' By a judgment, dated 14-12-1998, Mr. Shaukat Nawaz Goraya, Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,3, Lahore, at Ferozewala, disposed of the three petitions, two having been filed by the establishment and one by the Labour Union of the Orient Match Factory Shandra, Lahore; and the present appeal has been preferred by the Labour Union, claiming to be the C.B.A.
2. The management of the factory had on 30-4-1998 filed a petition under section 34, i.R.O., 1969.
Propriety/legality of the demand notice, datdd 26-11-1997 and the strike notice, dated 14-4-1998 was impugned; Exactly a month afterwards, on 30-5-1998, the union also submitted a petition under section 34, (ibid), alleging that the management was adopting illegal means in order to have a crackdown on the working class and victimize the union members, for their trade union activities. The establishment had in mind the intention or plan to close down the whole factory, w,e,f, 1-6-1998. Having served on the management two letters, dated 29th and 30th May, 1998, the union maintained that without permission of the Court, the closure of the factory could not be effected, as envisaged by section 11-A, West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.
3. The foreign concern, which had been running the Orient Match Factory, over a very long time, had sustained huge losses and decided to stage exit. It was purchased by a Pakistani in the year 1992, but the losses remained unabated, and best incentives offered to the workers also failed to work. Huge loan was obtained from bank, but even then the owner or the new management did not succeed in over coming the huge deficts and making the industry a viable project. The union throughout resisted the move made for closure of the factory, taking up the plea that the concern was earning a lot and the bid to stop its operation was wholly mala fide or mischievous in nature, the sole object being to crush the CBA and victimize the workers. The matter has lingered over an indefinite period and it had gone to the NIRC as well. Evidence was not produced in that forum, although a number of opportunities were afforded to the union for the purpose. The main brunt of the attack of the union is that the factory had been closed on 30-5-1998 (or on 5-6-1998), without intimation to the Labour Department and obtaining prior permission of the Labour Court. Attention of the Court in this regard has been invited to the provisions of section 11-A, Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. In a number of reported rulings, the most celebrated amongst those being 1975 SCM R 49 and 1983 PLC 502 (Karachi High Court) the interpretation enunciated is that the Standing Order 11-A' does not spell out any sequence of various steps to be taken towards closure of the establishment and the move to be made to the Labour Court for the necessary permission need not be the first step in the process, as the same could well be the last one in the series. Application could be made at any time or at any stage of the proceedings. It was pronounced in 1998 PLC 27 that the exercise of termination of the employees could commence at an opportune moment and the management was not duty bond to wait till further orders were passed towards that direction.
Essence of the process was bona fide intention of the employer. Incessant lapses and losses having concurred, over a period of about six years, and every efforts made to rectify the rot or to ameliorate or streamline the working conditions of the labourers having proved wholly futile, the management was left with no other alternative but to close down the establishment.
4. There was nothing to prevent the CBA to get the income and expenditure audited by experts. As per claim of the establishment there was a net loss of Rs,16,060 millions during the financial years pending on 30-6-1996 (Exh.P.5), and the loss for the subsequent year as per Exh.P.6 had inflated to Rs,21.804 millions. With a view (sic) up the income exgratia payment of allowances, bonus, etc. Was made to the workers for enlisting their active cooperation, but all went in vain. Negotiations in a sincere way were proposed to be undertaken, but on 14-4- 1998 a strike notice was served on the management by the CBA. In the demand notice a number of untenable and unsalutory demands had been made. There is, however, nothing tangible and concrete on record to support the plea of the CBA fhe factory was earning profit and it had been in operation throughout. The new proprietorship/management had strained and strived to the utmost to avoid the extreme step of closure of the factory, but their efforts were not crowned with success.
5. I have quite carefully and consciously gone through the impugned decision, dated 14-12-1998, covering 22 pages; and I must say that the learned Presiding Officer of the lower Court has laboured a lot and endeavoured his utmost to find out any loop-holes, favouring the cause of the working class, and eroding or displacing the stand point of the management, but he has not been able to do so. Throughout the proceedings always, a bearded person of apparently advanced age, certainly not a simpleton, Muhammad Yousaf by name, claiming to be the President of the appellant body, has been making appearance as the Union's representative, but it has not been possible for the learned counsel to address the Court, though he has been getting adjournments for preparation. On a number of occasions, emphasis was laid on early disposal of the matter. It was surely not a ham or hopeful situation, as the factory over a long time has not been in operation, and the workers, especially the office-bearers of the CBA, without being in service, have stubbornly and steadfastly been in occupation and enjoyment of the residential quarters. There was little room left for incessant anti unending adjournments. It as abundantly made clear, on the previous- date, therefore, that the learned counsel must come prepared. Still the desire/direction of the Court did not materialise, and the learned counsel could not make it possible to prepare the case and address the Court. On hearing the representative, orally, to some extent, as also the learned counsel for the respondent concern, briefly today, I have dietated the decision. The appeal is found to be without force and is dismissed with costs.