' This is tenant's second appeal under section 15(4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, against her eviction on grounds of non-payment of rent. Learned counsel contends (1) that the appellant being occupant of a scheduled building she could not be evicted on ground of default in payment of rent ; (ii) that it has wrongly been held in the impugned order that there was no practice between the parties of the appellant's paying lump sum amounts as rent and thus it should have been held that there was implied change of terms of tenancy with regard to payment of rent.
2. It is doubtful whether the building in question could be treated as a scheduled building because as admitted in para. 1 of the grounds of this appeal, the appellant had taken "the premises on rent for the purposes or running a clinic, as the appellant is lady doctor by profession". This, without residence, is not enough to treat it as a scheduled building.
3. Be that as it may, subsections (1) and (2) of section 13 do not make any distinction between one type of a building and another. The grounds of ejectment under subsection (2) are : transferring the rights of lease or sub- B letting ; using the building for unauthorised purposes ; damaging the property ; creating a nuisance ; at places other than hill stations failure to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months ; and, reconstruction :-Learned counsel is unable to answer the question whether an occupant of a scheduled building is protected from eviction if he is found liable to eviction on the above-noted grounds. Neither any other law, nor principle, nor any provision of the Ordinance, not even the preamble, has been cited to show that a tenant of a scheduled building would not be liable ' to eviction on grounds like damaging the property, reconstruction, subletting etc. That being so there can be no special consideration for the occupant of scheduled building who is liable to be evicted on ground of non-payment of rent.
Learned counsel has tried to argue that the expression used in subsections (1) and (2) is "building".
And because the terms : "building" 'non-residential' and 'scheduled building' have been separately defined in the Ordinance therefore it should be held that subsection (2) relates only to "building" simpliciter and not to the scheduled and non-residential buildings. If that were so even occupants of shops would not be liable to eviction on grounds of non-payment of rent. The term 'residential building' has also been defined separately in the Ordinance. If the arguments of the learned counsel were accepted the occupants of residential buildings also could not be evicted on grounds of non-payment of rent.'
4. The fallacy of the argument becomes vivid also when considered in juxtaposition to the definition of the building contained in sub-clause (a) of section 2. It means "any building or part of a building let for any purpose, whether being actually used for that purpose or not . . . . . ." All the purposes mentioned in other definitions of various types of buildings would be included in the term for "any purpose". Thus whenever the word`building' is used in section 13, subsections (1) and (2), subject of course to repugnancy in the context none has been pointed out ; the definition of building as given in section 2(a) would have to be read there. That being so the occupant of a scheduled building would be liable to eviction on any one or more grounds mentioned in subsection (2) of section 13.
First contention of the learned counsel therefore has no force.
5. Second argument of the learned counsel relates to the appreciation of evidence. Concurrent finding has been reached that the appellant was wilful defaulter in payment of rent. There is only one receipt showing that one lump sum amount was paid as rent for a period of six months. That is not sufficient to show that parties by their conduct or through practice or' consent, changed the terms of tenancy so as to make periodic lump sum payments of rent to the landlord, as lawful discharge of the liability to pay the rent monthly and in time. The argument of the learned counsel has no force. This second appeal is dismissed in limine.