MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, J.--- Nazeer Ahmed respondent filed a suit against Mst. Muhammad Bibi wife of Shukar Din on 45.5.1973 stating that the land has been sold by the said Mst. Muhammad Bibi to, him for a consideration of Rs.42,500/- three weeks before the institution of the suit and that a declaration be granted accordingly. On the same date, Mst. Muhammad Bibi filed. a written statement admitting the suit and also got recorded a statement that the suit be decreed.
Consequently, the suit was decreed on the same date i.e. 5.5.1973. Mutation No. 921 was attested on 30.6.1975. On 30.6.1976, the appellant filed a suit for possession of the suit land by pre-emption stating that the land had been sold by Mst. Muhammad Bibi to the respondent for a consideration of Rs.2,000/- and has fictitiously got recorded a sum of Rs.42,500/- in the said mutation. The right claimed was that he is an owner in the estate. The suit was contested by the respondent . In his written statement, he objected that the suit is barred by time; that the suit is not correctly valued for purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction; that the suit is bad for partial preemption and; that the appellant had waived his right. On merits, he asserted that he had purchased the suit land for Rs.42,500/-. The following issues were framed:- Issues:-
(1) Whether the suit is barred by time? OPD
(2) Whether the valuation of the suit for the purposes of Court-fee is not correct, if so, what is the correct valuation? OPP
(3) Whether the suit is bad for partial pre-emption? OPD
(4) Whether the plaintiff has waived his right of preemption? OPD
(5) Whether the plaintiff has a superior right of pre-emption? OPP
(6) Whether the sale price of Rs.42,500/- was fixed in good faith or actually paid? OPD (71 What is the market value of the suit land? OPP
(8) Relief.
Evidence of the parties was recorded. The learned Trial Court decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 17.3.1977 subject to payment of Rs.42,500/-. Feeling aggrieved the respondent filed a first appeal which was heard by a learned Addl. District Judge, Sialkot. Before the learned Addl.
District Judge, only the findings of learned Trial Court on issue No. '1 were challenged. The learned Addl. District Judge found the suit to be barred by time. Consequently reversed the finding- of the learned Trial Court on issue No. 1 and resultantly the suit was dismissed on 31.10.1982.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that this was a case where the sale had been effected by means of a mutation attested on 30.6.1975 and the suit filed on 30.6.1976 was well within time prescribed by Section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. Further contends that the evidence on record has been mis -read by the learned Addl. District Judge. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, argues that even if the said argument of the learned counsel is accepted, the year 1976 was a leap year and as such the suit having been filed on 366th day instead of the 365th day, is barred by time. The learned counsel supports the impugned judgment and decree' of the learned Addl-. District Judge.
3. I have gone through the. Trial Court records with the assistance of,the learned counsel for the partiess.
I find that in the first instance, the suit was filed by the respondent against the said vendor vide plaint Exh.D-4. On the same day; written statement Exh.D-5 was filed and statement Exh.D-6 was recorded and the decree Exh.D-2 was passed. Mutation No.'921 is available on record as Exh.P-4. As per entries in column No. 14, the mutation was entered on 28.6.1975 on the report of respondent. The mutation was attested on .30.6.1975. As per Roznamcha Exh.D-1, the mutation was entered vide report No 387! Dated 28.6.1975. The learned Addl. District Judge has relied on the statement of Muhammad Sharif DW-1 who is the recorded tenant of the land to hold that the possession of respondent dates back prior to the attestation of mutation Exh.P-4. DW-2 Faqir Hussain has also stated that since February, 1975, the land is being irrigated from his tubewell and that Sharif cultivates the land. DW-4 is the attorney of the respondent who has stated that the respondent had obtained the possession from the vendor under the sale and had cultivated some crops and thereafter Sharif had started cultivating the land. The appellant appeared as PW-1 and denied that the respondent had been cultivating the land three years prior to the sale. The learned Trial Court has also referred tg, document Exh.P-2. This is the copy of Register Khasra Girdawari for the period Kharif 1975 to Rabi 1976. The entry for Kharif 1975 was made on 31.1 1.1975 showing respondent to be in self-cultivating possessio while entry for Rabi 1976 was made on 11.3.1976 showing Sharif as a tenant under the respondent. No document had been brought on record by the respondent to support the plea that he was in possession of the suit land at any time before the attestation of the mutation. He himself produced Exh.D-1 which is the report Roznamcha Waqiati and it was not narrated by hm even. At that time that he had taken-over the possession of the land. The document Exh.P-2 goes to show that for the first time, the respondent came into possession of the land w.e.f. Kharif 1975 i.e. On 31.10.1975.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent tired to argue that the entry in Kharif 1975 has to be related back to Rabi 1975 i.e. a point of time prior to attestation of mutation Exh.P-4. I am afraid this is not possible. By now it is well-settled that entries in the Khasra Girdawari reflect the position existing on the date they are made and they cannot be related back. Reference may be made to the case of "Khadim Hussain, etc. Vs. Muhammad Nawaz Khan" (NLR 1981 Revenue 125. (S.C.)
5. The learned Addl. District Judge has obviously failed to read Exh.P-2. Had he read the same, he would have found that both the respondents as well as their tenant Sharif had made incorrect statements which are not supported by Exh.P-2 as otherwise observed by the learned Addl. District .Judge in his impugned&a + 36H judgment.
6. Coming to the said first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. He has sought support from the meaning/definition of the term "Year" in Wharton's Law Lexicon. I am afraid, the said definition does not at all help the learned counsel for the respondent when he tries' to argue that the year 1976 being a leap year, the suit filed on 30.6.1976 was barred by time. I only need to reproduce here the definition from the' said Lexicon to answer the argument of the learned counsel.
"Year: 365 days, twelve calendar months, fifty-two weeks and one day or in Leap Year, 366 days i.e. Fifty-two weeks and two days."
This means that whether it is a year of 365 daye or a Leap Year of 366 days,, it is a year and the prescribed period of limitation for filing of suit for pre-emption in one year from the date of attestation of mutation. Section 2(59) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Federal) defines a year to mean a ' year' reckoned according to the British calendar. S. 2(70) of the General Clauses Act, 1956 (Provincial) defines a 'year' to mean the year reckoned according to the Gregorian calendar.
Needless to state that the term British and Gregorian with reference to the Calendar are synonymous . It also need not be stated that normally in Pakistan, we go by the said British calendar. Thus the term ' year' used in S. 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 would mean a calendar year, whether it be a-year of 365 days or a Leap year of 366 days. Nothing, therefore, turns on the said argument of the learned counsel for the respondent.
7. Having, discussed the evidence available on record, I find that the learned Addl. District Judge has mis-read the evidence while recording his impugned judgment. I, therefore, reverse the finding of the learned Addl. District Judge on issue No. 1 and restore those of the learned Trial Court. The R.S.A. Is accordingly allowed, the judgment and decree dated 31.10.1982 of learned Addl. .District Judge, Sialkot is set aside while that dated 17.3.1977 of the learned Trial Court is restored. The parties are left to bear their own costs.