' The applicant is facing trial for an offence of attempt to commit Qatl-e-Amd punishable under section 324, P.P.C.
2. As stated in the F.I.R. The applicant is a worker in the Cane Furniture Factory of complainant Aziz Ahmed Khan. On 22-2-2000 the complainant left for Malir in connection with some work and his son Muhammad Fahim went to the factory. At about 10-00 p.m. Accused Akbar with an intention to commit Qatl-e-Amd of Muhammad Fahim attacked the latter and caused injury at his throat with some sharp-edged weapon. The accused/applicant ran away and the boy was shifted to Abbasi Shaheed Hospital where he was given treatment.
3. Learned counsel for applicant submitted that the F.I.R. Does not disclose the motive of commission of offence and that the victim was at the mercy of the assailant yet only one injury was caused which shows that he had no intention to commit murder. He further argued that medico-legal certificate shows two incised injuries caused with sharp weapon and thus, the version in the F.I.R. Is contradictory. Lastly he argued that the witnesses were examined after few days and on the whole the case is one of further inquiry. He relied on 2000 YLR 2792, Muhammad Fayyaz v. State 1995 PCr.LJ 1342, Muhammad Riaz Monna v. State 1993 SCM R 1321, Jan Muhammad v.. State 1994 PCr.LJ 541, Nowsherwan v. State 1994 PCr.LJ 1476 and Taj Muhammad v. State PLD 1963 Kar.
118. Learned State Counsel opposed the bail on the ground that the applicant had attempted to cut throat of victim which is sufficient to establish the offence of attempt to commit Qatre-Amil irrespective of the fact that the injury is found to be simple in nature.
4. Learned State Counsel has taken me through the statement of the victim Muhammad Fahim. He has directly implicated the applicant for causing him injury on his throat in a manner which, prima facie demonstrates his intention to commit Qatl-e-Amd. The F.I.R. Was lodged promptly and the name of applicant was specifically mentioned therein. No doubt motive is not shown in the F.I.R. But this fact equally supports the prosecution that the complainant had no animosity to implicate the applicant falsely. The authorities cited at the Bar also do not render any support to the bail plea.
5. In 2000 YLR 2792 the injury was on a non-vital part of the body whereas in the instant case the injury is on throat and it is needless to observe that, a little deeper slit was sufficient to bring an end to the life of the victim. In Muhammad Fayyaz's case 1995 PCr.LJ 1342 the witnesses were not named in the F.I.R. And they were examined by police after 8 days of registration of the case but in the instant case the victim has directly implicated the applicant, therefore, the facts being remarkably distinct the principle of law would not apply to the present case. In Muhammad Riaz Munna's case 1993 SCM R 1321 the F.I.R. Was lodged after delay of 20 days and the witnesses were not named therein, but in this case the victim was first removed to Abbasi Shaheed Hospital in injured state and within two and half an hour the matter was reported to police. The question of delay in F.I.R. Is thus, of no assistance to the applicant's plea of bail. In Nowsherwan's case 1994 PCr.LJ 1476 the facts were altogether different. The injured witness was not only dead drunk at the time of incident but he was found to be a drunkard and no data was available on record in support of the opinion of the doctor certifying the injury as grievance. In Taj Muhammad's case PLD 1963 Kar. 118 the appeal was decided by this Court holding that the intention was to be inferred from external acts.
The observations were made on the basis of evidence recorded at the trial in the instant case the trial has not yet commenced.
6. The effect of delay in recording statements of other witnesses and the difference in number of injuries can be considered in the light of evidence to be recorded at the trial and it is premature to extend benefit of doubt on that score at this stage.
7. Consequently, in view of the circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the guilt of appellant would require further inquiry. The application merits no consideration and is dismissed.
These are the reasons for the short order pronounced on 12-3-2001.