' Civil Revisions Nos.241, 242, 243 and 307 of 1991 involved common questions of law and facts where for all these cases are being disposed of together through this judgment.
2. Respondent Mirza Muhammad Riaz filed 4 separate suits i,e, one against each revision petitioner for recovery of Rs,25,000 as damages on account of defamation, mental and spiritual torment and financial loss allegedly caused to him by statement of the revision petitioners before Investigating Officer. It was alleged in the suit that owing to statement of each petitioner during investigation before the police in pursuance of F.I.R. No,20, dated 27-2-1987 under sections 34, 324 and 325 of P.P.C., the respondent was arrested, remained in jail for 20 days and underwent investigation trial for 8 to 9 months. Where after as a consequence of being declared innocent by police, the said F.I.R. Was cancelled on 2!.:-7-1987. The respondent, therefore, limited the above said amount of Rs,25,000 as damages on account of financial loss, defamation and spiritual/mental suffering.
Learned Civil Judge, Sialkot vide order, dated 14-1-1989 rejected plaints under Order VI., Rule 11, C.P.C. In all the above said suits. Feeling aggrieved thereof, the respondent filed four appeals Nos.456, 458, 459 and 460 of 1989 one each against the each petitioner. These appeals were accepted by the learned Additional District Judge, Narowal by order, dated 29-1-1991 and the cases were remanded back to the learned trial Court, Narowal for trial thereto. Against this order, dated 29-1-1991, present revision petitions have been filed.
3. Despite service no one appeared for the respondent where for he was proceeded against ex parte.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the learned Additional District Judge while pronouncing the impugned order committed material irregularity in miscomprehending and misinterpreting the law as to absolute privilege and immunity from prosecution available to a witness giving statement during investigation before the Investigating Agency or during the trial before a Court. It was further contended that action for damages against such a witness is barred by law and cannot proceed, where for the plaint thereto is rejectable for nondisclosure of triable cause of action and also for being barred by law. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon R.L. Nand and L.S. Sastar's on Law of Torts, Fifth Edition, published in 1985 by the Law Book Company (P) Ltd., Allahabad and on the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of "Methuram Dass v. Jagannath Dass" (1901) 28 Cal. 794). It was further asserted that in view of the settled position of privilege of immunity for a witness, the learned Additional District Judge legally erred in accepting respondent's appeals on the ground of non-applicability of Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C. And independence of causes of action.
5. Having given my anxious consideration to this unusual case, I am of the opinion that plain in respondent's suits for damages were liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. For being barred by law and for non-disclosure of triable cause of action. Respondent's suits were exclusively based upon statement of each petitioner as witness in investigation being conducted by Police/Investigating Officer, Police Station Qila Sobha Singh regarding allegations levelled against the respondent in F.I.R. No,20, dated 27-2-1987 registered under sections 34, 324 and 325, P.P.C.
Association of petitioners in investigation as witness was a legal requirement as well as a legal duty. Refusing to answer questions or making a statement before Investigating Officer would have obviously stifled, impeded or blocked investigation and ultimately the trial. Occasionally statements before police by witnesses are involuntary and are made for the fear of legal consequence under legal authority of the Investigating Agencies. Non-cooperation thereto entails unpleasant legal repercussions. As such the framers of law conferred immunity and privilege from legal action against a witness for making a statement before a Court, Tribunal and Investigating Agency. In absence of such immunity and privilege, no person would be willing to become a witness in any case thereby making administration of justice impossible hence causing chaos in the society.
6. The learned Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of "Methuram Dass v. Jagannath Dass" (28 Cal. 794) aptly observed that:--- "The sole question in this appeal is whether the defendant who, in answer to a question put to him by a police officer conducting an investigation under the provisions of Act X of 1882, stated that the plaintiff was concerned in the commission of the crime then being investigated, can be made liable in an action for damages for words so spoken.
' The learned Additional Subordinate Judge has held, on the authority of Queen, Empress v. Govinda Pillai (1), that no action would, under such circumstances, lie, and, we think, that his decision is correct. A person, as was pointed out in that case, examined by a police officer conducting an investigation under Act X of 1882 was bound by section 161 of the Act to answer truly all questions put to him, and on that ground the learned Judges considered that he was entitled to the same protection as that extended to witnesses in a Court of Justice. This view derives support from the cases of Goffin v. Donnely (3) and Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby (4).
' In the present case the investigation was required by law; it was conducted under the provisions of the law, it was ancillary to the administration of justice. The defendant was bound by law to answer all questions put to him by the Police Officer conducting the investigation, and was punishable if he answered untruly and what was said by him had reference to the matter under investigation. Virtually the only distinction between his position and that of an ordinary witness arises from the fact that his statement was not made in a Court of Justice, and we see no reason accordingly, to use the language of the Lord Chief Baron cited above, why public policy should not equally prevent an action being brought against him as against a witness in an ordinary Court of Justice.
' We think accordingly that the suit was not maintainable, and that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs."
In view thereof, I accept the above said Revision Petitions Nos.241, 242, 243 and 307 of 1991 and uphold the order, dated 14-1-1989 passed by learned Civil Judge rejecting the plaints in respondent's Suits Nos.480, 434, 456 and 453 of 1988, though for reasons stated hereinabove. The parties are left to bear their own costs. /Order accordingly.