1. ' The grievance of the petitioner is that the learned Lower Courts have not properly appreciated the evidence and have wrongly decided the factum of divorce by respondent No,1 to the petitioner No, 1 . Mr. A. Iqbal Qadri has assailed the findings of the learned Lower Courts which pertain to the appreciation of facts. He has not pointed out any error of law on the part of the Lower Courts in appreciating the evidence. He has not shown that the Lower Courts had no jurisdiction to decide the question of fact pertaining to divorce between the petitioner No,1 and the respondent No, 1 .
2. There is no plea of the non-exercise of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction or any other illegality.
3. When the Lower Courts are competent to decide the issue of facts and they have decided it on appreciation of entire evidence brought on record then, merely because a party is aggrieved with the finding of fact, shall not provide justification for invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. It is trite law of the administration of justice that if a Court or Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide certain issue then the discretion so vested can be exercised in accordance with the settled principles of law and even if the finding of fact is assailed as in wrong it will not provide justification for invoking the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. Mr. Iqbal has submitted that the view that a Tribunal invested with the jurisdiction to decide a particular matter, has jurisdiction to decide it "rightly or wrongly" has been overruled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Limited v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others reported in PLD 1987 SC 447. A perusal of this judgment shows that his Lordship Mr. Justice Nasim Hasan Shah (as he then was) has held as follows: "I cannot agree with the learned Judge in the High Court. The view of the learned Judge that this Court has ruled that even if the order of a Tribunal is wrong in law, the High Court still cannot intervene in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction is not justified and I feel that the judgments of this Court in the cases of Muhammad Hussain Munir (PLD 1974 SC 139) and Zulfiqar Khan Awan (1974 SCM R 530) have not been read in their proper context. It is not right to say that the Tribunal, which is invested with the jurisdiction to decide a particular matter, has the jurisdiction to decide it 'rightly or wrongly' because the condition of the grant of jurisdiction is that it should decide the matter in accordance with law. When the Tribunal goes. Wrong in law, it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it because the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide rightly but not the jurisdiction to decide wrongly. Accordingly, when the Tribunal makes an error of law in deciding the matter before it, it goes which is shown to be erroneous on a point of law can be quashed under the writ jurisdiction on the ground that it is in excess of its jurisdiction.
4. ' It need hardly be said that under Article 4 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, it is the right of every individual to be dealt with in accordance with law. Where the law has not been correctly or properly observed a case for interference by the High Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction is made out."
5. ' A perusal of the above dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan shows that where there is any error of law and any party has not been dealt with in accordance with law then it would amount to a jurisdictional error making the finding without jurisdiction, thereby providing justification for invoking of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. However, if any mistake in appreciation of facts is alleged then it does not provide a justification for invoking of jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The reason being that a Tribunal or Court of competent jurisdiction has the discretion to appreciate the facts and to give finding accordingly.
6. So long a finding of fact is not shown to have done any violence to the express provision of law or any statute, the Court shall not be deemed to have acted beyond jurisdiction. Merely because two views were possible or any other view could also be taken shall not make a finding of fact to be erroneous in law or unwarranted in law, taking out the finding beyond jurisdiction or making it in excess of jurisdiction. So, far questions of law are concerned, there is no room for interpretation of any law not warranted on the established principles of interpretation of Statutes. Thus, ratio of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, according to my humble opinion, is that if there is any error on the point of law by the Lower Court or Tribunal, the High Court shall be justified in making interference in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction vested under Article 199 of the Constitution. However, it shall not be available in the case of finding on facts until and unless it is shown that the finding of fact is so perverse or against the principles of appreciation of evidence that the finding on fact has entered into the realm of jurisdictional error, making it an error of law.
7. ' Keeping the above principles in view, I find that in the present case the contention raised that there was no evidence on the point of factum of divorce, is not correct. One of the Arbitrators, namely, Haji Muhammad Rafi was examined and in reply to a suggestion made to him by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the cross-examination, he stated as follows: "It is correct to suggest that the question referred to us was whether the defendant had divorced the plaintiff No,1 according to the Muslim Law or not.", ' This suggestion on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioner shows that a Reference for the determination on the point of divorce is admitted. Thus, there was material on the record forming basis for finding assailed in this petition that the petitioner No,1 was divorced by respondent No,1.
8. The result is that the grievance is about the finding of fact only which according to my opinion does not provide justification for invoking jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The permission to do so would amount to provide a forum for appeal or revision, which legislature has deemed fit not to allow. Any such course would amount to enter in the filed of legislation which is not permissible under any principle of the interpretation of statutes. The Constitutional petition can never be a substitute for an appeal or revision and, therefore, it is held that the petition is not maintainable, which stands dismissed in limine.