' JAVED IQBAL, J.---This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment, dated 10-6- 1997 passed by the learned Division Bench of Lahore High Court, Lahore, in Criminal Appeal No,522 of 1992 whereby all the accused were acquitted except Riaz Hussain son of Nawab Din (convict/appellant) whose death sentence has been kept intact for committing the murder of Saleem deceased and judgment of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Toba Tek Singh, dated 1-6- 1992 was upheld up to the said extent with direction to pay Rs,10,000 as fine and in case of default to undergo R.I. For 4 years with further direction to pay an amount of Rs,10,000 as compensation to the legal heirs of Saleem deceased and in case of default he shall further suffer R.I. For 6 months.
2. Precisely stated the facts of the case as contained in the F.I.R. Bearing No,231 of 1990, dated 10-8- 1990 got lodged by one Shah Din with Police Station Saddar, Gojra, District Toba Tek Singh, are that on 10-8-1990 Shah Din (complainant) slept in the house of Muhammad Saleem deceased on account of ailment of his child and the cot of Saleem deceased was lying in-between the cots of womenfolk when at about 1-30 p.m. In the night the complainant awoke and proceeded to go to his house and while crossing the cattle Haveli during moonlit night he suspected that a few persons were standing underneath a tree and on seeing them in suspicious condition the complainant went to the house of his nephew namely Farzand- Ali and son namely Tariq and awoke them. It is further averred that the complainant, his nephew and son proceeded to Haveli where Maqsood deceased the brother of complainant was sleeping and they witnessed during the moonlit night that Riaz Hussain son of Nawab Din accused duly armed with .12 bore gun, Karamat Ali armed with .12 bore gun double-barrel and three unknown assailants duly armed with 12 bore guns were standing near the cot of Maqsood deceased and the unknown persons were subsequently identified as Muhammad Ishaq, Khalid Mahmood and Manzoor Hussian. Riaz Hussain son of Nawab Din stated that Maqsood Ali had killed his mother and simultaneously fired at him with his gun which hit the deceased on his chest and meanwhile Karamat Ali accused also fired at the deceased which hit him on the right part of his leg and the remaining culprits also fired upon the deceased which hit the deceased on his abdomen while the fires of two other assailants hit the deceased on his right and left thighs. Riaz Hussain also fired at the deceased which hit him on the right foot when the complainant and P. Ws. Emerged at the scene but the accused persons raised Lalkara that in case of intervention they would be killed. Riaz Hussain accused said that Maqsood was expired and now they should kill Saleem and accordingly the above-named accused persons proceeded to the house of Saleem and complainant alongwith Farzand Ali and Tariq also followed them and on reaching the door of the house in their presence Riaz Hussain fired at Saleem who was nephew of the complainant and sleeping on his cot and the fire hit on his chest. It is alleged that meanwhile the womenfolk also awoke and Mst. Fateh Bibi and Mst. Manzooran Bibi (prosecution witnesses) attempted to save the life of Muhammad Saleem and intervened but the accused pushed them and Karamat Ali accused fired two shots at Saleem deceased hitting him on his left upper arm and underneath left armpit. In the meanwhile on hearing the commotion and firing many persons gathered at the spot from the Deh and on seeing them the accused persons fled away from the spot. It is further averred that Maqsoob Ali and Muhammad Saleem deceased succumbed to the injuries as a result of conspiracy and abetment rendered by Abbas, Jaffar alias Zafar and Sarwar accused. It is further averred that the complainant on account of fear could not go to police station during the night and he left Farzand Ali and Tariq to guard the dead body and subsequently got lodged F.I.R. After conclusion of trial the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Toba Tek Singh vide judgment, dated 1-6-1992 acquitted Karamat Ali and Riaz Hussain son of Noor Ahmad while Riaz Hussain son of Nawab Din (convict/appellant) Khalid, Ishaq and Manzoor Ahamd were found guilty under section 302/34; P.P.C. And sentenced as follows:--
(i) Riaz Hussain appellant was sentenced to death penalty on two counts for the double murder of both the deceased.
(ii) Ishaq, Khalid and Manzoor accused were convicted and sentenced to death penalty for the murder of Maqsood Ali deceased under section 302/34, P.P.C.
(iii) Ishaq, Khalid and Manzoor accused were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life each for the murder of Saleem deceased under section 302/34, P.P.C.
' All the abovementioned four accused were fined to Rs,10,000 each on both counts and in case of default in payment of fine each convict was to undergo further R.I. For 4 years. They were also ordered to pay compensation of Rs,10,000 each on two counts to be payable to the legal heirs of both the deceased on recovery and in case of default in payment of compensation each convict was to further undergo 6 months' R.I. While Sarwar, Abbas and Jaffar accused were convicted under section 302/109, P.P.C. On two counts and were sentenced to life imprisonment on two counts for the murders of both the deceased. They were sentenced to pay fine of Rs,10,000 each on two counts and in default thereof were to further undergo R.I. For 4 years. They were also burdened to pay Rs,10,000 each on two counts as compensation and in case of its recovery the same was ordered to be paid to the legal heirs of the deceased. In case of default in payment of the compensation amount they were ordered to further undergo 6 months' R.I. Riaz Hussian, Ishaq, Manzoor and Khalid appellants were also convicted under section 452/34, P.P.C. On two counts and were sentenced to 5 years' R.I. Each and to pay a fme of Rs,2,000 each on both counts and in case of default to suffer further R.I. For 6 months."
3. Being aggrieved an appeal was preferred by Riaz Hussain son of Nawab Din, Khalid Mahmood, Manzoor Ahmad, Muhammad Ishaq, Sarwar Hussain, Abbas, Jaffar Hussain and Shah Din complainant also filed Criminal Revision bearing No,662 of 1992 against the acquittal of Karamat and Riaz Hussain son of Noor Ahmad and moreso the case was also referred to Lahore High Court for confirmation of death sentence by way of Murder Reference bearing No,215 of 1992. The learned Division Bench of Lahore High Court partly accepted the said appeal and all the accused were acquitted of the murder of Maqsood deceased and they were also acquitted of the charge under section 452, P.P.C. Sarwar, Jaffar and Abbai were acquitted of the charge under section 302/109, P.P.C. Khalid, Manzoor and Ishaq were acquitted of the charge, for the murder of Saleem deceased but the death sentence of Riaz Hussain son of Nawab Din was confirmed.
4. Leave to appeal was granted vide order, dated 10-4-1998 to consider the following contentions and to reappraise the evidence:-
(i) That the prosecution evidence has been wrongly relied upon against the petitioner, because all the witnesses were interested;
(ii) that the ocular evidence is highly inimical and interested;
(iii) that the Courts below did not properly appreciate the defence version, and
(iv) that in the absence of any material corroboration the prosecution evidence could not be accepted against the petitioner when it had been disbelieved against all the other' accused."
5. It is mainly contended on behalf of convict/appellant that since all the accused have been acquitted, therefore, no conviction and sentence could have been awarded to Riaz Hussain son of Nawab Din on the basis of vague and sketchy evidence of Mst. Manzooran whose version was disbelieved regarding rest of the accused persons. It is next contended that being highly inimical and interested witness the statement of Mst. Manzooran should have been discarded but it has been taken into consideration by the learned Division Bench of Lahore High Court without any rhyme or reason. It is further contended with vehemence that no corroboration whatsoever has come on record to substantiate the version of Mst. Manzooran and hence the question of consideration of her testimony does not arise. It is pressed time and again that when the statement of Mst. Manzooran has been discarded in respect of accused Karamat Ali to whom an identical role was assigned why the same has been accepted regarding convict/appellant whose case was at par with that of accused Karamat Ali. It is pointed out that the statement of Mst.
Manzooran does not find support from medical evidence and thus, it should have been discarded.
It is contended that since no corroborative material was available in support of the testimony of Mst. Manzooran, therefore, the appellant deserves acquittal. It is argued that prosecution evidence has been wrongly relied upon because all the witnesses are interested and inimical. It is contended that the factum of delay of five hours in lodging F.I.R. Has not been considered without any lawful justifiable excuse and the possibility of deliberation, consultation and fabrication could not be ruled out in view of the said delay which aspect of the matter escaped unnoticed resulting in serious miscarriage of justice. It is also argued that the defence version has not been taken into consideration which ought to have been kept in juxtaposition for deriving any conclusion but no heed whatsoever has been paid to defence version which resulted in serious prejudice. In the alternative it is argutd that the convict/appellant at the time of commission of alleged offence was 24 years old and the alleged offence might have committed under influence of his brothers namely Sarwar, Abbas and Jaffar and thus, it is prayed that a lenient view may be taken. In order to substantiate his view-point the learned defence counsel has relied upon 1995 SCMR 127; 1986 PCr.LJ 583; 1996 SCMR 3 and 1999 SCMR 312.
6. Mr. Abdul Waheed Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court appeared on behalf of the State and strenuously controverted the view-point as canvassed by the learned defence counsel by contending that the doctrine of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has been pressed into service indirectly which is no more applicable in our system of criminal administration of justice and may be discarded because it is bounded duty of the Court to sift grain from chaff and thus, the statement of Mst. Manzooran could have been taken into consideration and by doing so no illegality or irregularity has been committed by the learned Division Bench of Lahore High Court. It, is next contended that the statement of Mst. Manzooran finds corroboration from medical evidence, recovery and absconsion of the convict/appellant who failed to offer any plausible explanation in this regard. It is contended that the eye account of Mst. Manzooran finds corroboration from medical evidence and thus, it has rightly been believed. It is argued that Mst.
Manzooran has identified the convict/appellant and categorical role has been attributed to him and there is absolutely no lawful justification to discard her statement as pressed time and again by the learned defence counsel. It is also pointed out that motive as incorporated in the F.I.R. Also lends corroboration to the eye account of Mst. Manzooran. On the point of delay in lodging F.I.R. It is submitted by the learned State Counsel that plausible explanation has come on record and complainant has stated in a crystal clear manner that F.I.R. Could not be lodged with promptitude on account of fear. The learned State Counsel has argued that prosecution has established its case by producing cogent and concrete evidence against convict/appellant and thus, no interference whatsoever has called for as sufficient justification is lacking for it.
7. We have carefully examined the respective contentions as agitated on behalf of convict/appellant and for State in the light of record of the case. We have minutely gone through the impugned judgments. We have also thrashed out the entire evidence. In our considered opinion the pivotal question needs determination seems to be as to whether the statement of Mst.
Manzooran could be taken into consideration in view of the existing enmity in-between the parties and as to whether sufficient corroboration has come on record which makes her testimony worthy of credence or otherwise?
8. At this juncture it seems proper to examine what does corroboration means and whether statement of an interested witness could be relied without corroboration and if not, what sought of corroboration would be needed. Primarily "corroboration evidence must proceed from a source independent of an extraneous to the person whose evidence is to be corroborated. Corroboration may consist of direct or circumstantial evidence and it needs not amount to the confirmation of the whole story of the witness to be corroborated so long it corroborates such evidence in some respect material to issue or charge under consideration. Extent and degree of corroboration rests on judicial discretion of the Court and varies with facts and circumstances of each case". (PLD 1977 SC 413). In so far as criminal cases are concerned "in the statement of the rules relating to corroboration in criminal cases it has never been held that corroborative evidence should itself be sufficient for conviction. Even in cases whereas matter of law corroboration is required, all that is insisted upon is that the corroborative evidence should tend to show that the witness or witnesses' evidence that the accused took part in the crime is true. To show that certain witnesses require corroborative and then to lay down that the corroborative evidence must show that the accused did the precise act attributed to him by the witnesses is tantamount to doing away with the evidence of those witnesses. And the same should be the result if the corroborative evidence required as such is incompatible with the innocence of the accused. The true governing such situation is that the corroborative evidence should at least tend to show that the evidence of the witness when they named the accused as taking part in the crime is true". (PLD 1956 SC 1986). It hardly needs any elaboration that there is no rule of law that every ancillary fact has to be supported by other independent evidence. It is only for the safe dispensation of justice that corroboration is necessary in certain given circumstances but the scope of this principle would not extend to the case of ancillary facts testified by the witness. "(1972 PCr.LJ 107).
' "The Supreme Court in Vadivleu Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614) held that a Court should be circumspect and look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before accepting the testimony of a partially unreliable witness. This means that a Court has to sift, from the evidence before it, parts which are wholly reliable and parts which are wholly unreliable and those which are partly reliable and partly unreliable. Even a partly unreliable part of the evidence may form the basis of a conviction where it is corroborated in material particulars by some reliable evidence. It is always a question of fact whether a particular piece of evidence is sufficiently reliable to be used, or, even it appears unreliable, whether it ought not to be accepted in view of some other independent and reliable corroborative evidence. A question appertaining to sifting or weighing of individual items of evidence, about which no fixed and rigid rules can possibly be laid down, must be distinguished from the general rule that a piece of evidence which is found to be partly unreliable, after such a sifting and weighing, needs to be corroborated by reliable evidence before it is acted upon. Of course, if a witness or any part of his version is wholly unreliable, no use can be made of the wholly unreliable evidence. But before this is done there has to be a finding, based on sound and reasonable grounds that a witness or a piece of evidence to be rejected in toto is wholly unreliable." (Devi Prasad v. State, AIR .1967 All. 64 at p.71).
9. To sum up it can be said with certainty "that there cannot be an accepted without corroboration.
By what was said in Niaz v. The State (PLD inflexible rule that the statement of an "interested" witness can never be 1960 SC (Pak.) 387) it was not meant to lay down any rule of law though it explained for the guidance of Courts the Supreme Court's approach to the problem that generally confronts the Courts in cases of crime by violence.
10. There may be an interested witness whom the Court regards as incapable of falsely implicating an innocent person. But he will be an exceptional witness and, so far as an ordinary interested witness is concerned, it cannot be said that it is safe to rely upon his testimony in respect of every person against whom he deposes. In order, therefore, to be satisfied that no innocent persons are being implicated alongwith the guilty, the Court will in the case of an ordinary interested witness look for some circumstance that gives sufficient support to his statement so as to create that degree of probability which can be made the basis of conviction. This is what is meant by saying that the statement of an interested witness ordinarily needs corroboration.
For corroboration it is not necessary that there should be the word of an independent witness supporting the story put forward by an interested witness. Corroboration may be afforded by anything in the circumstances of a case which tends sufficient to satisfy the mind of the Court that the witness has spoken the truth. What circumstances will be sufficient as corroboration it is not possible to lay down. But, as the question before the Court would be whether some innocent person had not been implicated in addition to those who were guilty, the circumstance relied upon must have a bearing on this question."(PLD 1962 SC 269).
11. It may not be out of place to mention here that accumulative effect of the entire evidence is to be taken in the consideration before deriving of any conclusion. The ocular evidence and corroborative evidence cannot be bifurcated and should be appreciated together as "the object of corroborative evidence is to test the veracity of the ocular evidence. Both have, therefore, to be read together and not in isolation. Indeed it would be anomalous to hold that the ocular evidence should be appraised on its own merits without reference to the corroborative evidence. What would then be the use of corroborative evidence which cannot by itself be the basis of conviction.
Where, therefore, in appraising evidence, the High Court isolated the ocular evidence of eye- witnesses from the corroborative evidence comprising of incriminating recoveries and rejected, in the first instance, the evidence of the eye-witnesses and then proceeded to rule out the corroborative evidence on the ground that it did not connect the accused with the crime "more particularly as the entire evidence had been disbelieved", the Supreme Court held that the view thus 'formed by the learned Judges of the High Court was fallacious". (PLD 1971 SC 541).
12. There is no rule having universal applicability that evidence of a related witness or an interested witness must be corroborated by ignoring the surrounding circumstances by means of some independent evidence and statement of such witness can be relied if found worthy of credence and confidence inspiring. We are fortified, in this regard, by the dictum laid down in PLD 1962 SC 269.
13. On the touchstone of criteria as discussed hereinabove we have examined the statement of Mst.
Manzooran. A careful scrutiny of her statement would reveal that presence of convict/appellant, factum of firing, seat of the injury as described by Mst. Manzooran and place of incident went unchallenged and mere a suggestion that she had not seen the occurrence would not be enough to disbelieve her version. A mention has been made regarding improvements without pointing out any specific improvement and she was not confronted with her statement got recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C. To prove such improvements and thus the nature of improvement and its implication could not be appreciated. In our considered opinion mere bald assertion in this regard would not be sufficient and where it is alleged by the defence that prosecution witness has made certain improvements then it becomes their bounden duty to highlight such improvements in a categoric manner by confronting the witness with statements got recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C. Which remained confined to the description/identification of Khalid Mehmood, Manzoor Ahmad, Muhammad Ishaq and factum of conspiracy. It is worth mentioning that no contradiction or improvement whatsoever .Was got proved through Investigating Officer. The presence of Mst.
Manzooran at the spot has hardly been challenged and thus in view of surrounding circumstances, motive and medical evidence mainly on the ground of speculation and conjectural presumptions or some inconsequential discrepancies to discard her statement, in our considered view be a sheer disregard of the well-established principle applicable to safe administration of criminal justice. The evidence of Mst. Manzooran in our opinion does not furnish any reasonable base for giving the benefit of doubt to appellant. We would like to observe that the seat of injury as per narration of Mst. Manzooran, duration of such injury, coinciding with the time of occurrence can be considered as additional evidence incrimianting the convict/appellant. A thorough perusal of the statement of Mst. Manzooran would lead to draw the only irresistible conclusion that there is nothing inherently improbability and thus her version has rightly been relied upon by the learned Division Bench up to the murder of deceased Saleem. We have not been persuaded to agree with learned defence counsel that since the statement of Mst. Manzooran has been discarded regarding acquitted accused, therefore, it hardly deserves any consideration for the reason that in fact futile attempt appears to have been made to press into service the doctrine of "Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus"
(False in one thing, false in all), which is admittedly not applicable in prevalent system of criminal administration of justice and more so there is no rule having universally applicable that where some accused were not found guilty the other accused would ipso facto stand acquitted because the Court has to sift the grain from chaff (1969 SCMR 1327) and (1973 SCMR 162). The principle that testimony of a witness found to be false in part should be discarded as a whole is no more in existence and as such the statement of Mst. Manzooran cannot be brushed aside. We may point out here that "similarly, the rule that the integrity of a witness is indivisible, dispite its moral virtue, has not been endorsed by the superior Courts of this country without reservations and cannot be accepted as one of universal applications. In the last analysis, as stated in some of the eminent judicial decisions, the grain has to be sifted from the chaff in each case, in the light of its own peculiar circumstances". (PLD 1970 SC 14). It may be kept in view that the statement of Mst.
Manzooran finds full corroboration from medical evidence and seat of injury on the chest of deceased. Saleem allegedly caused due to the hit of fire made by convict/appellant finds corroboration by medical evidence which cannot be ignored without lawful justifiable excuses.
14. It is worth mentioning that the convict/appellant remained absconder for a considerable period and no plausible explanation whatsoever has been furnished for such absconsion. There is nothing on record to show that at the time of the arrest of convict/appellant he was in jail as the learned defence counsel could not mention as to when he was arrested and in which case. The statement of Investigating Officer has made it crystal clear that convict/appellant was got declared as an absconder after completion of necessary formalities. Abscondence of an accused is a corroborative circumstance of the charge against him. (PLD 1971 Pesh.32). We are conscious of the fact that "the conduct of the accused soon after the incident plays an important part in determining the guilt of the accused, and is a I corroborative piece of evidence. (Bhamra v. State, 1953 Bhopal 1: 1953 Cr.LJ 217). The conduct of a person absconding after the commission of the offence is evidence to show that he was concerned in the offence (III. (i) Manzoor Elahi v. State PLD 1965 Lah. 656; Permeshwar Din v. E., 1941 0.517; Crown v. Fateh Muhammad 35 PLR 740; Chandika Prasad v. E; 126 IC 684: 1930 Oudh. 324: 31 Cr.LJ 1081; Gangaram Hari Parit v. E., 62 IC 545: 22 Cr. LJ 529; Q.E. v. Sarni, etc. 13 M.426, 432; Q.E. v. Gobardhan, 9A. 528, 545-6; Rakhal Nikari v. Q.E.2 C W N 81) but it is usually a very small item in the evidence on which a conviction can be based. (Crown v.
Fateh Muhammad, 35 PLR 740; Mahla Singh v. E., 130 IC 410: 1931 L. 38:32 Cr.LJ 522; Chandika Prasad v. E., 126 IC 684: 1930 Oudh. 324:31 Cr.LJ 1081; Q v. Sorab Roy, 5 W R Cr. 28). Absconding is equally consistent with innocence and guilt. It is a proper matter to be considered alongwith the other facts of the case, whether they bear upon guilt or upon innocence. (Khan v. State, 1955 C.146). It is well-known that different persons are differently constituted, and that some accused persons, though innocent, deliberately abscond rather than face the ordeal of a criminal trial. (Chandika Prasad v. E., 126 IC 684; 130 0. 324: 31 Cr. LJ 1081). Where it is shown that the accused ran away to avoid the consequence of being charged with an offence different from that for which he was being tried, no importance should be attached to the fact of his running away. (Rakhal Nikari v. Q.E.
2 CWN 81). If, after the commission of a crime, a person whose name is mentioned as a participator in the crime absconds, his conduct shows that he is concerned in the crime. Therefore, anything which tends to explain his conduct and furnishes a motive other than a guilty conscience, will be relevant under section 9, Evidence Act". (Gangaram Hari Parit v. E., 62 IC 545: 22 Cr. LJ 529). In view of what has been stated above the factum of absconsion cannot altogether be ignored and corroborative value of the abscondence of accused is to be judged in the light of facs and cirumstances of each case.
15. The factum of abscondence having its own significance also lends corroboration to the eye account of Mst. Manzooran. If any reference is needed PLD 1978 SC 103 can be cited.
16. The prosecution has also proved the motive which is an old enmity and a few murders have also been committed which aspect of the matter can also be considered as supporting factors to the version of Mst. Manzooran besides the factum of absconsion, and medical evidence which lends full corroboration to the eye account of Mst. Manzooran and we are accordingly inclined to believe her version up to the extent of murder of Saleem. There is no cavil to the proposition that motive is a double-edged weapon but it may not escape unnoticed that is has its own importance which cannot be overlooked. It cannot be sine qua non as for bringing offence home to accused yet relevant and significant enough to determine the factum of intention and can be considered in view of peculiar circumstances of the case. There is no lawful justifiable cause to discard the version of Mst. Manzooran duly corroborated by medical evidence, absconsion of convict/appellant and motive for the commission of alleged offence. (PLD 1976 SC 557; PLD 1962 SC 259 and PLD 1973 SC 83).
17. The acquittal of convict/appellant under section 452, P.P.C. For which unfortunately no sound reasoning whatsoever has been given by the learned Division Bench, would have no substantial effect on the murder of Saleem because the distance and range of firing could not be proved fatal to the case of prosecution for the simple reason that a range or distance cannot be measured with complete accuracy and exactitude. The other contention which was agitated on behalf of convicts/appellant vigorously that since Karamat Ali has been acquitted, therefore, convict/appellant may also be acquitted seems to be devoid of merit for the simple reason that Karamat was not only found innocent by the Investigating Officer but his name was also incorporated in column No,2 of the challan and furthermore he never remained an absconder.
18. There is no force in the contention that conviction could not be awarded on the basis of solitary statement of Mst. Manzooran as it is quality of evidence and not quantity which is to be considered.
The conviction can be based on the evidence of a solitary witness. In this regard we are fortified by the dictum laid down in PLD 1980 SC 225; 1971 SCMR 659; 1969 SCMR 76; 1971 SCMR 273 and 1995 SCMR 1979. As mentioned hereinabove the statement of Mst. Manzooran finds corroboration from medical evidence, motive surrounding circumstances and absconsion irrespective of her inter se relationship with deceased (PLD 1979 SC 144; 1975 Cr.LJ (DB) 218).
19. No mitigating circumstances are available benefit whereof could be given to convict/appellant and thus the appeal being devoid of merit is dismissed.