' DEEDAR HUSSAIN SHAH, J.---This petition is directed against the judgment, dated 4-12-2000 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, passed in HCA No,206 of 2000.
2. The facts, in brief, are that Karachi Building Control Authority, after conducting an inquiry, suspended the petitioners on the charge of misconduct. The petitioners filed Suit No,74 of 1997 in the High Court for declaration and permanent injunction. The learned Single Judge in Chambers vide order dated 15-6-2000 rejected the plaint under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C. Keeping in view the bar provided under Article 212 of the Constitution and imposed cost of Rs,2,000 on each petitioner to be paid to the KDA and KBCA with a further direction to the respondents to buy computers for their legal department. The aforesaid order was called in question by way of appeal in the High Court of Sindh.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in the High Court submitted that there can be no cavil with the proposition that in respect of an issue relating to the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant, Service Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction, provided there is a final order about it passed by the competent authority. According to him there was no final order that could be challenged before the Tribunal; and that the inquiry officer appointed in the petitioners' case was not competent person to carry out the inquiry. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned Division Bench of the High Court vide impugned judgment dated 4-12-2000 dismissed the appeal of the petitioners.
' Hence, this petition.
4. Mr. Fazle Ghani Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners, inter alia, contended that by virtue of section 3-E of the Sindh Civil Service Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1994, the service of corporation was declared to be the service of the Province; though the service of corporation was declared to be the service of the Province by virtue of section 3-E of the Act, ibid, but neither any corresponding resolution was passed by the Provincial Assembly of Sindh, nor any federal law was promulgated, whereby the jurisdiction of the Provincial Service Tribunal has been extended in respect of the employees of corporation such as the petitioners; that the petitioners were not governed by KDA Employees Service Regulations but were governed by the KMC Employees Service Rules, as such, the entire proceedings of enquiry by respondent No,2 (Secretary to the then Chief Minister) were coram non judice; that 29 KBCA's officers were placed under suspension on 11-8-1996 for alleged connivance in violation of Building Control Rules and Regulations, out of whom 27 officers submitted their written replies, whereas the remaining two ignored the enquiry proceedings, but by a partial order they were exonerated of their charges and held as innocent; that out of 27, 11 have been exonerated by the Enquiry Officer while for the remaining 16, who were named in the enquiry report, imposition of major penalty was proposed; that the Enquiry report was, thus, obviously partial and discriminatory and should have been declared to be null and void by the learned High Court, but unfortunately without considering the enquiry report the suit filed by the petitioners was rejected by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Sindh, keeping in view the provisions of section 3-E of the Sindh Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Learned counsel further emphasised that even if the suit and the appeal were liable to be disposed of under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C., the learned High Court was required to examine the merits of the report of the Enquiry Officer so as to determine its validity and legal effect. Learned counsel has relied upon the following plethora of case-law: "Abdur Rashid v. Additional District Judge (1983 CLC 443 (Lahore)), Moinul Islam v. Government of Sindh (2000 PLC (C.S.) 1172), Abbasia Cooperative Bank v. Muhammad Ghaus (PLD 1997 SC 3), I.A.
Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041), Abdul Bari v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1981 Karachi 290) and Muhammad Azhar v. General Manager (Operation), Power, WAPDA (PLD 1990 Lahore 352).
5. The petitioners filed the suit in the High Court of Sindh in its original jurisdiction wherein Director- General, Karachi Development Authority, Karachi Building Control Authority, Government of Sindh through the Secretary, Housing and Town Planning Department, Karachi, and Commissioner, Karachi/Chairman, Governing Body, KDA, Karachi, were impleaded as defendants, apart from Mr. Noor Ahmad Shah, Secretary to the then Chief Minister (Inquiry Officer) and Mr. Muhammad Hussain, Controller of Buildings, Karachi Building Control Authority. The reliefs claimed in the suit were as under:-- "(A) Declaration that the suspension order dated August 11, 1996 and the final show-cause notice dated 18-1-1997 in respect of the plaintiffs are unlawful, mala fide, discriminatory, void, and violative of the rules of natural justice.
(B) Declaration that the Inquiry. Report dated 13-1-1997 submitted by the defendant No,2 is unlawful, based on malice, surmises and conjectures, arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the rules ,of natural justice.
(C) Permanent injunction against the defendants, their superiors and subordinates, person/(s) acting under or through them restraining them from taking any adverse and prejudicial action against the plaintiffs including but not limited to dismissal or demotion from service.
(D) Suspend the operation of the impugned suspension order, dated 11th August, 1996 and reinstate the plaintiffs with full pay and benefits.
(E) Any other relief/s this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the circumstances of the case."
6. The respondents were served and they filed written statements and raised preliminary objections that the High Court is seized of the jurisdiction; that the petitioners have no cause of action against the respondents to get relief from the High Court, and if they are aggrieved they may approach the proper forum for the relief, if any.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, and have gone through the material placed on record, minutely examined the impugned judgment and the case-law cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, which was also discussed by the learned Single Judge as well as by the learned Division Bench in the impugned judgment.
8. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not tenable, and the case-law cited by him does not support the petitioners' case rather it supports the respondents' case. It would be an advantageous to reproduce below the relevant paragraph of the impugned judgment:-- "In the present case, the steps challenged include suspension of the appellants, enquiry conducted and its report and the recommendations of the Enquiry Officer. These actions are patently steps germane to a final order that may be challenged in appeal before the Service Tribunal. The bar thus applies to the present case. We are, therefore, unable to differ with the finding of the learned Single Judge. We feel, however, that the appellants were not liable to pay costs imposed upon them because they are responsible only for presentation of the plaint, which is not an act liable for imposition of any penalty by way of special costs. The order imposing costs is accordingly set aside. The appeal is dismissed in respect of the main relief."
9. Admittedly, Karachi Development Authority is a statutory body, which is working under the Government of Sindh and after the insertion of section 3-E of the Sindh Civil Service Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1994, the petitioners were required to approach the proper forum for relief. In view of the principles laid down by this Court time and again that all the issues agitated by the present petitioners can be raised before the Service Tribunal, which is a competent forum to decide the same. The case-law cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, in our considered opinion, is distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the case rather it supports the case of the respondents.
10. The impugned judgment is well-reasoned and based on the principles enunciated by this Court.
We do not find any misreading or non-reading of the evidence or any jurisdictional error and is not open to any exception.
11. For the above facts, reasons and case-law, we are of the considered view that this petition is without any substance, which must fail, and the same is accordingly dismissed alongwith the listed application, with no order as to costs.