' MUNIR A. SHEIKH, J.---Leave to appeal is sought against the judgment dated 28-4-1998 of the Lahore Court through Writ Petition No,537 of 1985 filed by respondent No,1 against the order dated 9-1-1985 of the Board of Revenue of acceptance of the revision petition of the petitioner against the order dated 30-12-1974 of the Commissioner, has been accepted and the said order dated 9-1- 1985 of the Board set aside and that of the Commissioner restored.
2. The facts of the case shortly stated are that land measuring 17 Kanals, 8 Marlas in dispute situated in Village Khanpur, District Lahore was mortgaged by the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner in favour of predecessor-in-interest bf the private respondent in the year 1968 since which date, the mortgagee had been continuously in possession thereof. On 1-4-1972, an application for redemption of the said mortgage was moved by the petitioner before the Assistant Commissioner (Saddar) with the powers of Collector under the provisions of Redernption and Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1964. The Collector by his order dated 29-7-1974 allowed the said application and declared that the mortgage stood extinguished without payment of the mortgage amount. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent filed an appeal before the Commissioner which was accepted by him through his order dated 30-12-1974; set aside the said order of the Collector dated 29-7-1974 and held that the mortgage being more than 60 years old, the present petitioner had forfeited her rights to claim redemption or restitution of the land in question. The revision petition filed by the petitioner before the Board of Revenue was allowed on 9-1-1985 with the result that the order of the Collector dated 29-7-1974 stood restored against which Writ Petition No,537 of 1985 filed by the respondent/mortgagee has been accepted through the impugned judgment dated 28-4-1998, against which leave to appeal has been sought.
3. The learned Judge. In Chamber of the High Court noticed that the revision petition of the petitioner was allowed merely on the basis of a previous judgment of the Board of Revenue in which it was held that section 20(2) of the Limitation Act was applicable in such cases where the mortgagee was in possession of the land and recovering the rent of the land and that on each recovery of rent, the period of limitation for redemption stood extended 'as the said act of receipt of rent was deemed to be an acknowledgement on behalf of the mortgagee of the existence of the mortgage. The learned Judge in Chamber, however, following the rule laid down in the case of Muhammad Akbar Khan versus Motai reported as AIR 1947 PC 322, held that the said section of the Limitation Act, was applicable to a suit for recovery of rent and not to redemption of the mortgage itself. The learned Judge in Chamber, therefore, held that in view of the authoritative pronouncements made by the Privy Council on the interpretation of section 20(2) of the Limitation Act, it was not open to the Board of Revenue to have followed its own judgment (reported as PLD 1965 W.P. (Rev.) 67 and ignore the law declared by the Privy Council.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to persuade us that in this case, he could circumvent the provisions of the Limitation Act prescribing period of 60 years for the redemption of the mortgage under any of the provisions of the Redemption and Restitution of the Mortgaged Lands Act, 1964. Different provisions of this Act in particular the provisions as regards extinguishment of mortgage as contained in section 10 ibid clearly show that the same were applicable where the mortgage was still subsisting. It was held in the case reported as PLD 1972 Lahore 682 that these provisions were not applicable with regard to the mortgage for th redemption of which period of limitation prescribed under Article 148 of the Limitation Act had already expired in which event the same would not be deemed to be a subsisting mortgage, therefore, the Collector while passing the order for extinguishment of mortgage did not correctly apply the law and his order dated 29-7-1974 was without lawful authority and was rightly so declared by the learned Judge in Chamber through the impugned judgment, which does not suffer from any legal infirmity.
5. For the foregoing reasons, the petition has no merits which is accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.