' In this Constitutional petition, action of the respondents disconnecting petitioner's Telephone No,616501 has been challenged on grounds of being incompetence, mala fide, arbitrary and without lawful authority.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that disconnection of petitioner's Telephone No,616501 was ordered by Senior Special Magistrate, Faisalabad and not by Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (P.T.A.) or any of its officers and Senior Special Magistrate, Faisalabad had no powers or authority to order disconnection of petitioner's telephone. It is further contended that even otherwise, the reasons contained in the said order are extraneous, illogical, unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory and absolutely illegal. The pretext, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, was that another Telephone No,682580 admittedly belonging to weekly newspaper "Taj" had outstanding in arrears of Rs,7,891. Further petitioner's telephone v as held to be in "working order in the same name, same premises, blood relation" and respondent No, I felt that the "said defaulter i.e, newspaper" should not be allowed to use petitioner's telephone in order to inflict "pinch" and pain on the defaulter. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that petitioner's Telephone No,616501 was installed at Plot No,65. Street No,4, Babar Market, Kutchery Bazar, Faisalabad, which was claimed to be 5 to 6 k.Ms. Away from the said defaulter's premises at Adam Chowk Near Water Tanki, Ghulam Muhammad Road, Faisalabad, where defaulter's Telephone No,682530 was operating. It is further contended that the petitioner's telephone was ordered to be disconnected, not because of petitioner's default or on the basis of any evidence that the said telephone was being used by any other persons. It was contended further that the petitioner was always up to date in payment of his bills.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner was confronted with the remedies in section 7 of Pakistan Telecommunication (Reorganization) Act, 1996 and Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan's judgment in Civil Petitions Nos.2170/L of 1999 and 186/L to 195 of 2000, holding that in presence of remedies under above said section 7, writ was unmaintainable. Learned counsel in answer thereto submitted that section 7 and the above said ruling of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan was inapplicable to the case of the petitioner as the impugned order (pursuance to which telephone was disconnected) was passed by Senior Special Magistrate, respondent No,1 and not by the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) or any of its officers. Wherefor, petitioner cannot avail of the remedy of appeal under subsections (1) and (2) or of the revision under section 7(3) of the 1996 Act and that the petitioner has no other remedy except to invoke Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court to challenge the impugned order, which is totally devoid of jurisdiction and competence. It is further contended that prior to disconnection, the petitioner was not heard or notified. Wherefor, the impugned order is void ab initio and action of the respondents in disconnecting petitioner's Telephone No,61650I is coram non judice and without jurisdiction.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents reiterated the revised parawise comments submitted on 4- 7-2001 and stated that petitioner misused the telephone by way of D.P. And obnoxious calls were received from the said telephone. Hence the Department was constrained to take action by way of disconnection. Learned counsel for the respondents further stated that petitioner misused the telephone through owner of weekly newspaper "Taj" and misused the Telephone No,682530 and that obnoxious calls were detected from the said telephone. As such, the learned counsel for the respondents supported disconnection of Telephone No,616501 belonging to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the respondents also emphasized that the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan applied to this case as well. As such, in presence of remedies under the abovesaid section 7, the present petition is unmaintainable and is liable to be dismissed.
5. Having considered the arguments of the parties, I am of the opinion that section 7 of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Reorganization) Act, 1996 is inapplicable to the case of the petitioner and this petition does not fall within the scope of judgment pronounced by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in Civil Petitions Nos.2170/L of 1999 arid 186/L to 195 of 2000. Section 7 of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Reorganization) Act, 1996 provides that:- ' Appeal and revision.--- (1) A person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Authority on the ground that it is contrary to the provisions of this Act may, within thirty days of the receipt of such decision or order, appeal to the High Court in the manner prescribed by the High Court for filing the first appeal before that Court and the Court shall decide such appeal within ninety days.
(2) A person aggrieved by any decision or order of any officer of the Authority acting under the delegated powers of the Authority may, within thirty days of the receipt of the decision or order, appeal to the Authority in prescribed manner and the Authority shall decide such appeal within thirty days.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (2), any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Authority may instead of filing an appeal under the subsection, within thirty days of such decision or order make an application for a revision of the decision or, as the case may be, order to the Federal Government, through the Secretary, Ministry of Communications, Government of Pakistan who will decide the appeal within sixty days."
6. Examination of the impugned Order No,FTD/ MAG/ DEF/PH. No, 1682530/23, dated (sic) 1996 (Annexure "C" with the petition) shows that order of disconnection was passed by Senior Special Magistrate, Faisalabad, respondent No,1 to exact recovery of Rs,7,891 against another Telephone No,682530 in exercise of powers under Land Revenue Act for recovery of arrears thereto. Senior Special Magistrate, Faisalabad is neither an Authority in terms of ' section 7 subsections (1) and (3), nor is he an officer of the Authority to attract section 7(2) of 1996 Act.
' Authority' has been defined in section 2(a) of Chapter I of the said Act of 1996 which reads as under:-- "Authority" means Pakistan Telecommunication Authority established under section 3."
' Section 3 thereof provides that:- "3. Establishment of Pakistan Telecommunication Authority.--- (1) As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, the Federal Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, establish an authority to be known as the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority which shall be a body corporate, having perpetual succession and a common seal with powers, subject to the provision of this Act, to acquire and hold property, both movable and immovable, and to use and be used by its name.
(2) The Authority shall consist of three members one of whom shall be professional Telecommunication Engineer and other shall be a Financial Expert, to be appointed by the Federal Government for a term of four years and shall be eligible for appointment for a similar term or terms.
(3) The Federal Government shall from amongst the members appointed under subsection (20) appoint a member to be the Chairman of the Authority."
7. Under section 10 of the Act of 1996, "Authority" is empowered to employ persons on terms and conditions as it may consider necessary for the purpose of functions of the "Authority". The employees and officers of the "Authority" are public servants within the meaning of section 21 of Pakistan Penal Code as per section 11 of the said Act.
8. Senior Special Magistrate, respondent No,1, is neither an employee or an officer of the "Authority" employed under section 10 of the Act, 1996, nor is he the "Authority" under section 3(2) or the Chairman of the "Authority" under section 3(3) of 1996 Act. He obviously is not a body corporate. By his designation, he is a civil servant employed by Punjab Government under Punjab Civil Servants Act. Respondent No,1, as a Magistrate, may be deputed to recover public dues in accordance with Land Revenue Act, but such assignment will not make him an officer of PTA.
' Remedies against the orders of the "Authority" or that of its "officers" cannot be availed of under section 7 of 1996 Act by the petitioner. The impugned order was passed by respondent No,1 i.e, Senior Special Magistrate, for disconnection of petitioner's Telephone No,616501 and not by the Authority or any of its officers. Petitioner's telephone was disconnected under the said order as has also been admitted in the parawise comments of the respondents. As such, I hold the present writ to be maintainable and also that the petitioner had no other efficacious and adequate remedy against the order of Senior Special Magistrate and action of respondents disconnecting his telephone.
9. The abovesaid impugned order of respondent No,1, Senior Special Magistrate is intriguing wherefor it is quoted hereunder in its entirety:- "The Chairman Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Islamabad has filed this case in the Court of Senior Special Magistrate F.T.A., Faisalabad for recovery as "Arrears PF Land Revenue Act" amounting to Rs,7,891 against Phone No,682530.
' A notice was accordingly issued to the defaulter by the Court. During course of proceedings in this it transpired that another Telephone No,616501 is/are in working order in the same name same premises blood relation and justice demand that he should not be allowed to use the said Telephone No, In case he is allowed to do so he shall feel the pinch and he will never make payment of outstanding telephone dues, thus, it sets a bad example; the defaulter will always get number after number without making payment of the dues.
' In the interest of justice I, therefore, order that the said Telephone No,616501 be immediately disconnected and compliance report to the Court.
10. The above order evidences the reasons for action against petitioner's Telephone No,616501, which are concisely re-referred as under: "(i) Alleged default of Rs,7,891 was against Telephone . No,682530 belonging to weekly newspaper 'Taj' whose bill (Annexure 'B') was sent on Adam Chowk near Water Tanki Ghulam Muhammad Abad, Faisalabad.
(ii) Recovery as arrears of Land Revenue was directed against abovesaid Telephone No,682530 and not Against petitioner's Telephone No,616501.
(iii) Notice was issued to defaulter of Telephone No,682530 and admittedly not against petitioner's Telephone No,616501.
(iv) Alleged reasons for disconnecting petitioner's telephone were that it was in working order in the same name, same premises blood relation and justice demands that he should not be allowed to use the said telephone and further that in case he is allowed to use the said telephone number, he shall not feel the pinch and will never make payment of outstanding telephone dues."
11. It is evident from the above purported reasons that either judicious mind was not applied or the respondent Magistrate considered himself to be above law or was unaware of the meaning of word "reason" and "reasonable". What he has termed as demand of justice is in fact traversity of justice and law. The purported reasons are in fact no reasons at all. These can only be termed as the devised excuses. It will 'be worthwhile to refer. To the definition of word "reason" and the term "reasonable" as given in Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, Centenial Edition (1891-1991) as under:- - ' Reason. A faculty of the mind by which it distinguishes truth from falsehood, good from evil, and which enables the possessor to deduce inference from facts or from propositions. Also an inducement, motive or ground for action, as in the phrase "reasons for an appeal".
' Reasonable. Fair, proper, just, moderate, suitable under the circumstances. Fit and appropriate to the end in view. Having the faculty of reason, rational; governed by reason; under the influence of reason; agreeable to reason. Thinking, speaking, or acting according to the dictates of reason. Not immoderate or excessive, being synonymous with rational, honest, equitable, fair, suitable, moderate, tolerable.
' Reasonable Act. Such as may fairly, justly, and reasonably be required of a party.
' Applying the abovesaid meanings and standards of "reason", "reasonable" and "reasonable act" to the impugned order, it can only be termed as devoid of reasons and legal logic. By all the accepted legal standards, the impugned order was unreasonable, fanciful, arbitrary, capracious, irrational; inequitable and excessive. The reasons given in parawise comments and advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents do not find any mention in the impugned order, ex post facto justification created by respondents in parawise comments did not at all prompt the impugned order. Had these reasons been the basis of the action, the petitioner could have been provided an opportunity of hearing through notice in writing to explain the misuse of telephone as EDPCO or the source of obnoxious calls. Even otherwise, the respondents Magistrate had no "Authority" or "jurisdiction" under any law to order disconnection of petitioner's telephone under the circumstances recounted above. It appears that the respondents have neither attended to the facts of the case in hand nor to the particulars of record in their custody. The two telephones had no connection. The same were in different names and were located at different premises. The telephones or the premises cannot be "blood relations". Disconnection was ordered purportedly because petitioner's Telephone No,616501 was in working order and to inflict pain and pinch on the defaulter, who may or may not have used petitioner's telephone. There is no evidence on record that the petitioner's telephone was being misused and obnoxious calls were being made therefrom or the same was being misused as EDPCO except for bald assertion in parawise comments.
12. Without an evidence thereto and without an opportunity of hearing, respondents had no power under law to disconnect petitioner's telephone and that too for absurd reasons recorded in the above analysed impugned order. As such, I have no option but to accept the present petition with costs and to declare the impugned order to be without jurisdiction and lawful authority. Action of the respondents endeavouring to disconnect petitioner's Telephone No,616501 is also declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.