' The petitioners are tenants of agricultural lands situate in village Jura Sakaiser, Tehsil and District Sargodha under the respondents 3 to 10. The respondents filed suits for their ejectment on 14th of November, 1977 in the Court of Assistant Collector I Grade, Sargodha. As these suits could not be concluded within 'a period of 60 days as laid down in rule 4(4) of the Punjab Land Reforms (Procedure for Ejectment Suits) Rules, 1977 the same stood automatically transferred to the Court of the Collector/Assistant Commissioner in view of rule 4(5) of the abovesaid Rules.
2. The Collector also could not decide these cases, transferred to his Court, within 30 days as laid down in rule 4(5). He, however, proceeded to consider them after the lapse of that time. An objection raised by the petitioners that the Collector had no jurisdiction to deal with those cases after the expiry of 30 days was rejected. He held that the proceedings could be continued even after the expiry of 30 days and accordingly directed that the evidence of the parties shall be recorded and the cases heard from day to day.
3. The petitioners challenged the order of the Collector in a revision petition before the Commissioner but the same was rejected on 23rd of April, 1978. It is against that order that the petitioners have now come to this Court.
4. It is contended by the learned counsel that the Punjab Land Reforms (Procedure for Ejectment Suits) Rules, 1977 had been framed for the benefit of the tenants and were meant to afford protection against his unfair and illegal ejectment, particularly at a time when his crops were still standing. The statement of law as made by the learned counsel is nearer the truth. But his contention based on this premises that the Rules meant that a suit against a tenant should be decided within the specified period failing which the same be dismissed and the landlord left to file a fresh suit in the following year is misplaced.
5. Undoubtedly rule 4 of the aforesaid Rules clearly lays down that the Assistant Collector I Grade should decide the suit of the landlord before him within 60 days. On his failure to do so the suit stands automatically transferred to the Collector who must do so within 30 days. In case of failure on the part of the Assistant Collector to decide a case, he has to forward the record of the case to the Collector alongwith his explanation for his failure to decide the case within 60 days. If his explanation is not found satisfactory, by the Collector, the Officer concerned is to be censured and liable to disciplinary action, under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules.
6. It is, therefore, quite clear that the procedure as given above is meant to accelerate the hearing and to get the same concluded within a specific period at the pain of a penalty. The present Rules supersede the ones framed in 1974. A comparison of the two with regard to the point at issue would show that substantially it is the period of disposal which has been added and the Assistant Collector who makes a default has been subjected to a penal action.
7. Apparently, the change in the Rules had been brought about to accelerate the ejectment of a delinquent tenant who committed such acts as warrant his ejectment with resulting benefit to the landlord. They are also for the tenants in other respects including that if he is to be ejected, the decree should be executed within a specified period. The contention of the learned counsel was that the Rules had been amended for the benefit of the tenants but the same is not spelt out therefrom. The Rules have been framed to achieve the purpose of para. 25(1) of the M. L. R.
115. The heading of this para. Is "Rights of the tenants". It provides the circumstances and the pre- requisites after which a tenant can be ejected. These must be established before a Revenue Court.
Leaving aside the other rights of the tenants that are given in para. 25(2), the Para. 25(1) is for the benefit of a landlord if he can prove that the tenant committed such acts as denuded him of the legal protection afforded to him. The Rules lay down only one further benefit which is that after the passing of a decree against him, a tenant cannot be ejected before the 1st of May or after the 30th of June in a year.
8. The next question is if the time provided in the Rules runs against the parties and particularly the plaintiff/landlord ? It is a well-established proposition of law that the provision of time in law binds the parties only if they are in control of acts to be done. The functionaries under law in such an event are bound to pass orders refusing to consider matters and grant reliefs subject to the law.
Further the laws which provide doing of an act within a specified time also provide for penalties or other consequences B in case of default. Reference be made to the Law of Limitation. It is also illustrated by rule 4(4) itself.
9. No penalty or consequences are, however, provided for with regard to a default under rule 4(5).
Such a situation is dealt with by Maxwell, 11th Edition page 369 as under :- "On the other hand, where the prescriptions of a statute to the performance of a public duty, and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, yet do not promote the essential aims of the Legislature, such prescriptions seem to be generally understood as mere instructions for the guidance and government of those on whom the duty is imposed, or, in other words, as directory only. The neglect of them may be penal, indeed, but it does not affect the validity of the act done in disregard of them. It has often been held, for instance, when an Act ordered a thing to be done by a public body or public officers and pointed out the specific time when it was to be done, that the Act was directory only and might be complied with after the prescribed time.
' Thus, the Riot Act, 1411 (c. 7), which required justices to try rioters "within a month" after the riot, was held not to limit the authority of the justices to that space of time, but only to render them liable to a penalty for neglect.
' To hold that an Act which required an officer to prepare and deliver to another officer a list of voters on or before a certain day, under a penalty, made a list not delivered till a later day invalid, would, in effect, put it in the power of the person charged with the duty of preparing it to disfranchise the electors, a conclusion too unreasonable for acceptance."
10. The Supreme Court in a similar situation, in Chief Commissioner, Karachi v. Jamil Ahmad (1) approved the following statement of law :- (He relies on the text of Crawford on Statutory Construction, 1940 Edition page 74). He also relies on the same book, where a principle deprived from certain American decisions had been laid down 'that a statute which requires certain things to be done, but does not prescribe any results to follow if they are not done, should be held directory.' (Page 524, Note 39). He also drew our attention to paragraph 266 of the same book at page 529, where under the heading 'Statutes Pertaining to Official Action' the principles stated are as follows :- "As a general rule, a statute which regulates the manner in which public officials shall exercise the power vested in them, will be construed as directory rather than mandatory."
' He also relied on Maxwell's interpretation of Statutes, 6th Edition pages 649-50 for the proposition.
11. The view of law taken above is supported by the comparison of rule 4(4) and rule 4(5). Whereas in case of default under rule 4(4) the case stands automatically transferred to the Collector, no consequence is provided if even the Collector does not decide the case within the stipulated period. There is grave danger to the cause of justice imminent if we permit the functionaries who are meant to achieve the purposes of law to either defeat or undermine the same. The Supreme Court in Kohinoor Textile Mills v. C.
1. T. (2) enunciated a similar principle to avoid the above results with the following observations :- "The statute which had come into force by the will of the Legislature could not also remain 'dormant' at the will of the executive. It operated of its own force and it became the duty of the executive to give effect to it as far as possible even without the modifications which could, at best, be only of a consequential nature. . . ."
' The operation of the law, therefore, cannot be left to the whim or caprice of the functionaries.
12. Thus the contention of the learned counsel that the proceedings before the Collector shall abate on the expiry of the period of 30 days and the landlord should repeat the proceedings in the next year is not only against the object of the law but is neither supported by any provision nor any principle of law. The only protection afforded is that no matter when a decree for ejectment is passed, it will not be executed before the 1st of May and after the 30th of June.
(1) PLD 1961 SC 145
13. In this view of the matter, I am quite clear that the proceedings before the Collector do not abate and must be concluded with the necessary despatch as it is the intention of the Rules. The Collector is, however, under a duty to take action against the defaulting Assistant Collector Grade 1.
As for the Collector who neglects to take action against the Assistant Collector and if he himself does not decide the case within the prescribed period, he exposes himself also to the penalty as provided in para. 30, of Martial Law Regulation No,
115. The relevant portion reads as under :- "30. Whoever contravenes or fails to comply with any of the provisions of this Regulation or the rules made thereunder shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment which may extend to seven years..
For the reasons given above, I am inclined to agree with the Collector that the proceedings could be continued even on the expiry of 30 days and would neither abate nor stand concluded. Both the functionaries are, however, liable to administrative and legal action for delaying the decision.
' In view of the above, there is no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed in limine".