' In pursuance of Government of Pakistan's Circular through Office Memorandum dated 28-6-1980, an ad hoc increase in pension was extended to the civil pensioners. The contesting respondents herein were given this benefit and relief. It appears that the matter was taken up by the Pakistan Railway with the Federal Government when a further memorandum was issued on 14-1-1986 that such a benefit was not admissible to those retiring on or after 1-7-1985. As a consequence thereof, Pakistan Railway started making recoveries from those who had already availed the said benefit.
The respondents served a grievance notice and thereafter filed petitions before the Labour Court.
Vide order, dated 21-12-1987 of Labour Court No,5, the petition was dismissed. However, on an appeal filed by the respondents, the Labour Appellate Tribunal accepted the same on 20-3-1988 and remanded the matter to the Labour Court for decision afresh. On remand the Labour Court accepted the petition on 3-1-1990. The said order was challenged by Pakistan Railway, the petitioner herein, before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal which was dismissed by the learned Chairman of the Tribunal on 12-4-1990 as time-barred. This is a petition against the same. Since the writ Petitions Nos.8639, 8640, 8641, 8642, 8643, 8644, 8645, 8646, 8647, 8648, 8649, 8650, 8651.
8652, 8653 and 8654 of 1990 arises out of almost similar circumstances and common question is involved, the same shall stand disposed of for the reasons contained in this judgment.
2. It is contended by the learned counsel that since the judgment of the Punjab Labour Court had been set aside by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal in another case titled "Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railway, Rawalpindi v. Fateh Muhammad, the Tribunal should have followed the said judgment and to accept the appeal by condoning the delay in the matter. It is contended that the order of the Labour Court was without jurisdiction, therefore, the dismissal of the appeal there against as time-barred was not legal and in accordance with law.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the contesting respondents contends that since the respondents were not party in appeal which was against Fateh Muhammad, the said judgment did not bind them and the judgment of the Labour Court attained finality qua these respondents as no appeal was filed by the petitioner within limitation. It is further contended the limitation could not be condoned without any plausible explanation by the petitioner which it failed to advance before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and the appeal was dismissed.
4. There is no dispute that the judgment of the Labour Court, dated 3-1-1990 was set aside by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal on 19-3-1990. In the appeal filed by the petitioner against Fateh Muhammad, the respondents herein were not party in the said appeal and the appeal against them was filed belatedly and condonation in limitation was claimed that judgment in Fateh Muhammad's case was a judgment in rem and not a judgment in personam, therefore, the same was binding on the respondents. This contention, however, did not find favour with the learned Tribunal and the appeal was dismissed on 12-4-1990 taking the view that "in the impugned decision of the learned lower Court all the eighteen grievance petitions are mentioned, therefore, the appellants had got knowledge at the time they had brought the previous appeal that the grievance petitions of the present respondents had also been accepted by the learned lower Court. Thus, no question of inadvertence arises." The argument that the said judgment was not in personam and was in rem, therefore, the delay in preferring the appeals should be condoned was not accepted by the learned Tribunal by taking the view that "if in the view of the learned counsel for the appellants the previous judgment of this Tribunal is binding upon those also who were not party to it, then it was not necessary for the appellants to bring the present appeals. Since the present respondents were not party to the previous appeal as the appeals were not brought against them, they are not bound by the previous judgment of this Tribunal. As no good ground has been given for condonation of delay, the right, which the respondents have secured by lapse of time, cannot be denied to them by condoning the delay without sufficient ground." There cannot be any dispute that only parties to a A judgment are bound by the judgment unless the judgment is in rem. In Pir Bakhsh and others v. The Chairman Allotment Committee and others (PLD 1987 SC 145) such a point had arisen before the Hon'ble Supreme Court when after considering number of Text Books and precedents, it was held that a judgment only binds the parties. In that case an order of the High Court whereby identical petitions had been disposed of by it was challenged before the Supreme Court by some of them only and not the others. On appeal the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court. While implementing the judgment of the Supreme Court, the.
Rehabilitation Authorities started applying the said judgment to those who were not party before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It was in that context that Pir Bakhsh's case arose and it was held by their Lordships that those who were not party to the judgment of the Supreme Court were not bound by the same as it was not a judgment in rem and was a judgment in personam. In Abdul Qadir and others v. Chairman, Allotment Committee and others (1987 SCM R 2104) the rule laid down in Pir Bakhsh's case was followed. Such a question arose quite recently in Muhammad Sohail and 2 others v. Government of N.-W.F.P. And others (1996 SCM R 218), it was a service matter wherein the matter was examined in view of the principle enunciated in Pir Bakhsh's case (supra) and it was laid down with reference to Article 55 of the Qanun-eShahadat Order, 1984 that "application of the principle of judgment in rem" is restricted "to the judgments, orders or decrees rendered in the exercise of jurisdiction pertaining to four types of jurisdiction, namely probate, matrimonial, admiralty and insolvency." When judged the order of the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal in the light of the principles stated in the abovementioned precedents, it is found to be absolutely consistent therewith. Present was the case of individual grievances of each of the respondents with regard to benefit extended and availed by them, the determination of which by the Labour Court was in the nature of judgment in personam which attained finality by not challenging the same within limitation.
5. The only ground for seeking condonation of delay was the judgment in the case of Fateh Muhammad by the Tribunal that the respondents were also bound by the same. The condonation of delay has been declined by the learned Tribunal for valid reasons. No exception to the same is warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that since after retirement, the respondents had ceased to be the "workmen", the petition before the Labour Court was not maintainable and the said Court acted without jurisdiction for that reason. It is, however, not tenable inasmuch as this petition was entertained by this Court with reference to Writ Petition No,6420 of 1989 which had been referred to a larger Bench for decision on an identical point. The said writ petition was heard by a Division Bench of this Court on 9-4-1997 and the view taken was that a retired employee did not cease to be a "workman" and could maintain a petition before the Labour Court. Such a view was taken by the learned Division Bench in view of "Basharat Ali v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and others (1989 SCM R 687).
' In view of the above, the petition has no merit and is dismissed. No order as to costs.