1. ' Ghulam Muhammad respondent entered into four agreements of sale at different times with different appellants in respect of different parcels of land which belonged initially to the Government but in respect of which he was a tenant under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912.
2. ' The agreement in favour of the appellants Nos. 1 and 2 was executed on the 20th of December 1964 in respect of 40 kanals of land comprised in Killas Nos. 6 to 10 of rectangle No, 354/11 in Chak No, 5-A/N. P. The sale consideration agreed upon was Rs, 10,000 out of which Rs, 1,000 was paid at the time of the execution of the deed and Rs, 5,000 on the 14th of December, 1965. The undertaking in the agreement, was that the respondent would sell this land to the said appellants after his tenancy rights are matured into ownership rights.
3. ' The agreement in. Favour of the appellant No, 4 was executed on the 22nd of September 1965 in respect of 8 kanals of land comprised in Killa No, 1 in the same rectangle as before. The sale price agreed upon in this case was Rs, 2,050 out of which Rs, 2,000 were paid at the time of the execution of the deed and Rs, 50 subsequently.
4. ' The third agreement was made on the 11th of January 1966 in favour of appellant No, 5 in respect of 120 kanals of land comprised in Killas Nos. 2 to 5, 11 to 16 and 21 to 25 in the same rectangle for a consideration of Rs, 24,000. Rs, 500 were paid on the day of agreement, Rs, 14,000 on 23-1-1956 and the balance of Rs, 9,500 on the 15th of June, 1966.
5. ' The first agreement was in favour of appellants Nos. 5 an 6 in respect of 22 kanals of land comprised in Killas Nos. 17 to 20 in the same rectangle for a consideration of Rs, 10,000. A sum of Rs, 1,000 was paid on the 27th of January 1966 when the agreement deed was executed, another sum of Rs, 4,000 was paid on the 7th of February 1966 and the balance of Rs, 5,000 on the 8th of March 1966.
6. ' As in the first agreement, the respondent promised to sell the respective parcels of land to respective appellants when he became full owner thereof.
2. These are the facts alleged by the appellants in their suit against the respondent filed in the Court of the Administrative Civil Judge, Rahimyarkhan. Since Ghulam Muhammad respondent was to star with only as an allottee of the Government land under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, they also named the Province of the Punjab as a co-defendant. The suit was for a declaration that the appellants having deposited in Government Treasury all the instalments due from Ghulam Muhammad respondent to the Government they had become owners of the entire land described above and in the alternative for the specific performance of the agreement executed by the said defendant. The Punjab Government did not contest the suit but Ghulam Muhammad respondent raised several objections resulting in as many as 12 issues to be tried between the parties.
7. ' After recording the evidence, however, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit with costs.
3. Now, in appeal before me, not all the questions raised at the trial are at issue. The learned counsel for Ghulam Muhammad respondent disputes neither the execution of the agreement in question nor the alleged payments made by the appellants to his clients at various times nor the fact that the appellants have already deposited the Government dues.
8. ' The questions for consideration in appeal, therefore, are :-
(1) Whether the transactions in question are hit by the Martial Law Regulation No, 64 of 1959 ?
9. (ii)Whether they are void under section 18 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 ? And
(iii) Whether despite the clearance of all Government dues, Ghulam Muhammad and respondent cannot be considered to have become full owner of the land in suit ?
10. ' Before proceeding further with the issues involved in this case, it is necessary that we should be clear about the form of the suit. There were two prayers in the suit one for declaration and the other in the alternative for specific performance. In view of the facts alleged and proved in the case, there is no alternative but to treat the suit as one for specific performance of the agreements the respondent entered into with the appellants.
11. ' The learned trial Court came to the conclusion that at least one of the agreements was in direct conflict with the Martial Law Regulation No, 64 of 1959 inasmuch as it reduced the holding of the respondent below the permissible limits. This finding was, however, based on a misappreciation of the situation. It is to be noted that an agreement of sale is not synonymous with sale. When the respondent entered into agreements, describing in detail in the first paragraph of this judgment, he did not part with ownership. A He only agreed to sell on a future date. If he were to give effect to all the four agreements simultaneously and sell his proprietary rights in the entire rectangle No, 354/11 on the same date to all the appellants leaving nothing for himself it is obvious that the sale would not be hit by the Martial Law Regulation, and since all the appellants have sued the respondent jointly and want a specific performance of all the four agreements simultaneously, the provisions of paragraph 25 of the Martial Law Regulation No, 64 are not attracted.
12. ' I, therefore, hold that the said regulation would be no bar to a decree of specific performance as prayed for by the appellants.
13. ' As regards section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 again the learned trial Court erred in holding that the transfers made by the respondent being without the sanction of the competent authority, were void. There was in fact no transfer of interests within the meaning of section i9 of the Act. There was only an agreement to transfer in future the ownership rights in the land after the respondent acquired them. The learned counsel for Ghulam Muhammad respondent cited Ghulam Rasul and others v. Muhammad Anwar and others (1) in support of his contention that an agreement of sale without the sanction of the competent authority is void and no specific performance of such agreement can be ordered. But a perusal of the judgment will show that the tenancy rights in that case had not matured into ownership rights. And the specific performance of the agreement of sale in respect of the tenancy rights was being sought. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellants cited a number of precedents to show that section 19 of the Act has no application once the tenant of the Government Land becomes owner after having paid all the Government dues. For example, Ghulam Muhammad v. Lakha Singh and B another (2) and Hussain Bakhsh and others v. Muhammad Alam and others (3). Both these are D. B. Authorities of our own High Court in which it has been clearly held that the bar of section 19 is not applicable once the tenant acquires proprietary rights.
14. ' Therefore, the only question that remains to be considered is whether the respondent has already acquired ownership rights. It is an admitted fact that all dues have been paid to the Government.
15. But the learned counsel for Ghulam Muhammad respondent asserts that payment of dues is only one of the conditions. Unless all other conditions of tenancy are satisfied, the tenant is not entitled to the conferment of proprietary rights on him. But this is an objection which can be raised only by the Government. The Government did not elect to contest the suit and here in appeal, the learned counsel for the appellants have produced a certified copy of the Collector's order refusing to engage a Government Pleader in this case as the Government has no interest left in the land in suit. This is an implied admission of the conferment of proprietary rights on Ghulam Muhammad respondent. In view of this admission by the Government which party alone was competent to object to the ownership rights of Ghulam Muhammad respondent, he cannot be allowed to plead against his own interest that he is not a full owner and thus deprive the appellants of their legal right to replace him. The respondent has in fact no right to hang on the land in suit. He has not only collected the full price of land but has also been absolved by the appellants of the obligation to pay the Government dues. He has no (1) 1969 SCMR 254 (2) AIR 1935 Lab. 181 (2) (3) PLD 1960 Lah. 869 option but to honour his agreements, execute sale deeds in favour of the appellants and have them registered.
16. ' I, therefore, allow this appeal with costs throughout, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and grant the plaintiff-appellants a decree for specific performance as prayed for.