1. ' These appeals arise out of common set of facts and a common question of law is involved, therefore, all these appeals have been heard together and are disposed of by this common order.
2. The common issue involved in all these appeals is whether the Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965 is applicable to those employees whose wages exceeded Rs,1,500 per month.
3. ' As already observed the facts and circumstances are almost similar. For the sake of convenience the facts are given as contained in the impugned order in M.A. No,5 of 1995. The appellant Reckitt & Colman Pakistan Limited filed an Appeal bearing No,24 of 1992 before the First Sindh Labour Appellate Court under section 59 of the Sindh Social Security Ordinance, 1965. The appellant had assailed issuance of notice by the Director Sindh Employees Social Security Institution, Karachi before Commissioner of Sindh Employees Social Security Institution. The appeal was decided against the present appellants and they assailed the order before the First Sindh Labour Court Karachi, taking plea that the employees of the appellant whose wages exceeded Rs,1,500 per month ceased to be a secured worker, and thus, the management was not liable to pay contribution to the Institution. The plea of the Sindh Employees Social. Security Institution (hereinafter referred to as the Institution) was that the employer was absolved to pay the contribution for the amount which an employee was getting in excess of Rs,1,500. So far the amount of Rs,1,500 is concerned the management was still bound to pay the contribution. Lengthy arguments were addressed pertaining to the connotation of the expression 'employed' as used in section 2(8)(f) of the Ordinance. Learned First Sindh Labour Court Karachi, ultimately held that the Institution is entitled to recover the contribution from the establishment for the workers up to the limit of Rs,1,500 and not on excess amount.
4. ' Without going into the details it would be appropriate to trace out the development and amendments in section 2(8)(f) of the Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965. At present section 2(8)(f) reads as follows:-- ' 2(8)(f) 'employee' means any person working, normally for at least twenty four hours per week, for wages, in or in connection with the work of any industry, business, undertaking or establishment, under any contract of service or apprenticeship, whether written or oral, express or implied but does not include:-- (a)
5. (c)..........
6. (d).....
7. (e)..........
(f) any person employed on wages exceeding (three thousand) rupees per mensem. Provided that an employee shall not cease to be an employee for the reason that his monthly wages exceed three thousand rupees."
8. ' The original amount of wages mentioned in section 2(8)(f) of the Ordinance was Rs,500 which was substituted for Rs,1,000. It was enhanced to Rs,1,500 and lastly by Labour Laws Amendment Act, 1994 to Rs,3,000. The proviso was also added by Labour Laws Amendment Act, 1994. In the present appeals the question whether an employee earning wages exceeding Rs,1,500 shall continue to be an 'employee' or shall ceased to be an 'employee' within the meaning of the terms contained in section 2(8)(f) of the Ordinance, pertains to the period prior to the insertion of proviso by the Labour Laws Amendment Act, 1994. However, a question has been raised whether the proviso added by Labour Laws Amendment Act, 1994 is retrospective in effect and shall be applicable to the proceedings pending at the time of insertion of the proviso or it shall have prospective effect.
9. Prior to the insertion of proviso to section 2(8)(f) of the Ordinance, the point of controversy between the institution and employers was on the interpretation of the word "employed" used in section 2(8)
(f) of the Ordinance. The plea of the Institution was that the term "employed" denotes to the initial employment of an employee meaning thereby that if a person was initially employed at wages above the ceiling provided in section 2(8)(0 of the Ordinance, he shall not be deemed to be an employee for the purpose of said provision, however, if a person was employed at a wages lower than the ceiling, he shall continue to be an employee even after crossing the ceiling. On the other hand the plea of the employers was that the term "employed" merely denotes the commencement of a contract of employment and creation of the relationship of employer and employee, meaning thereby that not only a person employed initially at the wages falling beyond this ceiling but a person employed for wages beneath this ceiling shall be ceased to be an employee for the purpose of section 2(8)(f) of the Ordinance if by revision of pay, promotion, increment or otherwise becomes entitled to wages exceeding the ceiling. However, with the insertion of proviso by the Labour Laws Amendment Act, 1994 the situation has undergone a change, and now the legislature had declared/clarified its intention. The ambiguity if any has been A removed, with the result that after the insertion of proviso one meaning only can be attributed to the provisions contained in section 2'6)(0 of the Ordinance, i,e, exclusion contained in the provision is applicable to the person who is initially employed on wages exceeding ceiling (Rs,1,500 Rs,3,000) per mensum and the exclusion is not applicable if a person was initially employed at wages below the ceiling and thereby falling within the purview of term employed as defined in section 2(8)(f) of the .Ordinance, irrespective of the increase in subsequent wages beyond the ceiling provided in the said provision.
10. In other words it can be said that the legislature has settled the controversy by -laying down the principle of once an employee always an employee, for the purpose of section 2(8)(f) of the Ordinance, irrespective of the wages remaining below the ceiling or exceeding the ceiling. Once the status of an employee is acquired by a worker it shall never be ceased for the reasons of increase in the monthly wages. Thus, in the case of a person once acquiring the status of an employee there should be no exclusion on account of any amount of wages per month received by the said employee.
11. ' The learned Advocates for the parties have addressed very lengthy arguments giving various meanings of the word "employed", taking assistance from English grammar dictionaries and use of the term in other laws including the effect of other provisions contained in the Ordinance pertaining to the formula of contribution to be made by an employer in respect of an employee and the various judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court and the High Court. I am of the opinion that the effect of amendment/change in law is always required to be considered by the Court, and therefore, it is incumbent to consider if the amendment made by the legislature shall have the effect of changing the entire complexion of the issue under consideration. It is, therefore, imperative to consider if the amendment made -by the insertion of proviso to section 2(8)(f) of the Ordinance, has retrospective or prospective effect. If it is concluded that the proviso has prospective effect then the very learned, elaborate and eruditely arguments addressed by all the learned Advocates shall be considered and dilated in depth and detail. However, if in the ultimate analysis I find that the proviso inserted by the Labour Laws Amendment Act, 1994 is retrospective in effect then notwithstanding the pains taken by the learned Advocates, their industry and labour, the issue shall be decided in accordance with the effect of amendment as discussed above.
12. ' Learned Advocates for the appellant and the respondent have placed reliance on two Single Bench judgments of this Court. First, in the case of Messrs Jupiter Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi v.
13. Director, Hyderabad Directorate, Hyderabad and another (1997 PLC 473). A contention was raised in this case which is similar to the point in issue in these appeals to the effect that no payment can be demanded in relation to the employees whose wages by virtue of agreement exceeded beyond Rs,1,500 p.m. It was pleaded that the moment an employee who was initially covered within the, term employee (as his wages were up to Rs,1,500 p.m.) receives wages exceeding Rs,1,500 p.m., can no longer be termed as employee as referred to in section 2(8)(f) of the Ordinance.
14. ' Mr. Khalid Habibullah, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents in those appeals argued in the cited case that the word employed' denotes the initial engagement and has reference to the concept of master and servant i,e, it declares the relationship between employer and the employee. In support of his contention he had placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court of India reported in the case of Workmen of the Food Corporation of India v. Food Corporation of India (AIR 1985 SC 670). He had further placed reliance on a judgment reported in (100 Pacific Reporter 2nd series page No,222) by the Supreme Court of New Maxico wherein it was held that word employed is synonymous to hire or appoint.
15. ' On the other hand Mr. Khursheed Anwar Shaikh, learned Advocate for the employers had taken plea that the word employed means, to appoint and to engage. It was held by Mr. Justice M.L.
16. Shahanai, after considering the point urged by the parties I would hold that the concept of employment/engagement/appointment is an initial appointment. In case a person is employed initially with salary more than Rs,1,500 per month the employer is not liable to pay the contribution in respect of such employee. The conclusion is in consonance with the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (PLD 1988 SC 1). The employer is liable to pay the contribution up to the sum of Rs,1,500 when he was covered under the net of social security, he shall continue to remain under the cover even after, his wages exceed Rs,1,500 by virtue of normal increment in the ordinary course of rendering services for the employer. In respect of proviso to clause (f) of section 2(8) of the Ordinance, it was observed that proviso is to be strictly construed as it is exception to the general concept conveyed by the Legislature. It was further observed that the reason that it was not included by the Legislature earlier, was that now the Legislature has brought more workers under the net of Social Security i,e, employees drawing wages up to Rs,3,000 per month or Rs,120 per day. The Legislature felt the need that such employees needed protection of the Social Security benefit, therefore, expressly now, it has been provided that even though they may draw wages exceeding Rs,3,000 and, therefore, would not be deprived from the benefit under the beneficial legislation i,e, under the Social Security Ordinance. It was further observed that another reason that may be for inclusion of such proviso is that the legislature knows the existing state of law which may be gathered from the judgments delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The law expressly declared by the Supreme Court in PLD 1988 SC 1, is given express contours in the form of the proviso which was added by the Legislature to confer express approval on the law declared by the Supreme Court.
17. ' The second judgment is in the case of Messrs Agfa Gevaert Pakistan Ltd. v. Sindh (Provincial)
18. Employees Social Security Institution, 2000 PLC 62 (Karachi High Court). In this case plea of appellants (employer) was that they were making contribution under the Ordinance on the basis of wages of persons falling within the definition of employee in terms of section 2(8) of the Ordinance to the mandate of section 20. In the year 1989 the definition of employee, inter alia, excluded persons employed on wages exceeding Rs,1,500. Pursuant to a revision of salaries of employees in the appellant company effective from 1-8-1989 the minimum wages payable in the appellant establishment were raised to Rs,1,545 and hence, no contribution was required to be made. The respondent was accordingly informed by letter, dated 31-7-1989 and admittedly thereafter no payment was made. However, more than five years later the appellant received a letter from a Director of the respondent alleging that they were liable to make contribution, and directed them to do so together with statutory increase within 10 days failing which, recovery will be made by way of arrears of land revenue. The appellant preferred a complaint against the aforesaid demand before the Commissioner of the respondent under section 57 of the Ordinance which was rejected. An appeal to the Labour Court under section 59 was also dismissed and thereafter appeal was preferred before the High Court under section 64 of the Ordinance. In the present appeals also the facts are almost similar. The same point came for consideration before Mr. Justice Sabihuddin Ahmed. He observed that it was not necessary to go in so much details and controversy would be resolved prior to 25-9-1993 and the effect of the amendment enacted on such date. It was held by my learned brother Mr. Justice Sabihuddin Ahmed, as follows:-- "As is evident from the preamble to the Ordinance that it seeks to provide some benefits to certain employees and not every person receiving remuneration for service rendered. Section 2(8) defines the expression employee and clauses (a) to (f) thereof exclude certain persons who otherwise, fall within the broad import of the expression. Clause (t) as it stood at the relevant time excluded persons employed on wages exceeding Rs,1,500 from the ambit of the expression employee."
7. The effect of the amendment brought about through the Labour Laws Amendment Ordinance, 1993 (which was subsequently adopted as an Act of (Parliament) was to hold from the stand point from expanding the definition of an employee. In the first instance the words 1,500 were substituted to read 3,000. In other words contribution became payable in respect of person drawing wages not exceeding Rs,3,000 from the date of enforcement of the Ordinance. Secondly, it was apparently realised that under the law existing prior to the amendment a person in respect of whom contributions were payable and who was allowed certain social security benefits would cease to enjoy such benefits the moment the quantum of his wages, crossed the amount specified in the clause (as 'appears to have happened in the instant case). To rectify this situation and to ensure that an employee does not lose such benefits a proviso was added stipulating that an employee shall not cease to be an employee for the reason that his monthly wages exceed 3,000 rupees. In other words once a person was entitled to social security benefits and contributions were required to be'made on his behalf, he would continue to remain so irrespective of the increase in his wages to an amount exceeding Rs,3,000. It is indeed settled law that a provision of a statute ought to be construed in the first instance according to its plain grammatical meaning and the unamended clause clearly showed that a person drawing wages exceeding the amount specified could not be treated as an employee for the purpose of the Ordinance. The amendment further fortifies the 'appellant's case inasmuch as it shows that a proviso (which is an-exception to the general rules) had to be enacted to ensure benefits for the liability to make contribution in respect of those who would otherwise not be entitled thereto.
8. Mr. Khalid Habibullah, learned counsel for the respondents, however, vociferously argued that the Ordinance was a beneficial statute and must be liberally construed in favour of employees. Indeed there can be no cavil with its proposition but the question of strict or beneficial construction could only arise if otherwise there was an ambiguity regarding the scope and meaning of a statutory provision.
10. Mr. Khalid Habibullah then attempted to argue that clause (f) of section 2(8) only intended to exclude those persons who joined employment at wages exceeding the specified amount. (Rs,1,500 or Rs,3,000) or as the case may be and not those whose wages came to exceed such amount.
19. Quite frankly I find no substance in such contention in view of what has been discussed above.
20. Learned counsel then attempted to contend that~ the 1993 Amendment was only a piece of declaratory legislation enacted by way of abundant caution and ought to be given retrospective effect. In support of his contention he referred to various observations from Craies Statutory Construction. I regret I cannot agree, to hold so would nullify the very basis on which proviso to the aforesaid clauses was added. At best it could only be treated as a piece of .Remedial> legislation and when the legislature itself gave it prospective effect the Court cannot make its application retrospective. "
21. ' A perusal of the above findings of my learned brother. Mr. Justice Sabihuddin Ahmed, contained in para. 10 of his judgment shows that the issue pertaining to retrospective effect of the amendment inserting proviso to section 2(8)(f) could not be considered elaborately, probably for want of proper assistance with the result that the point was decided by very short finding. I, would, however, like to consider the issue of retroactive application of the amendment in some detail. It is provided in para. 73 of the Crawford's Interpretation of Law, published by Pakistan Law House at page 105 as follows:-- "Curative statutes are those which attempt to cure or correct errors and irregularities judicial or administrative proceedings, which seek to give effect to contracts and other transactions between private persons which otherwise would fail to produce their intended consequences on account of some statutory disability or a failure to comply with some technical requirement. Remedial acts are those enacted in order to improve facilities and remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and for the redress of wrongs or injuries as well as to correct defects, mistakes and omissions in a former law."
22. ' It is stated in para. 74 (page 107) as follows:- "Generally speaking, declaratory statutes can be divided into two classes: (1) those declaratory of the common law, and (2) those declaring the meaning of existing statute. Obviously, those declaratory of the common law should be construed according t the common law. Those of the second class are to be constru as intended to lay down a rule for future cases, and to act retrospective. They closely resemble interpretation clauses, and their paramount purpose is to remove doubt as to the meaning of existing law, or to correct a construction considered erroneous by the legislature."
23. ' In the same treatise there is an elaborate discussion on the prospective and retrospective operations of law. It is stated at page 279 as follows:-- "But consideration of public good; and public justice have been regarded as, sufficient reasons for upholding retroactive legislation of a curative nature, even though certain vested rights were, thereby impaired:- 'The retrospection of the act is indisputable, and equally so if its purpose is to change the legal rights of the litigating parties.'
24. "On the other hand, laws of retrospective nature, affecting the rights of individuals, not adverse to equitable principles, and highly pro motive of the general good, have often been passed, and as often approved."
25. ' The subject has been dealt with in the Craies on Statute Law, as well dealing with the point of distinction between the declaratory and remedial acts. It has been observed at page 58 (Seventh Edition) that" For modern purposes a declaratory Act may be defined as an Act to remove doubts existing as to the common law, or the meaning or effect of any statute. Such acts are usually held to be retrospective.
26. ' It has been further observed that "the usual reason for passing a declaratory Act is to set aside what Parliament deems to have been a judicial error, whether in the statement of the common law or in the interpretation of statutes. Usually, if not, invariably, such an Act contains a preamble, and also the word "declared' as well as the word "enacted"."
27. ' Thus, the declaratory Acts and the remedial Acts are in fact similar in nature, but are differentiated with reference to the system of law prevailing in U.K., where common law is also practised and recognized alongwith the statute law. The removal of any doubt pertaining to common law is categorized as a declaratory Act and when any doubt is removed or any explanation is added to statute law it is called remedial Act. Thus, with reference to the system of law prevailing in Pakistan, the declaratory Acts and the remedial Acts are in fact, of the same nature and the two expressions are loosely used to describe the same nature of enactment. With reference to the system of law in Pakistan, any amendment or enactment of law primary purpose of removing the doubt, clearing an ambiguity or adding an explanation would in fact be a remedial Act. It is further observed at page 60 that.
28. ' Remedial Acts are subdivided by Black Stone into 'enlarging' and 'restraining' Acts, the former widening the common law where it was too strict or narrow, the latter taking away or cutting down rights existing at common law.'It is further observed that both terms are in truth purely relative. The same statute may be 'enlarging' as to one set of persons 'restraining' as to others."
29. ' In the same book while dealing with the subject of retrospective enactment it has been stated at page 395, that, "where a statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute, or, to explain a former statute, the subsequent statute has relation back to the time when the prior Act was passed." It is further observed that "where an Act is in its nature declaratory, the presumption against construing it retrospectively is inapplicable. A reference has been made to the case of Ahgen v. Theobald (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 557, wherein a proviso was held retrospective although limitation in which it terms had commenced before it was passed. It is further stated at page 396, that "If a statute is passed for the purpose of protecting the public against some evil or abuse, it may be allowed to operate retrospectively, although by such operation it will deprive some person or persons of a vested right".
30. ' Since the proviso under consideration was added by the legislature to a section containing definition, therefore, it would be appropriate to consider the nature of definition in a clause or a section. While dealing with the subject it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of The Punjab Cooperative Bank Limited v. The Republic of Pakistan and 128 others (PLD 1964 SC 616), as follows:-- ' "The object of incorporating a definition clause or section in a statute is generally to declare what certain words and expressions used in that statute shall mean. The definition thus is, as a rule, of a declaratory character and normally applied to all cases which come within its ambit whatever might have been the position before."
31. ' The learned Advocates for the appellant have submitted that the proviso inserted by the Labour Laws (Amendment. Act, 1994) is not declaratory in nature as according to them a declaratory law is that which specifically contains the words "it is hereby declared" and there are no such words contained in the Act inserting the proviso to section 2(8)(0 of the Ordinance. I am not impressed with the contention for the reason that by now the Courts have leaning towards the purposive interpretation of the statute. For this purpose the form is not material but the substance of law is to be seen. It is also established by now that any Act which purports to have been enacted for a declaration is not to be taken as declaratory law in its entirety. Notwithstanding that an enactment is purported to be a declaratory law, some of the provisions contained in the Act may not be a declaratory nature. Likewise a law may be declaratory in nature because of its substance although it is not stated that it is declaratory in nature. Moreover, normally an enactment on a particular subject contains provisions which are (a) substantial (b) procedural and (c) declaratory. The definitions are normally declaratory in nature as the definitions contained in a statute assigned special meanings to the terms and expressions used by the legislature in a particular enactment.
32. For this reason the definitions given in one statute are not considered for the purpose of any other statute because the meaning are assigned/declared to particular terms and expression for the purpose of the particular enactment. It has, therefore, been held that the definitions given in a particular statute are declaratory of the intention of legislature, pertaining to the connotation and scope of the terms and expressions used in a particular enactment.
33. ' At this juncture I would like to deal briefly with the scope of proviso added to the section or subsequent to an Act. Generally the proviso is taken to be an exception and is interpreted to= narrow r, the effect of preceding words. It Is also taken as means to create exception from the section to which it is added. Its function is treated to- exclude and take out certain cases from the rule to which it is added and to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment. However, it is not an absolute rule as proviso is some time used as a precautionary measure, to explain the general words or section and to exclude some ground of misinterpretation which would extend it to cases not intended to be brought within its operation or purview. The old view was that the proviso cannot be interpreted to enlarge the scope of enactment, however, with the adoption of purposive interpretation of statute the view has undergone change and it has been held that though while in many cases a proviso limits or qualifies what preceded it yet, it is the substance and content of the enactment, not its form, which has to be considered and that which is expressed to be a proviso may itself add to and not merely limit or qualify that which precede it. In the modern legislation instances are not wanting when leading enactments have been made through explanations or the provisos. Thus, the, principle of purposive interpretation requires that an enactment or-amendment is not to be interpreted merely in a particular form by following the formula that an explanation is to be understood as explaining the meaning of the, provision to which it is added and that K explanation clause cannot enlarge or limit the provision and that a proviso is always an exception to the general rule. Thus, instead of interpreting a provision of law on the basis of concept attributed to fop of legislation it would be more appropriate to consider the contents and substance of the provision- itself instead of following the conceptual interpretation. The purpose of interpretation of statute by the Court is to ascertain the intention L of the legislature and purpose of enactment. A bare perusal of the proviso under consideration shows that it does not have the effect of excepting any thing provided in the main section or narrowing the effect and scope thereof. It clearly envisages to remove any doubt having the effect of excluding an employee from the definition of the term, after exceeding, the ceiling of wages provided in the main enactment and enlarging the main provision. Thus, the proviso under consideration, is not to be interpreted narrowly but it has to be interpreted in wider sense and more particularly because the entire act is in the nature of beneficial legislation and the particular proviso under consideration is on its plain. Reading meant to remove a wrong which was likely to be committed to theemployees on narrow interpretation of the main enactment and thus, clearly the amendment is beneficial in nature.
34. ' My view that the proviso is not always meant for making exception and that it is not necessarily has limited operation is supported with the following observations, in the treatise Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statute, 12th Edition, page 190.
35. "If, however, the language of the proviso makes it plain that it was intended to have an operation more extensive than that of the provision which it immediately follows, it must be given such wider effect."
36. ' It is stated in Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, page 219, that "But sections, though framed as provisos upon preceding sections, may exceptionally contain matter which is in substance a fresh enactment, adding to and not merely qualifying what goes before".
37. ' It has been observed in Crawfords Interpretation of Laws, published by Pakistan Law House, page 604 as follows:-- "Even though primary purpose of the proviso is to limit or retain the general language of a statue, the legislature, unfortunately, does not always use it with technical correctness. Consequently, where, its use creates an ambiguity, it is the, duty of the Court to ascertain, the legislative intention, through resort to the usual rules of construction applicable to statutes generally, and give it effect even though the statute is thereby enlarged, or the proviso made to assume the force of an independent enactment, and although a proviso as such has no existence apart from the provision which it is designed to limit or to qualify."
38. ' Now I come to another aspect to which the rules of interpretation pertaining to the curative and remedial acts relating to retroactive effect. It has-been observed in Crawford's Interpretation of Law, page 105, that "Remedial Acts are those 'enacted in order to improve and facilitate remedies already existing for 'the enforcement of rights and for the redress of wrongs or injuries as well as to correct defects, mistakes and omissions in a former law".
39. ' I will now examine whether the entire law under consideration namely the Provisional Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965, is a beneficial and remedial Act as well as a welfare Act and thereafter, I will consider the rules pertaining to the interpretation of remedial, beneficial and welfare legislation. A preamble of the Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965 shows that the law was Acted to introduce the scheme of social security for providing benefits to certain employees or their dependents in the event of sickness, maternity, employment injury or death, and for matters ancillary thereto. The nature of enactment came for consideration before Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the case of National Embroidery Mills Ltd,' and others v. Punjab Employees Social Security Institution (1993 SCM R 1201) and his lordship Mr. Justice Saleem Akhtar, speaking for the full bench of the Supreme Court, held as follows:-- "Mr. Sarwana contended that as the Ordinance is a beneficial and remedial statute it should be liberally interpreted so that benefits may be conferred on large number of employees. The learned counsel referred to Kohinoor Chemical Co. Ltd. And another v. Sindh Employees Social Security Institution and another PLD 1977 SC 197 and Messrs MacDonald Layton Constain Ltd. v. Punjab Employees Social Security Institution PLD 1991 SC 1055. In the last case it was observed that under the Islamic dispensation interpretation which uphold the rights of the workers should be accepted.
40. There can be no cavil with the proposition that the Ordinance is a beneficial legislation intended to provide benefit to the workers of a particular group measured with the salary."
41. ' After examining the nature of relief needed to be provided to the employees under the enactment it was held "In these circumstances, the accepted principle of interpretation that beneficial statutes are to be interpreted liberally must be applied".
42. ' In the case of Kohinoor Chemical Co. Ltd., and another v. Sindh Employees Social Security Institution and another, which has been referred to in the judgment cited above it was held by Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under:-- "There is no doubt that we are dealing with a beneficial or remedial legislation conceived as a means of ameliorating the lot of the working class, and as such it would in keeping with the accepted principle of interpretation, as observed in Divisional Superintendent, P.W.R., Karachi v.
43. Bashir Ahmed (PLD 1973 SC 589) that it should be so construed as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief, or else it would frustrate the legislative intent. It would appear, therefore, that, in keeping with the object of the legislation, as wide an interpretation should be placed on the terms 'employee' and establishment as permissible within the language employed in the statute."
44. ' The question whether the Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965, is a beneficial legislation was raised before my learned brother Mr. Justice Sabihuddin Ahmed, in the case of M/s. Agfa Gevaert Pakistan Ltd., (2000 PLC 62) but the issue was not examined in detail for the reason that there was no ambiguity regarding the scope and meaning of the said statutory provisions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has granted leave to appeal against the said order on 26-7- 2000, in C.P.S.L.A. No,680-K, 685-K and 688-K of 1999, to consider the following:- "(i) To examine the scope clause (f) of subsection (8) of section 2 of Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965, with reference to the object of the Ordinance.
(ii) Whether the dictum laid down by this Court in the case reported as Sindh Employees Social Security Institution v. Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. (PLD 1988 SC I) is attracted to the circumstances of this case."
45. ' After concluding that the Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965 is a beneficial legislation, I will advert to the principles governing the interpretation of such acts/provisions. It has been held by Punjab High Court (India) in the case of Kanpur Textile Finishing Mills v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (AIR 1955 Punjab 130) that "where in keeping with the policy of the State, i,e, to establish a welfare State with the directive principles of State policy as contained in part IV of the Constitution, a statute is enacted by Parliament for the benefit of the workers, a beneficial construction must be given to it." It has been further held that as the object of the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952, is to provide for a provident fund for workers, it is the duty of the Court to interpret the Act in such a manner as to give effect to the intention of the Legislature and not to put a very narrow construction which may defeat the object of the Act".
46. ' The Calcutta High Court has held in the case of A. Bus Associations v. Assistant Labour Commissioner and others (AIR 1967 Calcutta 371) that "it has been generally recognised that Statutes like the Minimum Wages Act should be given a beneficial interpretation, because such Acts are meant for the social welfare of the masses".
47. ' There is no dearth of judgments from the superior Courts in Pakistan as well. It has been held by Mr. Justice Qaiser Ahmed Hamidi of this Court in the case of Muhammad Ibrahim v. Province of Sindh and another (1991 M LD 90) that "where a statute had been enacted for the benefit of affected persons, in interpreting such statute, there was no room for taking a narrow view but Court was entitled to be generous towards persons on whom benefit had been conferred".
48. ' The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Shaheen Airport Services v. Sindh Employees Social Security Institution (1994 SCM R 881) while dealing with the provisions contained in the enactment under consideration, held that "the Court cannot construe even a beneficial statute in such a way that it may violate its provisions nor the Court can place beneficial interpretation on a provision contrary to its language merely on the ground that its literal construction will cause hardship or would not be beneficial to the class for whose benefit the statute in question was enacted. However, at the same time, the Court while construing a beneficial enactment, can take into consideration the object for which it was enacted and the mischief which it intended to suppress, and if two possible constructions of a provision of such a statute are possible, one which favours the class of persons for whose benefit the statute has been enacted, would be preferred." It has been further held that "The West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965 is a specie of statute which was to be enacted by, the State with the object of promoting social and economic well being of the people and, therefore, it is a beneficial enactment intended to provide social security to the workmen covered by the provisions of the same and, hence, it is to be construed liberally and if two constructions are possible, one which extends the benefit of the Ordinance to more workmen and the other which limits such benefit, the former is to be preferred." In this case the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan preferred the extended definition of the term employee with reference to U.S.A.
49. And English cases. .I have already referred to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan (PLD 1964 SC 616), wherein it has been held that "the part of enactment containing definition is declaratory in nature".
50. ' I will, therefore, refer to some judgments from Indian jurisdiction in which the rules pertaining to the effect of declaratory enactments have been considered.
51. ' It has been held by Allahabad High Court, in the case of Muhammadi Bibi v. Kashi Upadhya and others (AIR 1926 Allahabad 725) that "A declaratory Act is an Act to remove doubts existing as to the meaning or effect of a statute, and the usual reason for passing a declaratory Act is to set aside what the legislative body deems to have been a judicial error. Declaratory Act, like judgments, decides cases pending when the judgments are given but do not reopen decided cases." It has further been held that if an appeal is pending it is not a decided case, and therefore, declaratory. Act is applicable to cases pending at the appellate stage.
52. ' It has been held by Madras High Court, in the case A.T. Pannirselvam v. A. Veeriah Vendayar and another (AIR 1931 Madras 83) that "No doubt it is possible that a provision of an Act not in its general character declaratory may be declaratory in effect, though not in form. "It has further been held that "a declaratory Act ordinarily has retrospective effect".
53. ' It has been held by Hyderabad High Court, in the case of Varalakhsmi v. Virmulu (AIR 1956 Hyderabad, 75) that "It is needless to state that the well-accepted principle and canon of construction is that an Act shall be given retrospective effect unless there are words to that effect or such a retrospective effort is to be given by necessary implication. But under the law an exception to this principle has been made in case an enactment having regard to the nature of the statute. Where therefore, the statute and its intendment partake of the characteristics of a declaratory law then it would be considered to have retrospective effect".
54. ' It has been held by the Allahabad High Court, in the case of Ramesh Metal Works and another v.
55. State (AIR 1962 Allahabad 227) that "the object of scheme of an Act is to be considered while interpreting the words "are employed" instead of interpreting the words according to rules of grammar." It was further held that law is, however, not an exercise in linguistic discipline. It is emerging as an important Therapy in disorder of social metabolism. It is complex process, and can be fully understood only by an attentive regard to its therapeutic function and its synthesis. There is accordingly growing recognition by Courts that a statute should be construed, rather than interpreted, with due regard to its avowed object and to its character." It was ultimately held that "the avowed object of the Act is to provide adequate security to the worker in old age and infirmity.
56. It is a welfare legislation land it should be so construed as to give necessary effect to that object".
57. ' It has been held by Kerala High Court, in the case of Narayana Pattar v. State of Kerala and others (AIR 1979 Kerala 139) that "A declaratory Act means to declare the law, or to declare that which has always been the law, and there having been doubts which have arisen, Parliament declares what the law is and enacts that it shall continue what it then is. It has further been held that "where a statutory provision is in its nature declaratory it will be presumed to be retrospective unless a contrary intention is clearly indicated by the legislature, the reason being that its underlying purpose of explaining or clarifying the existing law will be effectively served only by giving it such a retrospective construction".
58. ' Consequent to the above discussion it is held that although amendment has been made in section 2(8)(t) of the Ordinance, in the form of proviso but a bare perusal of the provision leaves no scintilla of doubt, that in effect and in substance it is not in the nature of proviso. In substance it is a leading provision. The reason being that the proviso is generally an exception to the section preceding the proviso and being in the nature of an exception it is interpreted very narrowly and strictly. A bare perusal of the proviso under consideration shows that 'it has enlarging effect. It is further held that the provision under consideration is part of section containing definition and therefore, it is declaratory in nature as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the judgment reported as (PLD 1964 SC 616).
59. ' As already held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the judgments cited above, the entire law contained in the Ordinance is beneficial in nature, therefore, the provision under consideration is also a beneficial and welfare legislation and thus, is required to be interpreted liberally and in a way which has the effect of advancing the relief and suppressing the mischief. It is further held that the provisions contained in proviso are explanatory in nature and an explanation added by the legislature is deemed to be a note of caution indicating the real intention of the legislature and purpose of the enactment as well as removal of any doubt. Thus, the provision is classificatory as well. The presumption is that the legislature while enacting any law or making any amendment is conscious of the circumstances prevailing at the time of enactment/amendment/substitution, and therefore, it is held that the legislature was aware that questions were being raised about the exclusion of a worker from the purview of the terms employee used in the Ordinance as defined in section 2(8)(f) and a view was prevailing which was prejudicial to the interest of worker and was not in consonance with the avowed object and purpose of legislation, therefore, an amendment was inserted whereby it was clearly provided without any ambiguity that once a person/ worker is included within the definition of employee under the Ordinance, he shall continue to be so, notwithstanding crossing the ceiling of wages. Thus, the law curative in nature as well. Thus, the proviso to section 2(8)(f) of the Ordinance being a part of definition section is declaratory and at the same time it is beneficial, curative, remedial and welfare legislation and has to be given retroactive effect.
60. ' As a result of above findings, it is held that the proviso to section 2(8)(f) of the Ordinance, being retroactive in effect, the respondents have rightly' held that the employees who have crossed the ceiling continue to be employees and therefore, the respondents are justified in demanding contribution in respect of such employees from the appellant in accordance with the provisions contained in the Ordinance.
61. ' For the foregoing reasons it is held that the learned First Sindh Labour Court/First Sindh Social Security Court, has rightly held that the provisions contained in Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1965, are applicable to the employees, whose wages have exceeded the ceiling and that the institution is entitled to recover the contribution in respect of the said workers from the appellant. The impugned findings on the point of continuance of the workers within the definition of employee even after exceeding the ceiling and continuing to be secured persons and thus, continuance of liability of employer for paying contribution under the Ordinance is hereby upheld.
62. ' Consequent to the above findings, all the appeals stand dismissed with no order as to costs.