DECISION ' This order will cover two appeals; namely Appeal No,KAR-290 of 1999 filed by Muhammad Irshad and Appeal No,KAR-291 of 1999 filed by Muhammad Farid, .Hereinafter referred to as appellant No,1 and appellant No,2 respectively. These appeals arose from dismissal of their grievance petitions by single common order, dated 30th October, 1999 of the Sindh Labour Court No,III, Karachi. The facts giving rise to the said two appeals may be summarized as follows. Both the appellants joined service of Armen Steels (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi hereinafter referred to as respondents Mills, as Turmors on permanent basis appellant No,1 with effect from 3-3-1992 and appellant No,2 with effect from 19-5-1991. Their services were however, terminated vide termination order, dated 9th April, 1999. It is reproduced as under:-- "You are employed as Turner Operating Lathe Machine (General Engineering). Keeping in view nature of your work it is more economic to get the work executed from outside the factory thus effecting saving. You are the junior most turner in your category. You are rendered surplus to our requirement. For the aforesaid reasons your services are hereby terminated w.e.f 12th April, 1999 on payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice.You are therefore, directed to collect your dues on any working day during working hours."
' According to the appellants, the above order was mala fide inasmush as the reasons of termination of their services mentioned in the order were absolutely incorrect. But as a matter of fact their termination was made due to their trade union activities, particularly because the appellant No,1 was active member of the Workers' Union of the respondents Mills and appellant No,2 was Vice-President of the said Union. On receipt of the said order both the appellants gave grievance notice, dated 28th April, 1999 separately to the respondents Mills by Registered Post to which they received the latter's reply, dated 5th May, 1999. As their grievance with regard to their reinstatement and back benefits remained unredressed, they approached the Labour Court in separate Grievance Petitions bearing No,87 of 1999 of Muhammad Irshad and No,88 of 1999 of Muhammad Farid.
2. In their Reply Statement denying the appellants' allegations, the respondents Mills took the legal objection that the appellants' grievance petitions were not maintainable. Their plea was that there being no industrial dispute between the parties no relationship of Employer and Employees existed between them. It was further stated by the respondents Mills, that the appellants had taken no plea of applicability of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and therefore, they could not lead evidence to prove the same and as such they could not avail the benefits of section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969. According to the respondents Mills, they had every right to make retrenchment of the appellants for economic reasons and get their work done in the market at cheaper rates. They further stated that the appellants alone were not retrenched but with them the services of one other Turner of their general category were also terminated. They further claimed that they had strictly followed the principle of "last in and first out" in dispensing with the services of the appellants. In other words the appellants being junior in the Turner's category their services were terminated while retaining the senior Turners in service. Moreover, unlike the appellants the senior Turners were doing roll- greeving, a sort of specialized job.
3. To prove their case appellants have filed their own affidavits-inevidence besides the affidavit-in- evidence of Muhammad Salim and Muhammad Ashfaq whereas Khamiz Abbas, the Executive Manager (Personnel and Administration) filed his affidavit-in-evidence on behalf of the respondents Mills. Apart from perusing all the aforementioned affidavitin-evidence and other relevant documents available in the case file. I heard the arguments of the learned counsel of both the parties Abid Akram for the appellants and Mr. Faisal Ghani for the respondents.
4. It was nobody's case that there existed industrial dispute between the parties and as such the question of determining the relationship of the parties being employers and employees did not, arise. At this stage the appellants' learned counsel referred to Supreme Court case 1998 PLC 172 wherein it was held that even though the services of the appellants were not terminated in connection with or in consequence of industrial dispute as defined in I.R.O., 1969, still they had right to seek redress of their grievance against termination of their services under Standing Order 12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. The appellants by virtue of being Turners were obviously workmen within the definition of the term given in the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and therefore, the said Ordinance automatically became applicable to them irrespective of the fact that no such plea was taken by the appellants in their pleadings but again it is noteworthy that they had claimed the applicability of the said Ordinance at the earliest opportunity. They had clearly indicated in their grievance notice which was the first ever document they drafted in the case that unless their grievance was redressed they would proceed against the respondents Mill under provisions of I.R.O., 1969 and the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance 1968. In view of what has been stated above the grievance petitions filed by the appellants were legal and maintainable.
5. After arriving at the above conclusion the only point to be determined for disposal of the appeals was whether termination order reproduced hereinabove was mala fide or not. As stated earlier the appellants' version of the case is that their services were terminated on account of their trade union activities particularly when one of them was active member of the Workers' Union and the other one was Vice-President of the said Union. The other reason given by the appellants for termination of their services was that they were earlier victimized by issuing charge-sheets for commission of various acts of misconduct. Therefore, they have dubbed their termination order asmala fide. On the other hand, after perusal of the Reply Statement filed by the respondents Mills I am of the view that respondents have continuously negatived the appellants' said allegations.
According to them, appellants being actively engaged in the trade union activities or being members or office-bearers of the Worker's Union was no reason at all to terminate their services because the Union had been in existence and operating for years. Their services were terminated, they have added, owing to economic reason and on the basis of "last in and first out" i,e, strictly in accordance with seniority of the Turners in their category. They have also denied the allegations that any other person was appointed in their place or that their work was got done through the remaining Turners on the basis of overtime. According to the respondents Mills one of the retrenched Turners, though not the appellants was, however, re-appointed in place of Turner who had expired and his appointment too was made strictly on the seniority basis. All this clearly indicated nothing but bona fide intention of the respondents Mills in terminating the services of the appellants. The appellants' learned counsel, however, cited this Tribunal's case reported as 1981 PLC 24 in support of the appellants' case. In the said case it was held that the retrenchment must be bona fide and not to victimize employees or as a cloak to get rid of the services of any employee. I am in full agreement with the dictum laid down in the above case. But this authority rather supports the respondents Mills because I have already held that the termination of appellants's services was bona fide. I have no reason to disbelieve the respondents' Mills that even issuing of charge-sheet against the appellants in respect of various acts had nothing to do with their termination of services. If any charge-sheet was the reasons for termination of appellants' services, it would have been pursued to its logical conclusion particularly when same charge-sheets related to misconduct which could have resulted in dismissal of the appellants rather than termination of their services simpliciter. The learned counsel for the respondents' Mills emphasised that the Mills had absolutely no intention to victimize the appellants. Explaining it further he submitted that the termination of their services was within the legal limits inasmuch that the termination order was made in writing and the reasons for the termination were mentioned in the order and it was accompanied by payment of legal dues. Thus the appellants have failed to prove that their retrenchment was mala fide. On the contrary the precautions taken by the respondents Mills were indicative of the fact that while dispensing with services of the appellants they had done everything possible to do justice to them. Mr. Faisal Ghani has relied upon the authority reported as 1991 PLC 506 which of course applies to his case with full force. It was held: "Termination simpliciter of a workman was permissible under Standing Order 12 and employer was only obliged to state the reasons for such action taken by him against workman. Such a procedure having been followed by employer and order of termination of employee's services not being tainted with rnala fide or colourable exercise of power by employer. Courts below rightly declined to interfere with employer's action of termination of services of employees."
For the foregoing reasons. I am convinced that the order of termination of appellants' services was not mala fide but it was rather based on reasonable grounds. As such the appeals preferred against the said order have no substance in them and are, therefore, hereby dismissed.