1. CH. IJAZ AHMAD, J.--- Brief facts out of which the present appeal arises are that Mst. Ainna Bibi and others were ,owners of land measuring 117 kanals, 1 marla situated in Chak No. 114/JB Tehsil and District Faisalabad. They sold land measuring 80 kanals, 9 marlas being 44/64 share of the total land in question for consideration of Rs.2,51,406/- vide registered sale-deed dated 13.12.1980 to Muhammad Salim, Liaqat A.I, Tariq Mehmood and Zain-ul-Abadin. Barkat A.I and A.I Muhammad filed suit for preemption of the land in question before the Senior Civil Judge, Faisalabad on 16.1.1982 on the ground that they have got superior rights of pre-emption as they are co-sharer in the land in question. Appellants/defendants filed written statement and controverted the allegations levelled in the plaint.
2. Out of the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following issues:-
(i) Whether the physical possession of the suit land was delivered to the defendants on 1.10.1980 under the sale and the suit is time-barred? OPD.
(ii) Whether defendant No. 4 is a minor and the suit has been instituted without appointment of guardian ,ad item? If so, its effect? OPD
(iii) Whether the plaintiffs did not purchase, the stamps for Court-fee, if so its effect? OPD.
(iv) Whether the plaintiffs Waived their right of pre-emption in view of the averment made in the written statement? OPD. .(v) Whether the suit is Benami and the plaintiffs lacked financial sources to pre-empt the land?
2. OPD.
(vi) Whether the suit has been fictitiously instituted without signatures of the plaintiffs? OPD.
(vii) Whether the suit is for partial pre-emption? OPD.
(viii) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPP.
(ix) Whether the plaintiffs lack cause of action? OPD.
(x) Whether the plaintiffs have superior right of pre-emption qua the vendees? OPP.
(xi) Whether the amount of. Rs.2,51,406/- has been actually paid or fixed in good faith as ostensible sale price of the suit land? OPD.
(xii) If issue No. 12 is not proved that was the ,market value of the suit land at the time of sale? OPP
(xiii) Relief.
3. Learned Senior Civil Judge, decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 31.1.1988. The appellants being aggrieved field an appeal before the District Judge, Faisalabad on 22.2.1988. The appeal was admitted for regular hearing by the District Judge, Faisalabad on 23.2.1988.
3. Learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs raised the preliminary objection about the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the valuation is above Rs.2,00,000/-. The appellants have to file the appeal before this Court. The objection of the respondents/plaintiffs was accepted by the learned District Judge, Faisalabad vide order dated 8.7.1989 and memorandum of appeal was returned to the appellants for presentation to the proper Court. The appellants filed R.F.A. No. 106/1998 before this Court on 8.7.1989 alongwith. C.M. No. 3764/89 under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act read with Section 151, CPC for condonation of delay in filing the appeal before this Court. The appeal was dismissed vide judgment dated 12.3.1990.
4. The appellants being aggrieved of the judgment of this Court filed petition which was converted into an appeal No. 1408/1992 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and accepted and same vide judgment dated 18.11.1992. Thereafter respondents filed review petition bearing No. 54-L/1993 which was accepted vide order dated 29.5.1993 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and remanded the case to this Court to decide afresh in the following terms:- "This being the position, it is only fair that the matter should be remanded back to the High Court for fresh decision in the light of the judgment of this Court after considering the application of the petitioners for condonation of the delay."
4. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that judgment of the trial Court is a nullity in the eyes of law as the suit of the respondents/plaintiffs was decreed on 31.1.1988 after the target date of 31.7.1986 fixed by the Hon'ble Supr'eme Court in Said Komal's case (PLD 1986 S.C. 360). He' further urged that the trial Court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to decree the suit of the respondents/plaintiffs due to the principle laid down by the superior Courts in the following judgments:- PLD 1994 Lahore 13 (Ch. Bashir Ahmad Vs. Ghulam Rasool).
5. PLD 1988 S.C. 287 (Sardar A.I Vs. Muhammad A.I). PLD 1988 S.C. 701 -(Ghulam Qadir Vs. Nawab Din).
6. PLD 1988 S.C. 412 (Sher Muhammad and another Vs. Allah Ditta and 2 others).
7. 1989 CLC 776 (Malik Muhammad alias Malkoo Vs. Jan Muhammad).
8. He further urged on the basis of the aforesaid judgments of the Superior Courts that the judgment and decree of the trial Court was void and nullity in the eyes of law as the same was passed in violation of the principle laid down by the Superior Courts. He further urged that no limitation runs against the void judgment. He relied upon the following judgments:- PLD 1992 S:C. 51 (Mls. L.M. Start Fort Vs. Syed Amjad Hussain and 9 others); PLD 1985 Quetta 74 (Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan Vs. Noor Muhammad and 2 others).
9. 1987 SCMR 11 t9 (Pakistan Post Office Vs. Settlement Commissioner and others)
10. PLD 1997 S.C. 351 (Province of Punjab Vs. Dr. S. Muhammad Zafar Bokhan).
11. 1991 SCMR 1399 (Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority Vs. Mst. Khadeja Bibi).
12. He further stated that no body should be penalised by the act of the Court. It is admitted fact that the appeal of the appellants was admitted for regular hearing by the learned District Judge, Faisalabad on 23.2.1988. The appellants engaged Senior Counsel Ch. Muhammad Bashir who filed appeal before the District Judge, Faisalabad, therefore, appellants were vigilent and should to be penalised by the act of their advocate. He further stated that appellants filed appeal in time before the District Judge who returned the same after considerable time. Therefore, application of the appellants for condonation of delay be accepted on the principle laid down by the superior Courts Ordinance, 1962, as the law laid down by the superior Courts in the following judgment:- (1995 SCMR 584) (Sherin and 4 others Vs. Fazal Muhammad and 4 others).
5. Learned counsel for the respondents/defendants contended that valuation for the purpose of Court-fee and jurisdiction mentioned in para 9 of the plaint was Rs.2,28,669.03 and the same was not 4 denied by the appellants/defendants in their written statement, The learned trial Court also did not change the jurisdictional value as is evident from the decree sheet prepared on 31.1.1988 which reveals the same as Rs.28,669.03. He further urged that valuation mentioned in the plaint has to determine the forum of appeal under Section 18 of Civil Courts in the following judgments:- PLJ 1987 S.C. 262 (Muhammad Nawaz Vs. Sher Muhammad). PLJ 1987 S.C. 423 (Abdul Majid Vs. Muhammad Walayat). PLJ 1987 Lahore 504 (Muhammad Zafar Vs. Yousaf Ahsan). PLD1992 Lahore 89 (Nazir Ahmad Vs. Muhammad Tahir. Lin reported judgment in C.R. No 6/1998, decided on 9.12.1998.
13. He further urged that appellants filed appeal before the District Judge on 22.2.1988 and the respondents raised objection regarding maintainability-of the appeal before the District Judge on 5.3.1989 but the appellants failed to withdraw the appeal and to file ,the same before this Court till the same was returned by the learned District Judge vide order dated 8.7.1989. The appellants also filed Civil Revision No. 1955/89 on 22.7.1989 before this Court against the order of the District Judge dated 8.7.1989. The same was dismissed by this Court on 11.3.1990. He further stated that memo. Of grounds of appeal was returned by the District Judge to the appellants vide order dated 8,7.1989 but the appellants did not file appeal immediately before this Court. The same was filed after considerable delay on 22.7.1989. He further urged that the appellants have to explain the delay of each delay which they have failed to explain. Therefore, the appellants committed gross negligence This appeal should be-dismissed as time barred as the appellants have taken only one ground for condonation of delay that they engaged a Senior Counsel. Negligence of the counsel is the negligence of the party and party should have to be penalised as the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following judgments:- PLD 1977 S.C. 102 (Abdul Ghani Vs. Ghulam Sarwar). 1988 SCMR 2 (lslam-ud-Din Vs. Allah Nawaz).
14. 1984 SCMR 890 (Mst. Mehmoodan Begum Vs. Manajor Malik Muhammad lshaque).
15. 1975 SCMR 259 (Muhammad Sharif Vs. Muhammad A.I and others). PLD 1991 SC 957 (Ghulam A.I Vs'.
16. Akbar alias Akoor and 'mother). PL..; 1997 SC 1817.
17. 1'998 SCMR 2296 (Syed Haji Abdul Wahid and another Vs. Syed Sirajud Din).
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered Sherin and 4 others Vs. Fazal Muhammad and 4 others (1995 SCMR 584) in the latest judgment and did not approve the same in (1998 SCMR 2296). He further urged that on merits this Court has already dismissed the appeal of the appellants on 15.4.1987 as the law laid doWn by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in PLD 1989 S.C.771). He further urged that this Court decided the appeal in accordance with the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. He further urged that appeal was decided by this Court when the pre- emption law was not framed by the Legislature and this Court has no jurisdiction to review the judgment of this Court dated 15.4.1987. This Court after considering the case on merits dismissed the appeal. He further urged that decree dated 31.1.1988 was passed in favour of the respondents as law stood on that date on the basis of the lay laid down by the Superior Courts in the following judgments:- 1987 MLD 2906. 1988 CLC 151.
19. PLD 1987 Lahore 358.
20. PLD 1989 S.C. 771.
6. We have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record ourselves. It is better and appropriate to reproduce the facts, in chronological order to resolve the controversy between the parties:-
(i) That the respondents/defendants filed suit for pre-emption on 16.1.1982.
(ii) That para 9 reveals the valuation of suit both for the purpose of Court-fee and jurisdiction as Rs.2,28,669.03/-.
(iii) Written statement para 9 not denied.
(iv) Suit decreed dated 31.1.1988. Decree sheet was prepared mentioned the same amount.
(v) Appeal filed before the District Judge on 22.2.1988.
(vi) District Judge admitted for regular hearing on 23.2.1998.
(vii) Respondents/plaintiffs raised objection about the maintainability of the appal before the District Judge on -5.3.1989.
(viii) On 8.7.1989 memorandum of appeal was returned by the District Judge.
(ix) R.F.A. No 106/89 filed on 22.7.1989.
(x) The appellants also filed C.R. No 1955/89 on 22.7.1989 against the order of the District Judge dated 8.7.1989.
(xi) Revision was dismissed on 11.3.1990.
21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has laiti down a principle that Civil Court has no jurisdiction to pass any decree in any pre-emption suit after 31.7.1986 in Said Karnes case. It is admitted that in the present e was passed on 31.1.1988 after the target date i.e. 31.7.1986. Therefore, judgment and decree is nullity in the eyes of law as the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following judgments would be attracted:- PLD 1986 S.C. 360 (Govt. Of NWFP Vs. Said Kama's case).
22. PLD 1988 S.C. 287 (Sardar A.I Vs. Muhammad A.I).
23. PLD 1990 S.C. 899 (Mst. Aziz Begum Vs. Federation of Pakistan).
24. It is also admitted fact that the appellants have to file an appeal before this Court as the valuation for the purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction was mentioned in plaint more than 2.00,000/- but the appellants filed an appeal before the Distt. Judge which was admitted for regular hearing and the same was returned to the appellant on 8.7.1989. In similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court condoned the delay is Sherin Vs. Fazal Muhammad's case (1995 .SCMR 584) and observed as under:- "We feel that omission on the part of learned District Judge to take timely action is the major cause of refilling of the appeal by the appellants, in the High Court, out of time. They have been the victim of the act of the Court which furnishes "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay. The fact that after receiving the memorandum of appeal from the District Court, some time was consumed by the appellants, in presenting it to the High Court, in the ,circumstances of the case is inconsequential. We are, therefore, inclined to condone the delay in 'presenting the memorandum of appeal to the High Court".
25. The above mentioned judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considered in Syed Haji Abdul Waheed's case (1998 SCMR 2296) and the relevant observation is as follows:- "The learned counsel for the appellants contended, that above view expressed in Sherin's case is in conflict with the view expressed by this Court in Abdul Ghani's case and as the numbers of Hon'ble Judges in both the cases were equal, the matter may be referred to a larger Bench to resolve the conflict. It is true that Sherin's case has not noticed the decision in Abdul Ghani's case. However, after examining the ratio decidendi of both cases which we have reproduced above, we are of the view that there is no conflict in the opinion expressed in the above two cases."
26. Cases relied by the learned counsel for the respondents are not in accordance with the recent trend of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme court has laid down a principle after the addition of Article 2-A of the Constitution that cases must be decided on merits instead of.
27. Technicalities. In Sher Muhammad's case (PLD 1989 S.C. 532), the relevant observation is as follows.- "A party should not be denied a relief on account of technicalities in the procedural law, as the same is formed for the purpose of regulating the legal proceedings, they are extending and designed to foster the cause of justice rather than to defeat it."
28. Subsequently the aforesaid judgment was also considered in Mst. Sarearan's case (1993 SCMR 363) and followed the same principle. It, is settled proposition of law that Limitation Law should be liberally construed without giving violence to intention of legislature. It must be applied for benefit of plaintiff. We are fortified by the reported judgment 1988 CLC 332. It is also settled principle of law that the rules framed in the Code of Civil Procedure are Rules made for the advancement of justice and they should not, as far as possible be allowed to defeat the ends of justice. We are fortified by the judgment of Muhammad Sarwar's case (1980 CLC 946).
29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down a principle in Khuda Yar's case (PLD 1975 S.C. 678); that technicalities should not be the hindrance in the way of justice. The relevant observation is as follows:- "The technicalities unless offering an insurmountable hurdle should not be allowed to defeat the ends of justice."
30. We are also fortified by the following judgments:- 1999 MLD 2146 (Alim Din and 14 others Vs. Muhammad A.I and 35 others).
31. 1999 MLD 2202 (M/s. Adam Jee Construction Company Ltd. Vs. Government of Punjab).
32. Since the decree of the trial Court is void, therefore, appeal cannot be dismissed on ground of limitation on the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muhammad Masi-uz-Zama Vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1992 'S.C. 825). The learned trial Court has no jurisdiction to decree the. Suit. It is settled proposition of law that judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is binding on each and every organ of the State by virtue of Article 189 of the Constitution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also declared the law against the injunction of Islam in PLD 1990 S.C. 899 (Mst. Aziz Begum's case). Therefore, decree of the trial Court is patently illegal and is nonexistence in the eyes of law, as the same was passed in clear violation of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Said Kamal's case supra even otherwise this Court has no jurisdiction to uphold the decree of the trial Court as the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following judgments:- PLD 1990 S.0 899 (Mst. Aziz Begum's case Vs. Federation of Pakistan).
33. NLR 1994 SCJ 367 (Khush Hall Khan Vs. Rao Nawaz and others).
34. 1993 SCMR 2050 (Sair Ameer Khan. Vs. `Mst. Shahzadi Khatoon and others).