had not directed the pre-emptor to deposit the balance money. This application was resisted by the petitioners. A plain reading of review application shows that the overall object of the pre-emptor was to seek the extension of time.
5. On 12-3-1997 the petitioners filed an application before the. Trial Court for suspending the review proceedings pending disposal of appeal. Reply was sought which was filed on 25-4-1997 and case was kept on adjourning for arguments till 6-1-1998. On 17-1 1998 the learned trial Court without hearing arguments rejected the application filed by petitioners and the case was adjourned to 19- 1-1998 for arguments on review application. On 19-1-1998 the petitioners as an endeavour to adjourn the case tendered an application on two-fold grounds; firstly that the counsel 'of petitioners was engaged in the High Court and in the Courts of learned District and Additional District Judges D.I. Khan in cases mentioned in the application and, secondly that they had moved an application before the learned District Judge for transfer of the case as they had lost confidence in the learned trial Court. The learned trial Court, however, did not entertain the application and proceeded to decide the review application again without hearing the petitioners which resulted in the modified, impugned, judgment and decree. The petitioners have given a sworn affidavit regarding the abovementioned facts which is not controverted by respondents. An appeal was filed by the petitioners which was also dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge on 25-1-1997 obliging the petitioners to file the instant revision petition.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently attacked the judgments and decrees of the two Courts below and argued that the learned trial Court had no authority in law to extend the time for deposing the preemption money. He further contended that review petition was not competent and extension of time could not be ordered under sections 148 and 151 or under Order 20, Rule 14, C.P.C. He vociferously argued that the respondent was guilty of contumacious negligence and he did not suffer from any act of the Court. The short order was announced in presence of the parties on 12-6-1996 and the respondent was directed to deposit the outstanding preemptive amount within two months and the file of case 'was ordered to be consigned to the record room after its completion.
7. On the contrary, the learned counsel for respondents defended the impugned judgments and decrees by contending that the judgment and decree dated 12-6-1996 of the learned trial Court was not in accordance with Order 20, Rule 14, C.P.C. As no specified day for the deposit of remaining amount was mentioned by the trial judge, thus it was a fit case for review. His next argument was that the respondents could not properly grasp and understand the directions of the Court contained in the short order of 12-6-1996 regarding the deposit of amount. His third limb of the argument was that since the judgment and decree was not prepared by the Court and the respondent could not get a copy of the judgment and decree, therefore, he was unable to deposit the requisite amount within the time fixed by the Court. While folding up his arguments he finally submitted that the learned trial Court had ample powers under section 148, C.P.C. To extend the time fixed by it.
8. I have heard the rival arguments of both the combatants and have gone through the record of the case. In this case primarily the vital questions having decisive bearing on the case were two- fold. One is that whether in the attending circumstances and as per contents of review petition the respondent (review petitioner) could make out a case for the review of the judgment and decree dated 12-6-1996 and the second is whether the learned trial Court has the power to extend the time for deposit of money under sections 148, 151 and Order 20, rule 14, C.P.C. The former question has been answered by the learned trial Court itself in the negative and rightly so by speaking in these words:-- "This Court gone through the sections under which petitioner seeking relief but does not find these to be proper as far as review of the judgment is concerned.". However, the learned trial Judge thought that in pre-emption cases Court can extend period for depositing decretal amount under sections 148, 151 and Order 20, Rule 14 of C.P.C. And relief can be granted under these provisions of law. Thus the learned trial Court feeling itself justified as above extended the period on the ground that the pre-emptor suffered due to the summer vacations.
9. It is a settled position of law i,e, Order 20, Rule 3, C.P.C. Which speaks eloquently that once the judgment is signed, dated and pronounced, it sliall not afterwards be altered or added to save as provided by section 152, C.P.C. Or on review. After signing and pronouncing the judgment, the rendering Court is rendered functus officio. The only two exceptions to this rule are proceedings under section 114 read with Order 47 and section 152, C.P.C. The former two provisions deal with review while the latter is for the purpose of correcting clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees, orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. The instant case is not a case of arithmetical or other clerical error envisaged by section 152, C.P.C. It is also not a case where the time was extended by way of reviewing the judgment. The learned trial Court has ventured to derive powers from sections 148, 151 and Order 20, Rule 14, C.P.C. For grant of relief. Therefore, the former question formulated above needs not to be adverted to and as per second question it is to be seen whether the trial Court had any authority to order the extension of time.
10. The Court which passed a decree in pre-emption case pursuant to the provision of Order 20, rule 14, C.P.C. And fixed time for the deposit of the pre-emptive price and the time so fixed expired, it has no power to extend the time as section 148, C.P.C. Does not apply to cases where the final judgment is pronounced as the Court becomes functus officio and ceases to have jurisdiction over the lis. In order to grasp the intended object of section 148, C.P.C. It is reproduced as below:-- "Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired."
The words "from' time to time" used in the section are significant to determine the phase during which the provision can be applied. These words clearly suggest that a Court can extend time under this section only as long as it continues to have jurisdiction over the matter, for the section only applies to acts preliminary to or during the course of trial i,e, prior to the final order. Extension "from time to time" can never be ordered in a finally decided matter as interference with a final judgment or decree is strictly controlled by Order 20, rule 3, C.P.C.
11. Section 151, C.P.C. Can also not be utilised for the extension of time in pre-emption cases, as non- payment of the pre-emptive price entails the mandatory penal consequences of the dismissal of suit as envisaged by Order 20, Rule 14, C.P.C. Even the omission to mention the condition by the trial Court that in case of non-payment of the pre-emption money within the specified time the suit stands dismissed, is not fatal, as held by the august Supreme Court in case of Fazal Qadeem v.
Amin Khan 1995 SCM R 1426 wherein reference was made to the case of Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq v. Bostan and others PLD 1979 SC 917. In the cited judgment of the Supreme Court, the august Supreme Court also made reference to the judgment of Indian Supreme Court in the case of Naguba Apa v. Namdev AIR 1954 SC 50 in which inter alia it has been held that the dismissal of a suit on default, in paying the purchase money within the time allowed is the result of the mandatory provision of Order 20, rule 14 C.P.C. And not by reason of any decision of the Court and, therefore, the omission to incorporate the above direction in the decree cannot, in any way, affect the rights of the parties.
12. In case of Keshav Yeshwant Koli v. Krishna Balaji Mahar and others AIR 1939 Nagpur 107 Vivian Bose, J. Has dealt with the point in the following diction:-- "The right of pre-emption is a very special right. It displaces ordinary legal rights and places restrictions upon normal rights of conveyance. Consequently, a person who wishes to avail himself of such a right must exercise the utmost vigilance and take care to see that he complies strictly with the conditions imposed on him. Order 20, Rule 14, Civil P.C. Is very precise. It states clearly that in cases of pre-emption the Court 'shall specify a day on or before which the purchase money shall be so paid' and it then continues that 'if the purchase money and the cost (if any) are not so paid the suit shall be dismissed with costs'. This means that the decree which is conditionally in plaintiff's favour ceases to be so the moment the due date passes without payment. After that it becomes a decree in the defendant's favour. It was further stated that in NLR 8 Prideaux A.J.C. Held that section 148, Civil P.C. Does not apply to a pre-emption decree and so a Court has no power to extend time under that section once the period fixed for payment is expired.'
13. Regarding the non-preparation of the judgment and decree by the trial Court, as stated by the learned counsel for the respondent, I may observe that the record speaks otherwise as the decree- sheet and judgment both reflect that the same were prepared on 12-6-1996. Moreover, the learned, trial Court has also not commented on this aspect having any tendency to show that in fact the judgment and decree were not prepared. Even if it is accepted that the judgment and decree were not prepared within the time fixed for deposit of pre-emption it could not be of any help to the pre- emptor as the short order of 12-6-1996 clearly carried the direction of such deposit to respondent.
The learned trial Court while justifying his order for the extension of time stated that due to summer vacations the respondent could not deposit the pre-emption amount and thus he suffered due to the act of the Court. These findings of the learned Court are also incorrect because the respondent had deposited the amount on 20-8-1996 i,e, during the month of August which clearly shows that vacations were not a preventive hurdle in the way of respondent for deposit of amount. This point was not even agitated before me by the learned counsel for respondent as he was probably conscious of the fact that the respondent had deposited the pre-emption money during the summer vacations.,
14. In view of the above legal and factual position obtaining in the case, I am obliged to hold that the findings, judgments and decrees of both the learned Courts below are erroneous and not warranted by law which persuade me to accept the instant civil revision petition. Consequently, this civil revision is accepted and the judgments and decrees of the lower Courts are set aside.