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1970 PLC 72

NASIR vs MESSRS KARACHI INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIOR, KARACHI AND

Citation1970 PLC 72
CourtIndustrial Appellate Tribunal
Case No.Appeal No. KAR-227 of 1968
Date1969-02-11
Judge(s)Inamullah Khan
Resultaccordingly dismissed

ORDER, This is an appeal against an order of the 'Second West Pakistan Industrial Court, Karachi, dated November 15, 1968. The impugned order was passed on an application under section 30(2) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter called the repealed Ordinance), whereby the learned Court granted the permission sought for by the respondent Corpora--tion to dismiss the appellant from service, because the appellant had remained absent without leave. The facts briefly put are these.

2. The appellant fell ill in June, 1967. He sent an application on 2nd June 1967, for leave, through one Choteh, who was his neighbour and working with the 'respondents. Choteh gave the application to the Manager, Mr. Yamin, who tore it away. He again sent another application through Choteh on 6th June 1967. The appellant came back to resume his duty on 3rd July 1967, but was refused to enter the premises of the Corporation.

3. The appellant denied to have received any charge-sheet. He, however, admitted to have received a letter dated 14th July 1967, on 18th July 1967, intimating that the matter was fixed at 10 a.m. on 18th July 1967. He sent a reply to the letter on 19th July 1967. addressed to the Management.

4. The enquiry was held by one Mr. Mustaqim in the absence of the appellant. He found him guilty, As the appellant was an office-bearer of the Union, an application under section 30(2) of the repealed Ordinance was made to the Industrial Court, which granted the permission to dismiss the appellan.

Mr. M. M. Gilani, the learned Representative for the appellant, contended that the appellant did not get sufficient opportunity to meet the charge-sheet. In this connection, the earned Representative relied on a number of circumstances, which I propose to deal presently. In the first place, he contended that the letter dated 14th July 1967, intimating that the appellant should appear before the Enquiry Officer on 18th July 1967, was received by him in the evening and, therefore, he could not appear before the Enquiry Officer. There is no much substance in this contention. If the letter dated 14th July 1967, was received by him in the evening of 18th July 1967 he should have at least preserved the envelope. The fact that the appellant did not preserve the envelope would show that he had received the letter earlier. Moreover, his reply dated 19th July 1967, does not mention that he received the letter in the evening of 18th July 1967. A perusal of the letter of 19th July 1967, would show that the appellant did not make any grievance of the fact that he was not given sufficient time by the Management to meet the charge-sheet. The appellant has denied to have received the charge-sheet, but the circumstances show that he knew the contents of the charge-sheet. The charge-sheet was sent through the Karachi Industrial Corporation Workers' Union by post. The ordinance presumption is that the appellant must have received the charge-sheet just as he received the letter dated 14th July 1967, addressed through the Union. The learned Representative for the appellant also, in this connection, relied on the fact that the Enquiry Officer did not satisfy himself as to whether the acknowledgment receipt had come back or not. It is common knowledge that acknowledgment receipts take some time to reach the sender. The Enquiry Officer knowing that the letter was sent on 14th July 1967, to .a person residing locally would not take more than two days to reach. The letter should have reached the other end by the 16th of July 1967, at the latest.

6. It appears from the statement of the appellant that he purposely wanted to non-co-operate in the enquiry proceeding. He believed that he will not be able to satisfy the Management that he was not absent from duty without leave. He thought that being an officer of the Union he will be able to force the hands of the Management through strike. He stated before the Industrial Court as under:- "I am Member of the Managing Committee. When I was turned out, the workers went on strike. The police had come."

7. The appellant's refusal to accept the charge-sheet and to participate in the enquiry appears to be a device resorted to with an intention of escaping the consequences of the enquiry and to achieve his object through the Union.

8. It was lastly contended by Mr. Gilani that the letter dated 14th July 1967, -did not disclose the place where the enquiry was to be held. It is true the name of the Enquiry pacer is not given, but the appellant knew where he was to appear. He should have appeared in the premises of the Corporation. He could have found from his Foreman as to who was conducting the enquiry and where. It is also noteworthy that he did not make any grievance of this fact in his reply dated 19th July 1967.

9. The case of the appellant that he had applied for leave, it was submitted by Mr. Mahmood A.

Ghani, the learned Representative for the respondents, was on the face of it to incon--sistent that it cannot be accepted. In this connection, it is submitted that there are inconsistent statements about the person by whom the application for leave was sent and the person who received the same. Before the Industrial Court the appellant stated that the application was sent on 2nd June, 1967, by one Choteh, who gave it to the Manager, Mr. Yamin. While the appellant in his letter dated 19th July, 1967, stated that he submitted applications for leave on 2nd and 6Th June 1967, which were not entertained by Munshi Muhammad Siddiq. The Union in its letter of protest addressed to the Management made out a different case in respect of the applications for leave. According to the said letter, dated 3rd July 1967, the application for leave was given by one Younus to Mr. Muhammad Salam, Foreman, who tore away the application. Thus there appears that the story about submitted applications for leave is on the face of it false. I have mentioned these facts only to strengthen my conclusion that the appellant knowingly avoided to face the enquiry, as he knew that he will not be able to prove that he had applied for leave. For these reasons, I see no force in the appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.

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