This order shall decide C.M. 1-C of 1999 in C.R. 459 of 1996 and C.M.2-C of 1999 in C.R..460 of 1995 as they involve common questions.
2. C.R. No.459 of 1995 and C.R. No.460 of 1995 were decided by me vide judgments, dated 23-6- 1999. Present C.Ms. Have been filed by Muhammad Jamil, petitioner purporting to be under section 12(2), C.P.C. Alleging that he had not appointed Mr. Tafazzal H. Rizvi as a counsel and that he had no authority to enter into a compromise on which my said judgment is based.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that in the first instance the said learned counsel had not been engaged by his client and that he had engaged only Mr. Talib H. Rizvi, Advocate. Further contends that even if it be deemed that the said learned counsel was so appointed as a counsel, then the power of attorney executed in his favour by the petitioner does not authorise him to enter into a compromise. Mr Shahzeb Masood learned counsel for the respondents argues that the said learned counsel was not only appointed as an Advocate but had fully authority to enter into a compromise.
4. I have gone through the record. I find that the Wakalatnama was executed on 1-3-1995 in favour of M/s., Rizvi and Rizvi and was accepted by Mr. Tafazzal H. Rizvi and Mr. Talib H. Rizvi. This is present in the file of Civil Revision No.459 of 1995. The Wakalatnama present in the file of C.R. No.460 of 1995 also stated that Mr. Talib H. Rizvi and Mr. Tafazzal H. Rizvi of Rizvi and Rizvi have been appointed as Advocates and has been accepted by both the said learned Advocates. I do not have any doubt in my mind that Mr. Tafazzal H. 'Rizvi, Advocate was duly appointed as an Advocate by the petitioner for the purpose of the said Civil Revisions. Coming to the said second contention of the learned counsel, he argues that unlike the Wakalatnama generally provided in vernacular and where all sorts of powers are conferred upon any Advocate, Wakalatnama in hand does not specifically authorise the Advocate to enter into a compromise. I may reproduce here the contents of the said Wakalatnama on record. It states that Advocates have been appointed:-- "To appear and act for him as his Advocate for the above matter."
5. The said argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner loses sight of the provisions of Order III, Rule 4, C.P.C. The said provisions of C.P.C. Provides that no person shall "act" for any person in any Court unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person. This term "act" is very wide and includes every conceiveable action with relation to the proceedings in which the Advocate has been authorised to act by a party. The consensus of judicial authority is that a counsel has an implied authority to do whatever he considers best for, his client and such acts are binding upon the client unless express limitations have been imposed upon his authority. It has accordingly been held that unless there is any provision to the contrary in the document appointing an Advocate to act he may withdraw or compromise or settle the dispute. Learned counsel for the respondents has referred to the case of Dr. Ansar Hassan Rizvi v. Syed Mazahir Hussain Zaidi and 3 others (1971 SCM R 634). In the said case the Supreme Court with reference to the case of Sourendra Nath Mitra and others v. Tarubala Dasi AIR 1930 PC 158) held that an Advocate has implied authority of his client to enter into a compromise and to settle the dispute unless such authority is expressly denied in the document appointing him as a counsel.
6. Rana Muhammad Sarwar, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the case of Mst. Noor Jahan v. Azmat Hussain Farooqi and another (1992 SCM R 876) to argue that Mr. Tafazzal H. Rizvi, Advocate had no authority to enter into a compromise. I am afraid the said judgment does not at all help the learned counsel so far as the facts and circumstances of the present case are concerned. In the said case the apex Court held that an Advocate can enter into a compromise regarding the subject-matter of the suit but not with regard to any matter alian to the same. In the case in hand it has not even been alleged that the compromise did not strictly pertain to the subject matter of the suit. Both the C.Ms. Are accordingly dismissed.