The petitioner's application under section 148, C.P.C. For extension of time, for making up the deficiency in the payment of court-fee, has been dismissed by the learned- Additional District Judge, vide order, dated 5-6-1999. Hence this petition.
2. The relevant facts are, that petitioner filed a suit for pre-emption against respondent No.3, challenging the sale of a shop purchased by the latter. Respondent filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., for rejecting the plaint, due to deficiency in the court-fee; the learned trial Court instead of rejecting the plaint, vide order, dated 20-4-1998, directed the petitioner to make up the deficiency to the tune of Rs.3,000. Aggrieved by the above, petitioner filed a revision before the learned Additional District Judge, Kasur, which was dismissed on 12-9-1998, and the petitioner was directed to make up the deficiency within 15 days, from the date of the order.
3. Thereafter, petitioner, on 17-10-1998, filed an application under section 148 C.P.C, read with section 151, before the learned Additional District Judge, seeking extension in the payment of the court-fee, on the score that he was not aware of the time fixed by the Court for making up the deficiency; he came to know of the dismissal of his revision on 29-9-1998, accordingly, deposited the amount in the Treasury, the court-fee stamps were supplied to him on 2-10-1998, which was filed in the Court on 10-10-1998, till that date he had no knowledge about the fixation of time period by the learned Additional District Judge. This application was contested by the respondent, which has been dismissed as stated earlier.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that fifteen days' time had lapsed on 27-9-1998, he deposited the amount in the Treasury on 29-9-1998, and there is only delay of one day; the petitioner was away on business tour and had no knowledge of the order of the Court. It is further contended that the question of deficiency in the court-fee is a matter between the State and the litigant. The object of the court-fee is to secure revenue for the benefit of the State and not to arm litigant with a weapon of technicality to harass his opponent. Reliance is placed on the case reported as Siddique Khan and others v. Abdul Shakur Khan arid another PLD 1984 SC 289. Learned Additional District Judge has Paled to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him and the order is absolutely arbitrary and against the established norms of justice.
5. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent argued that after dismissal of the petitioner's revision petition, learned Additional District Judge was functus officio and thus, could not extend the time under the provisions of section .148, C.P.C. Moreover, learned Additional District Judge has refused to exercise his discretion in favour of the petitioner and as such discretionary orders which are not fanciful, arbitrary, illegal cannot be subjected to writ jurisdiction.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. According to section 148, C.P.C., where a period is fixed or granted by the Court for doing of any act, the Court may in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though period originally fixed or granted has expired, but the condition is that the Court still retain control over the action and has full power to make a necessary order therein including the order for the extension of time. In the instant case, revisional Court had finally disposed of the revision filed by the petitioner, therefore; staving no control over the lis, thus, become functus officio and no authority in law to extend the time fixed in the order passed by it, while finally disposing of the revision petition. Reliance in this behalf has been placed on PLD 1966 SC 983, 1987 CLCI 1982 and .1991 M LD 2109.
7. Even otherwise, from the contents of the application filed by the petitioner under section 148, C.P.C, I am not satisfied with the bona fide and vigilance of the petitioner. His case, as sated in the application is, that he was away from Kasur, when the order was passed by the learned Additional District Judge, though his counsel was aware of the dismissal, but was not aware of fifteen days' time fixed by the Court. Besides, petitioner himself did not bother to ascertain time and it is stated that he also came to know of the fact on 12-9-1998, when it was pointed out by the opposite-party in the trial Court and on reading the order of the learned Additional District Judge, he was shocked to know that time fixed had expired and consequently, moved an application on 17-10-1998. In the facts and circumstances, particularly because of the averments of the application under section 148, C.P.C., if not deliberate, it shows sheer negligence on part of the petitioner and his counsel, to attain knowledge of the actual order of the learned Additional District Judge. On account of the above, it is not established, if the petitioner has acted with bona fide and due vigilance in purusing the matter to make up the deficiency of the court-fee, no particulars have been given in the application as to where the petitioner had gone on the business tour and thus, was prevented to know of the fate of his revision and the order passed therein. If the petitioner was away, he could have deputed any representative or contacted his counsel by telephone, etc. To find out the result of the revision. If he had been vigilant, he would have definitely come to know about the prescribed period, that he has to pay the court-fee by a given date.
8. As regards the competency of the writ petition, suffice it to say, :hat the orders, though discretionary in nature, which are perverse, arbitrary, fanciful and against the settled norms of justice, etc. Can be interfered in Constitutional jurisdiction. But, I do not find the instant case to be an appropriate one which suffers from any of the above vices calling for interference in the Constitutional jurisdiction, particularly when the learned Additional District Judge, as held above, had no jurisdiction to extend the time.
9. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the question of payment of court-fee is a matter between litigant and the State and there was only delay of one day and no prejudice has beer: caused to the respondent. It may be stated that on account of non-compliance of the order, the petitioner's plaint was liable to be rejected and this has created a vested right in the respondent, which cannot be breached, therefore, the judgment reported as PLD 1984 SC 289 does not help the case of the petitioner.
The upshot of above discussion is that there is no illegality, infirmity shown in the impugned order, which can be termed to be without lawful authority and jurisdiction, calling for interference in my Constitutional jurisdiction. This petition, thus, has no merits and is hereby dismissed.