DECISION ' This is an appeal against the award of the Labour Court dismissing the industrial dispute filed under section 32(1-A) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
2. There were three Unions in the establishment of the respondent. The appellant Union was determined as 'C. B. A.' on 29th May, 1972 and continued to act as such without any opposition or demand by the rival Trade Unions for any fresh referendum.
3. Mr. Amjad Hussain Shah was said to have been elected as General Secretary on 1st February, 1976 and the notice of the change of office-bearers was sent to the Registrar of Trade Unions on 9th February, 1976. Before the change was accepted by the Registrar a charter of demands dated 1st July, 1976 was served upon the Management. The change of the office-bearers including the General Secretary was approved by the Registrar on 23rd August, 1976. Since the demands were not accepted and the conciliation proceedings having failed an application under section 32(1-A), I. R.
0. Was made to the Labour Court.
4. The application was resisted and rested on certain grounds. Amongst them two legal pleas were taken. One plea was that, although, originally the appellant-Union was declared as 'C. B. A.' but after the amendment of subsection (1) to section 22 the appellant-Union could not be considered to be 'C. B. A.' as no application for being certified as 'C. B. A.' was made to the Registrar of the Trade Unions, although, it was necessary on the expiry of the period of two years. The second plea which was taken was that Mr. Amjad Hussain Shah was not approved as General Secretary by the Registrar of Trade Unions when the charter of demands was served and, therefore, he was not competent to serve the charter of demands and the proceedings taken thereafter were nullity in law.
5. Both these grounds found favour with the learned Presiding Officer. On the basis of some authorities he, therefore, dismissed the application. Aggrieved by this, present appeal had been filed.
6. Taking up the first ground that the appellant-Union could not be treated to be 'C. B. A.' until an application for being certified as such was made to the Registrar as required by the amendment of subsection (1) to section 22 and the previous certificate which was issued lapsed on the expiry of two years does not appear to be correct exposition of the legal position. It seems that the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court did not properly read the provisions of subsection (1). This section related to a case where there was only one registered Trade Union In an establishment or a group of establishments but, admittedly, in the present case theme were three Trade Unions and the appellant Trade Union was declared as 'Collective Bargaining Agent'. So the question of making an application for certification under this subsection did not arise. Question whether fresh application is at all necessary after the amendment of subsection (1) to section 22, I do not wish to deal with this point as it is not involved in the present case. It is not understood how the learned Presiding Officer observed that the previous certificate issued remained in force only for a period of two years and it lapsed after the expiry of that period. At least I am not able to find any such provision of law in the x. R. O. Nor any such has been pointed out to me by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. The period of two years which has been fixed by subsection
(10) to section 22 referred to a different subject altogether. It says that within a period of two years from the date of the certificate no application for determination of the 'Collective Bargaining Agent' shall be entertained unless the registered Trade Union is cancelled before the expiry of that period.
There is no allegation that the registration of the appellant-Union was cancelled at any time by the Registrar of Trade Unions. In fact, it is an admitted position that till this date the appellant-Union continues to remain as 'Collective Bargaining Agent' and is entitled to function as such till further proceedings are taken as required by law.
7. The learned Presiding Officer referred to one of my judgments but it seems that the point which was involved in that case was not fully appreciated and, therefore, the learned Presiding Officer erred in seeking support from that decision. The learned Presiding Officer is advised to carefully read a decision before it is relied upon.
8. So far as the second ground Is concerned, I fully endorse the view taken by the learned Presiding Officer. He had placed reliance upon my decision in the case of Messrs Bukhara Hotel and I see no reason to change my view.
9. In the result the appeal is dismissed. 1975 PLC 768