' These are two applications against the order, dated 22-12-1999, passed by the learned Presiding Officer of the Sindh Labour Court No,5, at Karachi whereby he dismissed the two applications, filed under section 25-A, of I.R.O., 1969, by the two applicants in these two revisions.
2. Mr. Gohar Iqbal, learned counsel for the applicants in both the revisions, submits that the learned Labour Court decided the case without giving him an opportunity of adducing evidence. The question, raised by the respondent before the learned. Labour Court, was a mixed question of fact and law and, as such, the learned Labour Court ought to have decided the matter after recording the evidence. He, however, fairly conceded that the respondent is a Hospital, but it is being run on commercial basis. Mr. Masood A. Khan, learned counsel for the respondent in both the revisions, took a preliminary objection that the impugned order was passed by the learned Labour Court on 22-12-1998; copy was made ready on 24-12-1998. The learned Labour Court finally disposed of the applications under section 25-A. It is not an order on interlocutory application. The remedy, available to the applicants, in law, was by way of filing an appeal under section 37(3) of the I.R.O., 1969 and not by resorting to file revisions under section 38(3-a) of I.R.O., 1969. To me, it appears, that the time for filing appeal prescribed in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 to be thirty days, having expired, the applicants resorted to file revisions, to overcome the difficulty: This seems to be an attempt to circumvent the law. Not a word has been said before me by Mr. Gohar Iqbal as to what prevented him to file appeal within time; neither in his opening address to the Court nor in reply to the submissions, made by the respondent's counsel. I think the objection, taken by the learned counsel for the respondent, is quite valid. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on two decisions reported as Pakistan Railways through General Manager (HQ) and another v. Naseeb Baig Mirza (1989 PLC 869) by the learned Chairman of this Tribunal, wherein it was held that---"... In my opinion under the circumstances of this case this is not a fit case where this Tribunal should exercise its revisional jurisdiction to reopen the case on a question which involves mixed question of law and fact specially when the applicants slept over their right of appeal and allowed the order of the learned Labour Court to attain finality". The other authority, which was relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent is reported as Sarni Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and 3 others (1985 PLC 754). It is a Divisional Bench Judgment of our own High Court, comprising Ajmal Mian and Haider Ali Pirzada, JJ., where the learned Division Bench, upholding the impugned order, observed that.".... We are, therefore, of the view that the impugned order cannot be said to be without jurisdiction warranting interference by this Court, in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction...".
3. In view of the facts and circumstances, which remained unexplained, as to why the remedy by way of revision was availed, to my mind, cannot be except that the time of filing appeal had expired under the law, referred to above, I am of the view that these two revisions are not maintainable. Mr. Gohar Iqbal, trying to distinguish the provisions of sections 37(3) and 38(3-a) of the I.R.O., 1969, submits that it is an order and not a decision whereas section 37(3) gives the right of appeal against an award or decision. It regret, the argument is fallacious and without any substance. Although it has been titled as order, but it is a decision in all respect disposing of the whole application. The word "decision" has been considered in Mian Zahid Sarfraz v. Raja Nadir Pervaiz Khan and others (1987 SCM R 1107), by a Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court comprising Muhammad Haleem, C.J., and Nasim Hasan Shah and Shafiur Rehman, JJ. In the said case, it appears, that the whole matter was disposed of on two preliminary issues by Election Tribunal. The word "decision" has been fully discussed supported by a pathora of laws and authorities in the aforesaid Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein a golden principle of interpretation of statutes has been laid down at the end of the long Judgment. The principle of construction of statutes always drew upon first on the express language of the statute, next the context, then the subject and A purposes and last of all on the policy. If the express language presents no difficulty in interpretation resort cannot be had to the context. To me it is a decision as used in section 37 and remedy by way of appeal was open to the applicants. By way of analogy. I may add that an order, passed on an application under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C., rejecting a plaint, has been held to be not an order, but a Judgment/decree against which appeal has to be filed and not a revision.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent next submitted that the learned Labour Court was justified in dismissing the application under section 25-A, as the provisions of I.R.O., 1969 were not applicable.
Reference was made by him to section 1(3)(f), which is an amendment made in 1979, after ten years of the promulgation of the I.R.O., 1969. He refers to section 1(3)(t) which says that (3) it shall not apply to any person employed--(f) by an establishment maintained for the treatment or care of sick, infirm, destitute and mentally unfit persons. Reference was also made to section 3 of the same Amendment Ordinance whereby even the registration of trade union stood. Cancelled. The relevant provisions reads as under:- "(3) Cancellation of registration of Trade Union.---Notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, (XXIII of 1969), the registration of, and the certificate of registration issued to the registered. Trade Unions in any establishment maintained for the treatment or care of sick, infirm, destitute or mentally unfit persons shall stand cancelled."
' Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that even the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is not applicable as the respondent is not a commercial establishment.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent took me through the record, the written statement and various documents, submitted alongwith it. R/1 is a certificate of registration, dated 30-1-1992, issued by the Directorate of Social Welfare, Government of Sindh, which shows that the respondent has been registered under the Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies (Registration and Control)
Ordinance, 1961. He also referred to schedule attached to the said Registration Ordinance. Items Nos.12 and 13 of the said schedule relate to the welfare and rehabilitation of patients and welfare of the aged and infirm. A reference was also made to Annexure R/4 which is a memorandum of association and rules and regulations of the MA-Ayesha Memorial Centre, the respondent. Under heading, "aims and object", it is stated that, "the MA Ayehsa Memorial Centre is a non-profit voluntary organization for the welfare of physically handicapped established. "(4) To provide service for painful conditions such as Rheumatoid arthritis, stiff joints, Lumbago and other orthepedic ailments...." He also referred to Annexures R/2 and R/3, two.Balance sheets for the years 1996 and 1997. A cursory glance to the said balance sheets will show the following figures, which are relevant for the present case:-- {{TABLE}} 1996 Zakat Rs,2,22,890,00 Donation Rs, 1,857,246,00 Defiction (in income)... Rs,6,38,390.30.
1997 Zakat Rs,1,88,904.00 Donations Rs,1,969.662.00 Defiction (in income).... Rs,74,702.40. {{TABLE}} ' The reply, filed by the applicants, to the written statement including the preliminary objections, wherein none of the documnts, annexed with the written statement which is on oath, was challenged nor they produced any document rebuttal thereof.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to a number of authorities that the "Hospital" establishment have been exempted from the application of the I.R.O. 1969, and Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, reported as Women Christian Hospital v. Mst. Sakina Yonis (1990 PLC 371), given by Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab and another one reported as Mst. Sakina Younas v. Administrator, Woman's Christian Hospital, Multan and 2 others (1991 PLC 798), which is a Lahore High Court Judgment by Riaz Ahmed, J. (now Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan) whereby the Constitutional petition against the decision of Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab, was dismissed. I may also refer to my own Judgment in the case of Pakistan Telecom Foundation v. Naveed Nayar (in Appeals Nos.KAR-349 and 350 of 1998), decided on 23-2-1999, wherein, after referring to the case of Sakina Younas, and a case reported as Ghousia Iqrar v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal (1984 PLC 1400), which is also to the same effect, it was held by me that, "in view of the above legal position, the learned Labour Court had no jurisdiction in the matter to entertain the application under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969. The impugned- order, is therefore, set aside and the appeal is allowed.
7. In view of the facts and law, referred to above, the learned Labour Court was quite justified in deciding matter on the basis of the documentary evidence, already on record. In fact, the learned Labour Court has no jurisdiction in the matter.
8. For the aforesaid reasons, the decision (described as order), passed by the learned Labour Court No,V, is maintained and the revisions are dismissed.
' Announced in open Court, this 26th October, 1999.