' The petitioner who was a Head Fitter in the Weaving Section of Shamas Textile Mills, Chiniot, respondent No,3 herein, was charge-sheeted for the allegations contained in the charge-sheet dated 17-11-1987. He was dismissed thereafter from service on 14-1-1988. He then filed a petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which was accepted by the Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,V, Sargodha on 18-12-1989. This order was challenged by respondent No,3 by filing an appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal which appeal was accepted on 7-3-1990 for the view taken by the learned Tribunal that the petitioner was not a workman and the forum for him to challenge the order of dismissal was not the Labour Court. This order has been challenged through this petition.
2. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there are concurrent findings of fact by the Courts below that no misconduct was committed by the petitioner and that by reversing the finding of the Labour Court on the point as to whether the petitioner was a workman the learned Appellate Tribunal has erred in law in setting aside the order of the Labour Court. It is further contended that the petitioner was a workman and rightly held so by the Labour Court, the view taken by the learned Tribunal is not supported by law. Reference is made to Emirates Bank International and another v. Rana Zahid Iqbal and 2 others (1999 PLC 302), The President Habib Bank Limited, Karachi and 3 others v. Syed Shafqat Hussain Shakir (1998 PLC 390), M/s. Allied Bank of Pakistan, Karachi and 3 others v. Abdul Karim (1993 PLC 412), Zia Ahmad Makhdoom v. Pak Suzuki Motor Company Ltd. (1991 PLC 145) to support his contentions.
3. Learned counsel for respondent No,3 supports the order passed by the learned Tribunal and contends that the findings recorded by the Tribunal do not suffer from any infirmity, therefore, writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised to upset the same. It is further contended that it is a question of fact as to whether the petitioner was a workman or not, the finding recorded by the learned Tribunal should be given due regard. It is further contended that there was ample material on the record in support of the findings recored by the learned Tribunal that the main duty of the petitioner was of supervisory nature and was thus, not a workman. Relies on Muhammad Fazil v.
The General Manager, Faislabad Serena Hotel, Faisalabad and 2 others (1999 PLC 307) and Government of Pakistan and another v. Furqan Ahmad Qureshi (1988 SCM R 623) in order to support the view taken by the learned Tribunal.
4. In view of the undisputed position that finding of the Labour Court has been affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal as well that no misconduct had been committed by the petitioner, the only issue is whether the petitioner was a "workman" and was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. For coming to the conclusion that the petitioner was a "workman" the learned Labour Court considered the evidence brought on the record and after analysing the same recorded its findings that:-- "In the light of the oral as well as documentary evidence discussed above, it become crystal clear that the nature of duty of the petitioner was manual and was not supervisory or managerial. He was, therefore, a workman under the Standing Orders Ordinance as well as Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and could come to the Labour Court against his order of termination."
' The learned Tribunal, however, took a different view of the matter and observed that:-- "The main duty of the respondent was not to repair the machinery and since he was head fitter with more experience, therefore, he had to remove the difficulty which could not be removed by his subordinates and thus, even this amounted to supervising the work of his subordinates. He had to do this work occasionally whenever his subordinates found difficulty in removing the defects. So, the respondent is not covered by the definition of a workman given under section 2 (i) of the Standing Order Ordinance, 1968." \ The approach of the two authorities below is thus at variance, their view is, therefore, to be judged on the basis of the evidence and the law applicable.
5. Undoubtedly, the petitioner was proceeded against under Standing Order No,15 (3), clauses (c) and. (h) thereof. The said Standing Order is applicable to a workman who is to be proceeded against for imposing punishment mentioned therein. Under section 2(i) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 a workman is defined as "any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward". By issuing charge-sheet under Standing Order 15(3) (ibid) respondent No,3 itself admitted the status of the petitioner as workman. It was on the basis of this charge-sheet that the petitioner was removed from service on 14-1-1988. This aspect was duly considered by the Labour Court in taking the view that the petitioner was a workman. However, the learned Labour Appellate Court Tribunal did not advert to this aspect which, undoubtedly, had material relevancy and bearing on the point. In addition to the above, there was evidence of overwhelming nature in the case to establish that the petitioner was a workman, reference to which was made by the learned Labour Court in extenso. There were representations made by the respondents to the Medical Officer, Social Security Dispensary about the petitioner. The petitioner was also certified by the Factory Manager that he was a workman in terms of section 2, clause (28) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 for the allotment of a residential plot in a scheme in which only the workmen were eligible. This document designated the petitioner as "Head Fitter". The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in pursuance of such certification the petitioner indeed was allotted residential plot. A second show-cause notice issued to the petitioner, after the conclusion of the inquiry also makes a reference to Standing Order 15(3), explanation to which was sought from the petitioner.
6. In Mustekhum Cement Limited through Managing Director v. Abdul Rashid and others (1998 SCM R 644) the matter was considered at great length and it was held as follows:-- "The provisions of Standing Order 12(3), therefore, indicate that it allows right to a workman who is aggrieved by termination of his services or removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal to seek redress in accordance with the provisions of section 25-A of the Ordinance. The words 'and thereupon, the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance' clearly indicate that for the purpose of redress of such grievance the procedural provisions of section 25-A have been extended to Standing Order 12(3) and the said provisions shall apply in the same manner as they would apply in case of an individual grievance referred to in the said section. It, therefore, clearly follows that right to seek redress has been made available to such workman, not through the force of section 25-A of the Ordinance but by extending the said provisions to Standing Order 12 (3). However. The Legislature has provided for a different definition of the term 'workman' in clause (i) of section 2 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, which provides as under:- "(i) 'workman' means any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward.'"
' It is pertinent to notice that the two definitions of 'workman', one provided in the Ordinance and the other provided in the Standing Orders Ordinance are completely different. The question which, therefore, arises is, which of the two definitions would be applicable in case, redress is sought by an aggrieved workman under Standing Order 12(3). Since in the present case admittedly, the respondent's services were not terminated in connection with or in consequence of an industrial dispute, right to him to seek redress of his grievance was available only under Standing Order 12(3).
When redress was sought by the respondent under Standing Orders Ordinance, it is the definition of the term 'workman' as provided in the Standing Orders Ordinance, which was to be considered by the Labour Court for entertaining his grievance petition and not the definition of the said term as contained in the Ordinance."
' This dictum should clinch the controversy. On comparing the finding of the Labour Court with that of the learned Tribunal, in the light of the evidence that has come on record, I am persuaded to hold that the view taken by the Labour Court was eminently supported by the facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, I am unable to endorse the view taken by the learned Tribunal that the petitioner was not a workman. The petitioner had rightly invoked the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and that was the forum available to him.
7. Since there are concurrent findings by the two Tribunals that the allegations of misconduct had not been proved against the petitioner, the petitioner was entitled to be reinstated and was rightly ordered so by the learned Labour Court.
' In view of the above, the judgment of the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal whereby the grievance petition of the petitioner was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, is not sustainable and is declared as of no legal effect. No order as to costs.