' Facts leading to this Constitutional petition, as stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, are that the petitioner-employer was coerced by his twenty-two workers to enter into an agreement on 27-8-1976 where-under besides other terms it was settled firstly that the petitioner-employer shall pay a sum of Rs, 20, instead of Rs, 10, for what is called Tooti Dehari explained by the learned counsel to be that workers are available but work can't be done for lack of energy, defect in machinery etc. Secondly, the bonus shall be paid after every four months. This agreement was implemented partially by the petitioner-employer by paying a sum of Rs, 15, instead of Rs, 20, and a sum of Rs, 200 as a bonus for first four months only. The employee, respondent No, 3, filed an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before the Punjab Labour Court No, 1, Lahore, asking for implementation of the agreement. The application was resisted on the grounds of lack of grievance notice, agreement having been obtained under coercion and that it was not a "Settlement" as defined in section 2 (xxiv) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 because copy thereof had not been sent to the Provincial Government or the prescribed authority.
The learned Labour Court found that grievance notice had been given, plea of coercion was not raised in the written statement and that although the agreement was not a "Settlement" because of copy having not been sent to the relevant authorities but it was a contract between the parties and enforceable under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Thus holding, the learned Court allowed the application vide order dated 29-10-1977. The petitioner-employer filed an appeal and it was urged that the agreement being not a 'Settlement" for copy having not been sent was not enforceable and that claim for the bonus was barred by time. The learned Appellate Tribunal held that agreement as such was enforceable, and that breach of the contract being continuing, there was 'to question of limitation involved. Thus, the appeal was dismissed vide order dated 16-3-1978. The petitioner-employer has challenged the aforesaid orders through this Constitutional petition.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that the agreement between the parties was not a "Settlement" as defined under section 2 (xxiv) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and has rightly been so found by the Administrative Authorities. He has contended that the Administrative Authorities, however, erred in enforcing the agreement dated 27-8-1976 because that could not be enforced under section 25-A of the aforesaid Ordinance. Learned counsel has referred to section 25-A of the aforesaid Ordinance relevant portion of which is that a worker may bring his grievance in respect of "any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force" The contention of the learned counsel is that the only rights which can be enforced through an application under section 25-A of the aforesaid Ordinance are those which are "guaranteed or secured to him under any law, award or settlement". Learned counsel has submitted that the Administrative Authorities have found that the agreement was not a "Settlement". It was undoubtedly, not an award. It was not guaranteed under any law. Therefore, it could not be enforced under section 25-A of the Ordinance. He has placed reliance on Muhammad Ishaque v. Crescent Jute Products Ltd. (1). Learned counsel has also submitted that the respondent No, 3 had claimed relief on the basis that the agreement was a "Settlement" but it was not, in fact, a "Settlement" as has been found by the Administrative Authorities too. Therefore, he could not have been granted relief on the ground that the agreement.
Between the parties was binding and enforceable through section 25-A of the aforesaid Ordinance. In any case, the agreement could not be enforced because it was obtained under coercion. Learned counsel has also contended that the respondent was not entitled to relief because he was estopped to claim the relief as he has been accepting lesser amounts than the one which have been allowed under the impugned orders.
3. Taking the last contention first, it is to be seen that the fact that the petitioner-employer paid less than what he had agreed to do, by no means, constitutes an estoppel as against the employee, respondent No, 3, because A the latter had done nothing to make the petitioner-employer change his position to disadvantages. Plea of coercion is hardly available in the circumstances of the case.
The petitioner has been voluntarily carrying out the agreement, though partially. Moreover, this plea was not taken in the written statement, nor, appears to have been pressed before the Appellate Tribunal. It is too late in the day for the petitioner to raise it in Constitutional jurisdiction.
Coming to the crux of the contrary that the agreement being not a "Settlement" for copying having not been sent to the prescribed authority, it could not be enforced under section 25-A of the Ordinance, it would be worthwhile to refer to the definition of Settlement" as given in section 2 (xxiv) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. It is as follows :- " 'Settlement' means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding, and includes an agreement between an employer and his workman arrived at otherwise than in the course of any conciliation proceeding, where such agreement is in writing, has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof (1) 1976 PLC 531 has been sent to the Provincial Government, the conciliator and such other person as may be prescribed."
The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has been that the administrative authorities have rightly held that the agreement was not a "Settlement", because a copy thereof, has not been sent to the Provincial Government or the prescribed authority. The provision regarding sending of copy prima facie appears to be directory rather than mandatory. It is not quite in consonance with justice that an agreement entered into by the parties can be rendered redundant and ineffective simply because a copy thereof has not been sent to somebody. Be that as it may, since the Administrative Authorities have allowed relief to the worker, respondent No, 3, on the ground that the agreement between the parties was a contract and as such guaranteed by law and, consequently, enforceable, it is to be seen whether the Administrative Authorities have acted with lawful authority. It is to be noted that special statute regulating the relationship of the petitioner-employer and the worker, respondent No, 3 i,e, the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, provides for a new and more effective machinery than hitherto available. It does not annul rights acquired under general law. Remedial legislation is construed to advance the remedy and not to whittle down rights and avoid agreements entered into by parties by specious arguments or sophistry. The case of Muhammad Ishaq v. Crescent Jute Mills Products Ltd. Relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is distinguishable on facts in so far as that the agreement in that case was not even signed by both the parties and the agreement was not between the employer and his workers. It was only in respect of an individual.
4. In view of what has been stated a little while ago, the impugned orders passed by the Administrative Authorities within their jurisdiction as conferred on them by law, even if those were to be erroneous, which, of course, is not so held, would still be immune from attack in Constitutional Jurisdiction, as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others (1). Consequently, this petition cannot succeed and is, therefore, dismissed in limine.
(1) PLD 1974 SC 139