An F. I. R. Has been lodged with Police Station (Anti-Corruption) Jhang for violation of a Martial Law offence as mentioned in Zonal Martial Law Administrator Order No. 7 of 1977 (as amended in 1978).
The petitioner, who is mentioned as ore of the accused is the relevant F. I. R. Has come up in writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution to this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised a number of points which will be presently attended to.
2. The first point argued by the learned counsel was that there 1 no power in the Zonal Martial Law Administrator to issue 'Orders' of a legislative character. The contention has no merit, and as a matter of fact, the point has already been dealt with by me in Allan Bakhsh v. District Magistrate, Jhang and others (PLD 1978 Lah. 765) an d I do not find any ground to take a view different from the one taker, by me in that caw.
3. The next point submitted was that even if the Zonal Martial Law Administrator has power to make 'Orders' of a legislative character, such 'Orders' could not alter, amend or repeal any existing law.
The point raised so far appears to have substance in its abstract form, because, according to Article 5(l) of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order No. 1 of 1977, existing laws are to continue subject to any Order of the President or Martial Law Regulation or Martial Law Order made by the Martial Law Administrator, until altered, amended or repealed by a competent authority. The question as to who otherwise would be a competent authority in the aforesaid context for legislation on any particular subject is to be determined with reference to each case and that aspect of the matter need not be gone into because that issue has not specifically arisen here.
What has precisely happened in the instant case is that the Zonal Martial Law Administrator has promulgated Zonal Martial Las Order No. 7 as amended by Order No. 8, which purports to create, if it can be so-called, "a Martial Law offence" and in my opinion it cannot be doubted that the relevant Martial Law Authorities, and to be mare precise, a Zonal Martial Law Administrator has power to enact and enforce laws which purport to serve the "purpose of Martial Law". The purpose of Martial Law, as enunciated in Begum Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of Army Staff and Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1977 SC 657) at page 703, line 14 inter alia is "the welfare of the people". To create "Martial Law offences" to curb-corruption naturally would fall within the aforesaid purpose. The Zonal Martial Law Administrator, therefore, was well within his jurisdiction to promulgate martial Law Order No. 7 as amended by the Zonal Martial Law Administrator Order No. 8. It may be reiterated that this order creates a special offence in the peculiar situation prevalent in the country and cannot be taken exception to. From that point of view, since it is a new offence in the new context, it cannot be said to alter, amend or repeal any existing law, because all the existing laws did not deal with 'Martial Law offences'--which contingency is not contemplated in the laws existing prior to the imposition of Martial Law.
4. The next point argued was that the Zonal Martial Law Order No. 7 was ultra vires of the Constitution and the Laws Continuance in Force Order No. 1 of 1977. The latter limb of this argument has already been dealt with above and so far as the first part of this argument is concerned. I have not been able to comprehend as to how a law creating a Martial Law offence can be said to be ultra rues of the Constitution when, according to the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Begum Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of Army Staff and Federation of Pakistan, the very imposition of Martial Law in the context has already been held to be valid, for State necessity and welfare of the people.
5. The neat point argued was that the registration of the case against Mapal Khan petitioner was mala fide, inasmuch as, according to the apparent tenor of the F. I. R. No offence is alleged to have been committed by him. I have no intention to thrash out the merits of the case or the attending evidence in that respect. All that need be said at the moment is that the name of the petitioner does figure in the F. I. R. And a specific part has also been attributed to him. Whether the accusation against the petitioner is false or otherwise incorrect, is not for me to go into at this stage, especially when it is a matter of leading evidence and holding of an enquiry on the subject.
6. The last point argued was that according to the West Pakistan Anti Corruption Establishment Ordinance XX of 1961, Anti-Corruption Establishment could take notice of offences mentioned in the Schedule attached with the Ordinance which, according to the learned counsel, did not contain Martial Law offences. In that view of the situation, he submitted that no case could have been registered In the Anti-Corruption Police Station. The contention has no merit. Police Station whether designated as Anti. Corruption Police Station or otherwise remains a Police Station and a report of cognizable offence can be lodged there both under the ordinary law, for example, as contained in the Police Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure as well se under the relevant Martial Law Orders/Regulations. The learned f Advocate-General submitted that the case has passed the stage of investigation and actually a regular challan now has been filed before the summary Military Court. The question as to which Agency was competent t investigate, in the circumstances, does not remain of any significant importance.
7. No other point was argued before me.
8. The result is that no case has been made out for admission of this writ petition which has no merit and is dismissed in limine. It may be clarified that nothing written herein should be considered as an expression of opinion, one way or the other, on the merits of the case.