IFTIKHAR AHMAD CHEEMA, J. - Petitioner, namely, Patrosin Product Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. Is a company limited by shares, incorporated and registered under the provisions of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, having its head office at 82-(115), Attaturk Avenue, G-6/3, Islamabad. As per its claim, the petitioner has a vast experience and expertise in the oil and gas industry and has been providing engineering and manufacturing services to the oil and gas sector in Pakistan. The instant petition has been filed by the petitioner through its General Manager (Mr. Tassadaq Bashir Malik).
2. A privatisation commission, respondent No. 2, was constituted by the President of Pakistan for the privatization of state owned business, projects and concerns and its head office is located at 5-A, Constitution Avenue, Islamabad. Respondent No. 2 is performing its functions through its Chairman.
On February 15, 2000, respondent No. 2 on behalf of Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL), Suit Southern Gas Company Limited (SSGC) and Pakistan State Oil Company (PSO), invited legal entities and individuals to submit their expressions of Interest for the purchase of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) assets of SNGPL, SSGC and PSO.
3. The petitioner vide letter No. PET/INVPK-LPG/001, dated March 9, 2000, submitted to respondent No. 2 its Expression of Interest for the purchase of LPG businesses of SNGPL, SSGC and PSO. In response to the aforesaid letter, respondent No. 2 invited the petitioner to participate in the prequalification process for the privatization of the aforesaid businesses and also required to submit its statements of qualification in the manner prescribed. The petitioner alongwith Petrosin Engineers and Contractors (Pvt.) Limited formed a consortium so as to participate in the bid for the said LPG assets and the petitioner satisfied the pre-requisites of respondent No. 2 and by an affidavit it was made clear that neither the petitioner or any of its directors or Principal share holders, was a defaulter in payment of LPG or other governmental dues, taxes, duties etc., and respondent No. 2 vide its letter dated 22.5.2000 allowed the petitioner to participate in the bidding and on 15.6.2000, respondent No. 2 vide its letter dated 22.5.2000 allowed the petitioner to participate in the bidding and on 15.6.2000, respondent No. 2 forwarded a copy of "instructions of bidders" to the petitioner. The petitioner was also invited to attend the pre-bid conference to be held on 21.6.2000. The petitioner attended and participated in the said meting. However, respondent No. 2 invited per qualified parties excluding the petitioner arbitrarily and informed them regarding the bidding date. The petitioner approached this Court vide Constitutional Petition No. 1800/2000 and my learned brother Mr. Tassaduq Hussain Jillani, J. Allowed the petitioner to participate in the bidding by passing the following order:- "Learned counsel for the respondent accepts notice. As the main case has been admitted to regular hearing respondent has not been able to show any ground tenable in law to justify petitioner's exclusion and as the petitioner shall suffer irreparable loss if he is not allowed to participate, it is directed that subject to the final order to be made in the main petition, petitioner shall be allowed to participate in bidding to be held on 24.8.2000. " and on 24.8.2000 the bidding for the LPG Businesses of SNGPL, SSGC and PSO took place and the petitioner participated in the bidding process which was telecast on Pakistan Television. The said bidding/auction was open, fair, competitive and transparent. The petitioner made the highest bid for LPG businesses of SNGPL. Thereafter the bidding results were placed before their respective boards of directors for consideration and for the passing of appropriate board resolution. The board of directors of SNGPL approved the highest bid of Rs.121 million made by the petitioner.
However, Cabinet committee on privatization (respondent No. 4) did not approve the bid of the petitioner for the privatization of LPG businesses of SNGPL, although respondent No. 4 had approved the bid of M/s. Caltex Oil Pakistan Ltd. But refused to approve the petitioner's bid/offer without assigning any reason whatsoever. The petitioner was, therefore, constrained to approach this Court with a Constitutional missile in its hand and his learned counsel (Mr. Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, Advocate) who has put forward his client's case with an exuberant skill, has sale LPG businesses of SNGPL being the highest, gave the petitioner a vested and valuable right and legitimate expectation that respondent No. 2 and 4 would fulfil their Constitutional and statutory obligation and approve the said bid and the sale of the said LPG business of SNGPL to the petitioner. The petitioner took positive steps aimed at acquiring the LPG Business of SNGPL. Hence respondents Nos. 2 and 4 are estopped from rejecting/not approving the highest bid of the petitioner.
(ii) That the respondents Nos. 2 and 4 have not communicated any reason whatsoever for not approving the highest bid of the petitioner for the privatisation of LPG business of SNGPL. The impugned decision suffers from malice of law and fact.
(iii) That respondents Nos. 2 and 4 took the decision of not approving the highest bid' of the petitioner in absolute contravention of the principles of natural justice by not affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard before taking the impugned decision.
(iv) That the impugned decision is violative of Article 2A, 4, 25 and more particularly Article 25 as by approving the highest bid of M/s. Caltex Oil (Pakistan) Limited for the LPG business of SSGC and not approving the highest bid of the petitioner for LPG business of SNGPL even though the board of directors of both SSGC and SNGPL had approved the highest bids by M/s. Caltex Oil (Pakistan)
Limited and the petitioner respectively, the petitioner has been discriminated against, and Article 18 as by being unlawfully deprived of its legal right to acquire the LPG business of SNGPL, having become the highest bidder in a most transparent bidding process, the petitioner has been deprived of its freedom to trade and profession.
(v) That the LPG business of SNGPL having been put up for bidding and the bid of the petitioner having been declared the highest, the same could not be rejected/not approved arbitrarily by respondents Nos. 2 and 4. There was no reserve price fixed or intimated to any of the bidders. The highest bid of the petitioner at the bidding reflected the market price for the LPG business of SNGPL, and the same cannot be termed as unacceptable by respondents Nos. 2 to 4.
4. Raja Muhammad Akram, Advocate, learned counsel for tire respondents raised various objections to the maintainability of the writ petition, namely, inter alia on the grounds that the petitioner had failed to establish infringement of any legal right or entitlement to the performance of any legal duty which is imperative for invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court; that the petitioner had no cause of action; that the decision to reject the bid was valid and legal and the offer made by the petitioner was fully considered by respondent No. 2 and was thoroughly examined by respondent No. 4 and ultimately decided that the "LPG assets of SNGPL be put to re- auction. This decision was made in the national interest and was motivated to fetch the best-and highest possible price, It was submitted further that the respondents were not under any Constitutional obligation to approve the highest bid and without approval or acceptance of the bid by respondents Nos. 2 and 4, no vested right had accrued to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the respondents argued with a forensic skill that where the bid for sale of property was subjected to prior approval of government/competent authority the highest bid per se would not create any contractual right for sale of a property to such a bidder unless approval was duly granted by the competent authority. Reliance was placed on 1970 SCMR 542, 1971 SCMR 533, 1972 SCMR 63, 1974 SCMR 337, PLD 1987 SC (AJK) 99, 1991 CLC 313 and 1993 MLD 1500.
5. Learned counsel further contends that principle of natural justice was not applicable in cases like the instant one, where the bidding it in cases like the instant one, where the bidding document contains riding clause. The board of directions of SNGPL may have its own dictionary but the last word lies with the Government; that no contractual relation had come into existence, hence the petitioner had no contractual right; that fixation of reference price was not a sine qua non for privatization process.
6. The first question which fails for the determination of this Court is whether by virtue of being the highest bidder a vested and valuable right had accrued to the petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 and 4 are estopped from rejecting/not approving the highest bid of the petitioner. This question came under consideration before the superior Courts of this country including the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan and has been consistently answered in negative, In Muhammad AH Vs. The District Council, Gujrat and others (1993 MLD (Lhr.) 1500 (1503), it has been held that a bid made on an auction is in the nature of an offer which does not mature into contract till its acceptance. The auctioneer acts as an agent of the seller and if he has authority to accept the bid, a concluded contract comes into being the moment the bid is accepted. But if the auctioneer is not vested the power to accept a bid which is without any authority the contract only comes into being when a bid is accepted by that authorised person or authority.
7. A similar view was approved by a Division Bench of Karachi in M/s. Javed (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. Government of Pakistan (1991 CLC Note 313 (Karachi)) and I quote the relevant portion: "Bid offered by petitioner to supply goods was still in process of recommendation and was not finally accepted by competent authority-nothing was there in bidding documents to indicate that competent authority could not accept after of a party if it considered same to be competitive and lower when compared with other bidders-Petitioner who had submitted his offer/bid in . Response to invitation published by competent authority did not acquire any vested right for award of contract, even if he had complied with all conditions of bidding document-Participation of petitioner in bidding and submission of bidding document in pursuance of advertisement in newspaper inviting bid, at best amounted to creating a civil contract, performance whereof could not be secured under Article 199 of Constitution of Pakistan.
8. In Babu Pervaiz Qureshi Vs. Settlement Commissioner, Multan and Bahawalpur Divisions, reported in 1974 SCMR 337, it was held as under:- "A mere bid at an auction if the bid is subject to confirmation, does not create any contractual right until the bid is confirmed, It is in the discretion of the auctioneer to confirm or not to confirm it. A person who was a successful bidder at the auction cannot claim to be a person aggrieved by the order of present auctioneer."
9. In Meraj Din Vs. Noor Muhammad and others (1970 SCMR 542 (544-A)), it was held as under:- "Person giving highest bid at auction and also depositing substantial account of auction money- Auction, however, not confirmed by relevant authority and terms and conditions of auction also providing that highest bid could be rejected without assigning any reason-person, held did not acquire any right whatsoever in property."
10. A similar view was expressed in Munshi Muhammad, etc. Vs. Faizan-ul-Haq, etc. (1971 SCMR 533).
In that case the auction of property was made through bid. However, it was stipulated in the auction proceedings that highest bid at the auction was subject to approval of the Addl. Commissioner (Settlement) who may or may not accept it without assigning any reason. The highest bids offered at the auction were not approved and the property was transferred to an allottee, It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the highest bids in absence of final approval of the bid by the authority was not clothed with any right in auctioned properties and had no locus standi to challenge the transfer competently made and consequently the petition was dismissed.
11. This moot point also came under discussion in Moeen- ud-Din's case, reported in PLD 1987 SC
(AJK) 99 (109) and was answered as under.
12. It is thus clear from the aforesaid precedent cases that if a highest bidder where any auction or sale does not acquire any right or Interest in the auctioned property when the auction or sale is subject to confirmation by some person or authority, and the same has been confirmed by that person or authority. The mere highest bid for property in an auction does not, prima facie, carry vested right to bring a suit nor it can give rise to a Constitutional right under Article 199 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, unless the bid is approved by the competent authority, In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court after a careful scanning of the relevant case-law came to the aforesaid conclusion and the same has been approved by the Hon'ble apex Court of this country in the aforesaid precedent cases.
13. This view has universal application and has been consistently followed by the Court in India and the Britan and I quote AIR 1947 Madras 366, AIR 88 Delhi 224, AIR 1972 Mad. Perdash 131 and AIR 1971 SC 2295.
14. In AIR 1954 SC 592, a liquor contract was knocked down in an auction by the Deputy Commissioner, who had authority to accept or reject offer in favour of "A" who was the highest bidder and granted the contract to "B", "held" that the cancellation, though irregular was not illegal and as "A" obtained no right to the licence by the mere fact that the contract had been knocked down in his favour (the acceptance being subject to sanction), the first relief asked by "A" for a "mandamus" to confirm his right to the licence could not be granted."
15. In AIR 1972 SC 2142, it was held that there was no concluded contract between the Government and the highest bidder, In AIR 1982, SC 1234, it was held that the Government was under no obligation to accept the highest bid and that no right accrued to the bidder merely because his bid happened to be the highest, In this case although the bid had been accepted at the time of auction, however, it was subject to ratification by the competent authority/Government, and the Government refused to ratify the same. The Supreme Court, of India held that no right or interest had accrued in favour of the highest bidder. While adjudging the point of not assigning any reason by the Government for not accepting the highest bid, the Supreme Court of India held that the Government's power to refuse to accept the highest bid could not be confined to inadequacy of bid only. There may be a variety of good and sufficient reasons apart from inadequacy of bids, which may impel the Government not to accept the highest bid. The Government is, therefore, under no obligation to offer reasons for its refusal to accept the highest bid. In AIR 1995 SC, it was held as under:- "In the matter of sale of public property, the dominent consideration is to secure the best price for the property to be sold. Sale by public auction is universally recognised to be the best and most fair method and is beyond reproach and, if it is not possible to adopt the said method, sale may be held by inviting tenders, but in that event every endeavour should be made to give wide publicity to get the maximum price."
16. There is no doubt or dispute that the petitioner who participated in the bidding process was the highest bidder, It is also an admitted fact that the proceedings were fair, open and transparent.
Anyhow, the last word lay with respondent No. 2 (Privatization Commission) which was functioning under the direct supervision and control of respondent No. 4 which was fully competent to accept or .Reject the bid and by refusing the same the respondents were within their right. They were not actuated with any motive or malice against the petitioner nor they acted arbitrarily, It was the discretion and prerogative of the aforesaid respondent to accept or reject the bid and while rejecting the offer of the petitioner, the highest bidder, for a sum of Rs.121 million for the LPG businesses of SNGPL, their decision was neither tainted with malice nor it bears an imprint of illegality on its forehead because no right or Interest in respect of the aforesaid property had accrued to the petitioner by his mere participation in the bid nor his qualification as highest bidder per se is sufficient to conclude that his offer was biding on the aforesaid respondents and they had no option but to accept it despite the fact that under clause 4(iv) of "Instructions to Bidders", they had reserved an unconditional right to reject the highest bid without assigning any reason.
17. The respondents were not bound to assign any reason whatsoever for their refusal to accept the highest bid when public property was put to auction. The authorities intended to fetch the best price and while disposing of the public property like the instant one which is the subject-matter of this petition certain things have to be observed e.g. That the auction should take place publicity.
However, the paramount consideration should be the public Interest. Appearance of public justice is as important as doing justice. Nothing should be done which gives appearance of bias, jobbery or nepotism. None of these infirmities exist in this case.
18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the plea of discriminating by contending that the highest bid by M/s. Caltex Oil (Pakistan) for the LPG businesses of SSGC was approved while the highest bid of the petitioner to acquire the LPG businesses of SNGPL was disapproved. This discrimination speaks volume about the mala fide of the respondents.
19. Before dealing with this objection I must say with emphasis that the state which has right to trade, has also the duty to observe equal. The Government cannot choose to exclude persons discrimination. When the state acts to the prejudice of a person it has to be supported by legality.
The state can enter into contract with any person it chooses. No person has fundamental right to insist that the Government must enter into a contract with him. However, every citizen has a right to claim equal treatment to enter into a contract which may be proper, necessary and essential to his lawful callings.
20. The petitioner has not been black-listed or permanently excluded from participating in reauction which is scheduled in near future. The sole grievance of the petitioner is that he being the highest bider his offer was refused while the highest bid made by the Caltex for the businesses, assets, etc. Of SSGC was accepted, hence the decision was discriminatory.. I do not see any merit in this contention. The petitioner and Caltex had opted to bid for different properties. There was no direct context between the petitioner and Caltex whose bid was approved and accepted by the Commission. The respondents might have after due consideration come to the conclusion that offer made by Caltex was commensurate with the market value of the properties for which they offered their bid. Anyhow, having no direct or remote concern with the bid made by Caltex, the petitioner cannot allege any grievance whatsoever on this score alone that his bid was rejected and the bid of Caltex was accepted because both the bids were for separate properties. The petitioner and Caltex were not the rival bidders. Had the respondents accepted the offer of a 3rd party, who had either not participated in the bidding process in an open auction alongwith the petitioner or the respondents had made some under hand deal with that party in a clandestine manner, the argument of discrimination, mala fide and arbitrariness on the part of the respondents would have certainly carried weight. But in the instant case where the Commission was looking for the best price, it was the discretion and prerogative of the Commission to decide whether the offer made by the highest bidder was fair and in the national interest.
21. At this stage I cannot help borrowing a very wise observation of Bhagwati, J. In AIR 1980 SC 1992 (2O0O) and I quote the relevant portion: "Where any governmental action fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness and public Interest discussed above and is found to be wanting in the quality of reasonableness or lacking in the element of public Interest, it would be liable to be struck down as invalid. It must follow as a necessary corollary from this proposition that the Government cannot at in a manner which would benefit a private party at the cost of the state; such an action would be both unreasonable and contrary to public interest. The Government, therefore, cannot for example, give a contract or sell or lease of its property for a consideration less than the highest that can be obtained for it, unless of course these are other considerations which render it reasonable and in public interest to do so.
Such considerations may be that some Directive Principle is sought to be advanced or implemented or that the contract or the property is given not with a view to earning revenue but for the purpose of carrying of a welfare scheme for the benefit of a particular group or section of people deserving it on that the person who has offered a higher consideration is not otherwise fit to be given the contract or the property. We have referred to these consideration only in illustratively, for there may be an infinite variety of consideration which may have to be taken into account by the Government in formulating its policies and it is on a total evaluation of various considerations which have weighed with the Government in taking a particular action, that the Court would have to decide whether the action of the Govt, is reasonable and in public interest. But one basic principle which must guide the Court in arriving at its determination on this question is that the governmental action is reasonable and in public interest and it is for the party challenging its validity to show that it is wanting in reasonableness or is not actuated with public interest. Th's burden is a heavy one and it has to be discharged to the satisfaction of the Court by proper and adequate material. The Court cannot lightly assume that the action taken by the Government is unreasonable or without public interest because as we have said above, there are a large number of policy considerations which must necessarily weight with the Government in taking action and therefore the Court would not strike down governmental action as invalid on this ground, unless it is clearly satisfied that the action is unreasonable or not in public interest."
22. In the instant case, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to prove that the respondents action in rejecting the offer/highest bid of the petitioner was not actuated in the public interest but was tainted with malice.
23. The precedent cases referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner have no relevancy with the facts and circumstances of the instant case e.g. In AIR 1990 SC 1031 the appellants sought a writ of mandamus against the respondent directing it to desist from denying or discontinuing the supply of all kinds of lubricants to the appellant and from outstanding, black-listing, coercing or pressurising the appellant from the business of dealing with lubricants etc. It was found as an admitted fact that the respondents corporation was supplying lubricants to the appellants for the last 18 years, hence their discontinuation of the same without assigning any reason was an at of arbitrariness. But even in that case it was unambiguously held that the writ petition is competent only in those cases where the state or any organ is under the contractual obligation to give reasons for the non-performance of their contractual duty but in a case like the instant one where no legal and binding contract existed between the parties, no legal right or interest in the property which was a clear, matter of auction is said to have accrued in favour of the bidder. Even thought he may be the highest bidder in the bidding process.
24. In AIR 1988 SC 157, the legal principle which was judicially recognised was that when public property is the subject of sale it should be disposed of through public auction and the bidding process should be fair and transparent and there is no cavil to this proposition, on the petitioner's own showing the auction process was fair and transparent.
25. In AIR 1979 SC 1628, a notice, inviting tenders was put up for running a second class restaurant and two snack Bars was issued by the respondent (The International Airport Authority of India and others) which is a corporate body, offer made by respondent No. 4 was allowed and the petitioner's (Ramana) was rejected, It was held by the Supreme Court of India that it is discretion and prerogative of the state, which is the guardian of the finance of the State, to accept the price Offered by the highest bidder or to reject it. The relevant portion is as under:- "The activities of the Government, have a public element and, therefore, there should be fairness and equality. The State need not enter into any contract with anyone, but if it does so, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure."
"The Government is the guardian of the finances of the state, It is expected to protect the financial Interest of the State. Hence quite naturally, the legislature has empowered the Government to see that there is no leakage in its revenue, It is for the Government to decide whether the price offered in an auction sale is adequate. While accepting or rejecting a bid it is merely performing an executive function. The correctness of its conclusion is not open to judicial review. We fail to see how the plea of contravention of Article 19(1 )(g) or Article 14 can arise in these cases. The Government's power to- sell (the exclusive privilege set of in Section 22) was not denied, it was also not disputed that these privileges cofild be sold by public auction. Public auctions are held to get the best possible price. Once these aspects are recognised, there appears to be no basis for contending that the owner of the privileges in question who had offered to sell them cannot decline to accept the Highest bid if he thinks that the price offered is inadequate."
(Underlining is mine)
26. In another case referred in 1995 MLD 15 which has been strongly relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, there was a contest for the grant of contract for installation of mini liquid Petroleum Gas Plant at Fimkassar, 60 miles towards south side from Rawalpindi. The petitioner had invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court by filing a writ petition alleging that having offered lowest rate he was entitled to the grant of contract and the respondents had no lawful authority to grant the same to respondent No. 1 who had offered the higher rates. However, the matter ended in compromise but while dealing with the controversy my learned brother Iftikhar Hussain Chaudhry, J. Observed in para 12 of his judgment as under:- "But first, the maintainability of the petition. Both the learned counsel appearing for respondents have forcefully questioned the maintainability of the petition on the ground that the grant, or refusal to grant a contract cannot be a subject of examination in Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. True; matters regarding enforcement of contractual obligations for performance of a contract are subjects which are not prone to judicial scrutiny because of the limitation in exercise of judicial review. Such matters do involve factual enquiries of some sort or other and law thus prescribes other forums and other remedies to be availed of. But since here the controversy raised is' about the process through which decision has been arrived at and judicial review, in essence, is a review of the manner in which decisions taken by public decision-makers the matter aptly falls within the competence of this court. No doubt, this is not the arena for thrashing of private disputes regarding contracts but a statutory corporation being involved in the decision making reverses the position. There is no prohibition in law or authority to entertain the petition. The scope of exercise of Constitutional power of High Court in matters of contract has been examined variously, It has been laid down in Pacific Multinational (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. Inspector General of Police (PLD 1992 Kar. 283) and Abdullah and Company Vs. Province of Sindh (1992 MLD 292) that an arbitrarily, capricious or unfair exercise of discretion in the grant of public contracts by functionaries of State renders the exercise to judicial review. Maintainability of the petition, thus is not controvertible."
27. Likewise in case reported in 1998 CLC 1890 (Lhr.) where the sole question was whether the material supplied by M/s. Huffaz Ltd. To Sui Northern Gas Pipe Lines were exempted from liability of payment of sales tax, there was no question of existence of any binding contract between the parties, hence it is distinguishable on facts and law and has no direct bearing on the facts of the instant case.
28. In an identical case reported in 1994 SCMR 1758 (1710), it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the successful bider who had failed to satisfy some pre-requisites for the conclusion of satisfied shares had no right which could be enforced through the Constitutional jurisdiction. Leave to appeal was refused by the apex Court.
29. Last but not the least, Mr. Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioner, with his characteristic lucidity and forensic skill argued with great vehemence that the respondents were bound to afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before rejecting his bid. The respondents have, therefore, violated the well-established principle of audi alteram partem (no body should be condemned unheard).
30. Before dealing with this contention it will be useful to have a general idea of the concept "Natural Justice' and the board principles governing its application or exclusion in the construction or administration of statutes and the exercise of judicial or administration powers by an authority or Tribunal constituted thereunder.
31. Well then, what is "Natural Justice"? The phrase is not capable of a static and precise definition, It cannot be imprisoned I the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Historically, "Natural Justice' has been used in a way "which implies the existence of moral principles of self evident and unarguable truth", "Natural Justice" by Paul Jackson, 2nd End. Page 1. In course of time, Judges nurtured in the traditions of British jurisprudence, often invoked it in conjunction with a reference to "equity and good conscience". Legal experts of earlier generations did not draw any distinction between "Natural Justice" and "Natural Law". "Natural Justice" was considered as "that part of natural law which relates to the administration of Justice." Rules of "Natural Justice" are not embodied rules.
Being means to an end and not an end in themselves, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules.
32. But two fundamental maxims of natural justice have now become deeply and in-delibly ingrained in the common consciousness of mankind as per eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially, objectively and fairly. Described in the form of latin tags these twin principles are (i) audi alteram partem (no body should be condemned unheard) and (ii) nemo judex in resua (nobody should be a judge in his own case or cause). For the purpose of the question posed above, we are primarily concerned with the first.
33. The rules of "Natural Justice' can operate only in the areas not covered by any law validly made.
They can supplement the law but cannot supplant it. If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of "Natural Justice", then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded, wholly or in part, in the exercise of statutory powers, depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provisions conferring the power, the nature of the power, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power.
34. The maxim audi alteram partem has many facts. Two of them are (i) notice of the case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain. This rule is universally respected and duty to afford a fair hearing in Lord Loreburn's of-quoted language, is "a duty lying upon every one who decides some thing", in the exercise of legal power. The rule cannot be scarified at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; for, "convenience and justice"-as Lord Atkin felicitously put it--are often not on speaking terms." General Council of Medical Education Vs. Spakman (1943) AC 627 at page 638.
35. In the instant case, the Commission had vast discretionary powers to reject a highest bid without assigning any reason as is evident from "Instructions to bidders" which can ligitimately be termed as a policy letter of respondent No. 2 to the bidders. Compliance of which was imperative, hence the application of the well-established principle of audi alteram partem was not applicable in the instant case and it was not obligatory for the respondents to afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before rejecting his offer.
36. The upshot of the above discussion, therefore, is that the petitioner has got no vested right to compel the respondents to accept his bid on the sole ground that he was the highest bidder.
Assuming that the bidders participating in the bid process make a pool among themselves and offer to purchase some public property on a ridiculously low price, shall it be legal, valid and logical to argue that public property must be surrendered in favour of someone simply because he is the highest bidder. Since the petitioner is not clothed with any right in the auctioned property, therefore, he has no locus standi to challenge the business of the respondents through a writ of mandamus which can only be issued in respect of a legal right. Hence the instant writ petition is not competent. Reliance may be placed on 1997 CLC 1288.
37. Petition has no merit which stands consequently dismissed.