' MIAN MUHAMMAD AJMAL, J.---Through this common judgment we propose to dispose of Civil Petitions Nos. 577 to 579 of 2000 as they arise out of common impugned judgment and involve identical factual background.
2. Brief facts are that Azimul Waqar, Imtiaz Ahmad and Mushtaq Ahmed Shujra the respondents are the employees of the petitioner. They were removed from service on account of misconduct. They challenged the orders of termination of their services before the Punjab Labour Court under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter to be called the I.R.O.). The petitioner contested the petitions, inter alia, on the grounds that the respondents were not workmen and that the petitioner-Council being constituted under a statute, was not an industrial or commercial concern to attract the provisions of the I.R.O. The Labour Court accepted the petitions of the respondents and ordered their reinstatement in service with back benefits. The petitioner filed three appeals alongwith applications for suspension of operation of the impugned order of the Labour Court before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, who suspended the order to the extent of payment of back wages. The petitioner filed Constitution Petition No,1578 of 1976 before the Lahore High Court, which was allowed on 30-9-1976 declaring the order of the Labour Court and the proceedings pending before the Labour Appellate Tribunal to be without jurisdiction and of no legal effect. On appeal against the judgment of the High Court, this Court vide judgment dated 25-10- 1987 passed in C.A. 275 of 1977 held that the writ petition was premature and that the appeals filed by the petitioner before the Labour Appellate Tribunal would be deemed to be pending and would be disposed of in accordance with law. Consequently, the Labour Appellate Tribunal vide its order dated 26-1-1988 remanded the cases to the Punjab Labour Court No,6, Rawalpindi for decision afresh, who vide its order dated 19-4-1990 decided the cases ex part directing reinstatement of the respondents. They were also held to be entitled to 50% of the back benefits. The petitioner filed petitions before the Punjab Labour Court for reversal of the ex parte orders of reinstatement but in vain. The petitioner preferred revision petitions before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, who vide its orders dated 27-3-1991 remanded the cases to the Labour Court for fresh adjudication. On remand, the Labour Court vide orders dated 20-5-1992, rejected the applications of the petitioner for setting aside the ex parte orders. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed revisions before the Appellate Tribunal, which were dismissed vide order dated 28-6-1992. The petitioner then invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, through Writ Petitions Nos.565, 566 and 575 of 1992, which were disposed of by a learned Judge of the High Court vide its common judgment dated 25-1-1999 as having abated due to insertion of section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The petitioner then filed Appeals Nos.1443, 1444 and 1445(R) of 1999 before the Federal Service Tribunal, which have been dismissed as barred by time vide common judgment impugned herein.
3. The learned Deputy Attorney-General argued that the time spent by the petitioner in good faith in pursuing its remedy before the High Court was sufficient to justify condonation of delay in filing appeals before the Tribunal. He has relied upon the rule laid down by this Court in Muhammad Afzal v. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation 1999 SCM R 92; Syed Aftab Ahmad and others v. K.E.S.C.
And others 1999 SCM R 197 and Muhammad Yaqub v. Pakistan Petroleum Limited 2000 SCM R 230.
4. The only question for determination in these petitions is whether the appeals of the petitioner before the Service Tribunal were within time. Section 2-A was added in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (hereinafter to be A called the Act) vide Service Tribunals (Amendment) Act (XVII of 1997), which came into force with effect from 10th of June, 1997, according to section 6 thereof, all suits, appeals or applications regarding any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal pending in any Court immediately before the commencement of the Act, stood abated, meaning thereby that by operation of law all the pending proceedings before the Courts stood abated forthwith, and any party to such a suit, appeal or application could prefer an appeal to the appropriate Service Tribunal within ninety days in respect of any such matter which was in issue in such suit, appeal or application. The petitioner filed separate writ petitions which were disposed of as having abated vide judgment dated 25-1-1999. After insertion of section 2-A in the Act on 10-6-1997 the petitioner, a statutory body duly represented by a counsel, by its sheer negligence allowed the writ petition to remain pending before the High Court, which had abated on the very day when section 2-A was inserted in the Act. The party or his counsel in such a case cannot be given any concession who either remained ignorant of law or negligent and careless to pursue his remedy diligently and carefully and such ignorance or negligence cannot be made an excuse. The Service Tribunal has taken notice of this fact and concluded as follows:-- ' "We have perused the application for condonation of delay and applied our conscious mind to the reasons and grounds advanced by the appellant for condonation of delay and considered the same sympathetically and found no legal and sufficient grounds for condoning such a long delay and granting' the application. We find no merits in the arguments and contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the delay be condoned by excluding the time spent in proceeding before Hon'ble High Court. In treating the contention of learned counsel as without merits we are fortified by the law well settled in PLD 1983 SC 385; 1985 SCM R 333/890, 1991 SCM R 1841 and 1997 SCM R 1167. It is held that in such a situation of suchlike cases there is no justification for condonation of delay where litigations had been made/undergone before incompetent forum. Our Hon'ble Supreme Court in an unreported judgment rendered in C.P. 250-K of 1999 on 18th August, 1999, has held the contention of learned appellant's counsel, to the effect that the time spent, in proceedings before the Labour Court and Sindh Appellate Court is to be excluded from consideration in computing the limitation, for the reasons that the petitioner was pursuing the remedy before the forums in good faith, is without any force. It has further been held in the said citation that there was no reason for the petitioner to continue with his petition before the said forum (wrong forum) after the incorporation of section 2-A in Service Tribunals Act, 1973.
' We, being supported by the above-cited rulings and the unreported judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, decline to condone the delay and reject the application of condonation of delay. We, accordingly, in the circumstances of the case and for the reasons and law given above, dismiss all the three appeals as hopelessly time-barred in limine. "
' The judgments in cases of Muhammad Afzal v. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, Syed Aftab Ahmad and others v. K.E.S.C. And others and Muhammad Yaqub v. Pakistan Petroleum Limited (supra) cited by the learned Deputy Attorney-General, are not applicable to the present case. In the first cited case, it was held that change of forum being matter of procedure, the Tribunal was not justified in non-suiting the employee, inasmuch as, on specified date when employee presented his appeal before the Tribunal, the same had the jurisdiction in the matter. The facts of the instant case, therefore, are distinguishable from that of the cited case as such, the rule laid down therein is not applicable herein. Similarly, the propositions in the second cited case are not attracted to the facts of the present case, wherein it was held, firstly that it was not necessary for the _employees working in any Organisation covered by section 2-A that they should come within the ambit of the definition of "civil servant" as given in section 2(1)(b) of the Act but such employees have been treated in service of Pakistan only for limited purpose of providing them remedy of appeal before the Tribunal against an order of which they may feel aggrieved and secondly, the employees approaching the Tribunal without filing an appeal or representation or before expiry of 90 days from the date of filing an appeal or representation, it was observed that in absence of any statutory provision or statutory rule providing a right of appeal. Or representation to such employees the requirement of filing such appeal or representation as provided in section 4 of the Act would not apply. The last citation relied upon by the petitioner would also not apply to the facts of the preseni case as the Tribunal has duly considered the applications of the petitioner for condonation of delay sympathetically and found no legal or sufficient ground for condoning such a long delay to grant the applications, therefore, remanding the condonation applications to the Tribunal to reconsider the same would be of no use.
5. Lastly, we may observe that the petitioner, a statutory body having enormous resources and facilities at its disposal cannot be treated differently from an ordinary litigant. The petitioner had to explain delay of each day for its condonation and ignorance of law cannot be made an excuse for condonation of delay.
6. In view of the above, we do not find any merit, in these petitions and as such they are dismissed.
Leave is refused.