' S. AHMED SARWANA, J.---The brief facts as available from the pleadings are that Nagina Bakery through its proprietor Muhammad Nasir (Petitioner), a consumer of Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (SSGC/Respondent No,1) has filed this petition challenging the demand of Rs,1,74,826 made by SSGC. The facts giving rise to the petition as stated in the petition are that on 23-5-2000, some representatives of SSGC came to premises of the petitioner, took away his Gas meter for testing in the laboratory after replacing it with a new one. The following observations were made in the Testing Report dated 23-5-2000 relating to the Meter: "Meter is physically checked and proved in presence of vig. Rep. As the portion of upper case was found removed meter found the carbon in to valve/valve seal and chamber. It was observed that meter found slow. Meter found-50% should be bill charge from consumer. (sic)
' On the basis of the report, the Chief Engineer of SSGC (respondent No,2) ordered that recovery be made accordingly. Consequently, SSGC by letter dated 14-7-2000 demanded Rs,1,74,826 as arrears and informed the petitioner that if this was not done, the said amount would be included in the following bill for the month of July, 2000. The 'petitioner requested the respondents to withdraw the aforesaid letter and demand but in vain. It is alleged that on 3-8-2000 some staff members of SSGC came to the petitioner's premises and threatened to disconnect his gas supply: consequently, the petitioner immediately filed the present Petition against (i) Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (SSGC) through Chief Manager as respondent No,1. (ii) The Chief Engineer, SSGC as respondent No,2. (iii) Deputy General Manager (Marketing and Billing), Sui Southern Gas Company as respondent No,3 and (iv) Government of Pakistan through Ministry of National Resources. Islamabad, as Respondent No,4, seeking the following relief: "The petitioner, therefore, humbly prayed that demand of Rs,1,74,826 as arrears by the respondents from the petitioner may kindly be declared illegal, mala fide, baseless, void ab initio, without justification, without lawful authority and without jurisdiction. Because the petitioner had paid all the previous bills issued by the respondents and the petitioner is not in arrears. And the respondent may kindly be restrained from receiving said amount and they may kindly also restrained from disconnecting the gas supply of the petitioner due to non-payment of said demanded amount.
(sic)
2. On 4-8-2000, the Court issued pre-admission Notice to respondents for 8-8-2000. Today, Mr. Abdul Sattar Kazi, Advocate filed power on behalf of respondents Nos.1 to 3 and requested for time to file a counter affidavit/comments to challenge the maintainability of the petition. We asked Mr. Shoaib Shibli, learned Counsel for the Petitioner to satisfy the Court as how the Constitution petition was maintainable. In reply, he submitted as follows:
(i) Sui Southern Gas Company Limited is owned and controlled by the Government of Pakistan and as such it is a department of the Government of Pakistan. Alternatively, it is a local authority, and therefore, its working and conduct is amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution.
(ii) Respondents Nos.1 to 3 being employees of Sui Southern Gas Company are public officers/functionaries whose mala fide action is subject to correction by the High Court under its Constitutional Jurisdiction.
(iii) SSGC letter dated 14-7-2000 demanding arrears of Rs .1,74,826 is mala fide and liable to be set aside.
3. We asked Mr. Shibli to support his arguments with reference to the relevant provisions of law or by any reported judgment, he submitted that there was substantial law in support of his contentions and Mr. Kazi should be directed to file a counter-affidavit or comments on the petition whereafter he would submit the relevant law. We informed him that on 4-8-2000 on his request Pre-admission Notice was issued to the respondents for 8-8-2000 and consequently the matter was fixed for Katcha Peshi today and he should satisfy the Court as to how the Constitution petition was maintainable as apparently there are several judgments of the superior Courts against the propositions he had advanced. He did not place any law in support of his contentions and asked the Court to decide the petition on the basis of the legal contentions/arguments advanced by him.
4. We have researched the law ourselves and have found several judgments of the superior Courts relating to the issues raised by Mr. Shibli, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, some of which are as follows:
(i) The contention of Mr. Shibli that SSGC is owned and controlled by the Government of Pakistan and as such, it is a department of the Government is incorrect. Admittedly. SSGC is a public limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1913 (now the Companies Ordinance, 1984) and is quoted on the Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad Stock Exchanges. We confronted Mr. Shibli with a copy of the Karachi Stock Exchange Report published in the daily Dawn of 8-8-2000 which quoted the price of shares of SSGC at Rs,14.80 per share. It is obvious that the shares of SSGC are freely sold and purchased at the various Stock Exchanges of Pakistan. In these circumstances, we fail to understand how Mr. Shibli can argue that SSGC is a department of the Government of Pakistan. On further research we found that the President of Pakistan owns majority shares in SSGC. Even the fact that the majority shares in SSGC are held by the President of Pakistan does not make it a Department of the Government of Pakistan. In this connection, we may mention here that after nationalization of Pakistani Banks in 1974, the entire share capital of all the banks vested in the Government of Pakistan; nevertheless, in the case of Badruddin H. Mawani v. Messrs Commerce Bank Ltd. PLD 1975 Karachi 182 wherein a question arose whether the banks after nationalization under the Banks Nationalization Act, 1974, continued to exist as legal person, the Honorable High Court of Sindh, after considering the provisions of the Banks Nationalization Act, 1974, observed that the banks continued to exist after nationalization as legal entities independent of the Federal Government though they might be subject to the directions of the Federal Government directly or indirectly through the Banking Council. Again in the case of Darab Shah B. Dalai v. Muslim Commercial Bank, PLD 1977 SC 457, the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan held that after the Banks Nationalization Act, 1974, the corporate status of the banks was not affected and their rights and obligations continued to subsist as before. Therefore, SSGC which is a public limited company cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as a department of the Government.
(ii) Under Article 199 of the Constitution, a High Court may, if it is satisfied that no other adequate remedy is provided by law, on the application of an aggrieved party may make an order declaring that any act done or proceedings taken within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court by a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or local authority has been done or taken without lawful authority. It is not the function of the Government of Pakistan to transmit and supply/sell gas to the public. SSGC, a company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, which is carrying on the business of transmission and supply/sale of natural gas cannot by any logic be said to be performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation or the Province of Sindh.
(iii) Under section 3(28) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 "local authority" means a municipal committee, district board, body of port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of a municipal or local fund.
Admittedly, SSGC is a public limited company quoted on the Stock Exchange and has not been entrusted by the Government with the control or management of a municipal or a local fund. SSGC, therefore, cannot be regarded as a local authority against which a writ can be issued under Article 199 of the Constitution.
(iv) The term "Public Servant" has been defined in Pakistan Penal Code as follows:-- "21. 'Public servant.' The words 'public servant' denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following, namely:-- ' First.---Every covenanted servant of the State:-- Second.---Every Commissioned Officer in the Military, Naval or Air Forces of Pakistan while serving under the Federal Government or any Provincial Government; ' Third.---Every Judge; ' Fourth.---Every officer of a Court of Justice whose duty it is, as such officer, to investigate or report on any matter of law or fact, or to make authenticate, or keep any document, or to take charge or dispose of any property, or to execute any judicial process, or to administer any oath, or to interpret, or to preserve order in the Court and every person specially authorized by a Court of Justice to perform any of such duties; ' Fifth.---Every juryman, assessor, or member of a panchayat assisting a Court of Justice or public servant; ' Sixth.---Every arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or matter has been referred for decision or report by any Court of Justice, or by any other competent public authority; ' Seventh.---Every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to place or keep any person in confinement; ' Eighth.---Every officer of the Government whose duty it is, as such officer, to prevent offences to give information of offences, to bring offenders to justice, or to protect the public health, safety or convenience; ' Ninth.---Every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property on behalf of the Government or to make any survey, assessment or contract on or to investigate, or to report, on any matter affecting the pecuniary interests of the Government, or to make, authenticate or keep any document relating to the pecuniary interests of the Government, or to prevent the infraction of any law for the protection of the pecuniary interests of the Government, and every officer in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty; ' Tenth.-- Every officer whose duty it is as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property, to make any survey or assessm ent or to levy any rate or tax for any secular common purpose of any village, town, or district, or to make, authenticate or keep any document for the ascertaining of the rights of the people of any village, town or district; ' Eleventh.---Every person who holds any office in virtue of which he is empowered to prepare, publish, maintain or revise an electoral loll or to conduct an election or part of an election."
' The argument of Mr. Shibli, learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Chief Manager (respondent No,1), the Chief Engineer (respondent No,2) and the Deputy General Manager (Marketing and Billing) (respondent No,3) are public servants/functionaries is not bona fide. These persons cannot by any stretch of imagination be deemed to be public servants as discussed above. It appears that Mr. Shibli learned Counsel for the petitioner, while advancing this argument had in mind section 2-A which has been added in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, on 10-2-1997 whereby service under any authority, company, corporation or organization owned and controlled by the Federal Government has been declared to be service of Pakistan and every person holding a post under such authority, corporation, body or organization shall be deemed to be a civil servant for purpose of Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The deeming clause was added in the statute to provide a convenient and speedy remedy for the redress of the grievances of employees of companies owned or controlled by the Government of Pakistan e.g., Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, Nationalized Banks and Sui Southern Gas Company Limited, etc. The amendment does not in any way make such employees civil servants or public functionaries to make them amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Mr. Shibli, learned Counsel for the petitioner, can only be complimented for his fertile imagination for advancing such an argument.
(v) The argument of Mr. Shibli that SSGC letter dated 14-7-2000 demanding arrears of Rs,1,74,826 is mala fide and liable to be set aside is not tenable. According to the statements made in the petition by the petitioner himself, the gas meter on physical examination was found defective and running slow by-50% (sic-actual defect was to the extent of 45% only). Consequently, in the circumstances, the demand of SSGC for arrears is justified as the defective meter had been recording lower consumption by 45%.
(vi) Further, the petitioner has alleged that he is a consumer of SSGC through Meter No,00174485 for the last six years and has been paying the bills regularly. The gas is obviously being supplied under a contract between the parties which lays down the terms and conditions of supply, the rights and obligations of SSGC and the consumer (petitioner) and the circumstances in which the petitioner would have the right to demand supply of gas and SSGC has the right to disconnect the same and consequences of breach of contract committed by either party. In the present case, the petitioner has prayed for declaration that the demand of Rs,1,74,826 as arrears by SSGC is illegal and mala fide and an injunction to restrain SSGC from disconnecting the gas supply to the petitioner allegedly in breach of the provisions of the agreement between them. The petitioner is thus, seeking enforcement of obligations arising from the contract between himself and SSGC. It is well established that a party cannot procure enforcement of purely contractual obligations by filing a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution (See M. Muzaffar-ud-Din Industries Ltd. v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, 1968 SCMR 1136 and Messrs Pacific Multinational (Pvt.)
Ltd. v. Inspector-General of Police, Sindh. PLD 1992 Karachi 283). Consequently, this petition is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed in limine.
(vii) It is settled law that legal proceedings can be filed by or against natural or legal person only and cannot be filed against official designations or titles. The petitioner has filed the petition against the designations and titles of officers of SSGC who are not legal or natural persons and, therefore, the petition to that extent is bad in form and not maintainable. [Secretary, B & R Government of West Pakistan v. Fazal Ali Khan, PLD 1971 Karachi 625].
(viii) The petitioner has also sued the Government of Pakistan through the Ministry of Natural Resources, Islamabad, as respondent No,4, but has neither made any allegation nor sought any relief against it in the petition. It appears that the learned Counsel impleaded Government of Pakistan as a party/respondent to overcome any objection that might be raised by the, Writ Branch on the maintainability of the petition and thereby justify the petition by misleading the clerks of the Writ Branch. The action of the learned counsel in making the Government of Pakistan respondent No,4 is, prima facie, mala fide which act cannot but be disapproved by this Court.
5. It is well-established that an Advocate is an Officer of the Court and is concerned in the proper administration of justice and owes an overriding duty to the Court, to the standards of his profession and to the public, to ensure that it is achieved. We regret to note that Mr. Shibli, learned counsel for the petitioner failed in his duty by not maintaining the standards expected of an Advocate and an officer of this Court in the administration of justice by not preparing his brief properly and placing the relevant law before the Court. The petition was fixed for Katcha Peshi and it was his bounden duty to come ready with the facts and law on the legal propositions he was going to advance which he failed to do. Such lapse on the part of the Counsel show disrespect to the standards of the profession, duty to the Court in the administration of justice and negligence of duty to client.
6. We may add here that when Mr. Shibli accepted the brief of his client, petitioners herein, he undertook to prepare and file the petition on behalf of his client as a gentleman and an honest advocate. When he charged his fee for professional service he promised his client that he shall draft the petition, research the law and present the arguments to the best of his ability for the benefit of his client at the time of Katcha Peshi and thereafter handle the matter responsibly until its conclusion. He was duty bound to fulfill his obligations to his client In Surah 5. Al-Maida, Ayat 1 the Holy Qur'an ordains: "O you who believe; Fulfill (your) obligations" In Surah 17. Al-Isra, Ayat 34. It is enjoined: "And fulfil (every) covenant."
' As a Muslim and as an Advocate, it was obligatory on the part of Mr. Shibli to prepare and present his clients case to the best of his ability when the matter was fixed for Katcha Peshi. From his conduct and the manner in which he argued the case before us, it is evident that he not only I committed breach of the Injunctions of the Holy Qur'an but also committed a breach of promise to his client.
7. It would not be out of place to mention here that when an Advocate enters into an agreement with a client to represent him in Court and charges his fee, he contracts with that client to be skilful and careful. It is his duty to fulfill his obligation and undertaking of carrying out extensive research and argue the case to the best of his ability. If he does not do so, he not only violates the Canons of Professional Ethics but is also guilty of professional misconduct an if his client suffers injury because of his negligence he would be liable for the loss or injury suffered by his client. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition. Volume 44, Paragraph 134 the responsibilities and conduct of counsel is discussed as follows:-- "135. Liability for negligence.--A solicitor holds himself out to his clients as having adequate skill and knowledge properly to conduct all business that he undertakes, whether contentious or non- contentious. He owes a duty to his client both in contract and in tort, and he may be liable to a third person for the tort of negligence. Where the solicitor is in breach of his contractual duty to his client or where he fails to use proper care to his client or a third person, where he owes a duty of care to that third person, suffers loss as a result, he is liable in damages even if the claim in negligence is for purely financial loss."
' Further, in the case of Bashir Ahmed v. Government of Punjab, 1985 SCM R 333, the Honourable Supreme Court has observed as follows: "In a case of gross negligence of law or negligence on the part of the counsel, the client has to seek a redress against the counsel..."
' The above two authorities have been reproduced by us to show the importance of the standard to skill and conduct which is expected from the Advocates in a civilized society.
8. In view of the above discussion, it is crystal clear that the petition is not maintainable and the Counsel should have advised his client not to pursue the same. The petition is patently vexatious to the knowledge of the petitioner's counsel and he should not have filed it even if his client insisted that he should do so. A Counsel should never allow himself to be tempted by financial gains to commit a breech of his duty to the Court which has precedence over his duty to the client. It is accordingly dismissed with costs of Rs,5,000 to be paid by the petitioner's Counsel from his pocket to the respondents who have been unnecessarily inconvenienced and harassed and had to engage an Advocate to defend the petition after receipt of notice from the Court. Mr. Abdul Sattar Kazi, learned Counsel for respondents Nos.1 to 3 states that the costs, instead of being paid to him, may be deposited in the High Court Bar Library for purchase of books. The request made by the Respondents Counsel is commendable and appreciated. Accordingly, Mr. Shibli shall deposit Rs,5,000 with the concerned officer of the High Court Bar Library and provide a photo copy of the receipt of such deposit to Mr. Kazi within 30 days hereof.
' Mr. Shibli shall also provide a photo copy of the receipt to the Additional Registrar of this Court within 30 days. In case of any dereliction by the petitioner's Counsel, the Additional Registrar shall, after notice to Mr. Shibli, bring the matter to the attention of anyone of the members of this Bench.