MUHAMMAD BASHIR JEHANGIRI, J.---This appeal with the leave to the Court is directed against the order dated 2-10-1997 passed by a learned Judge in Chambers of the Lahore High Court in Writ Petition No,11286 of 1996.
2. The facts which formed the background are that the land measuring 1-1/2 Kanals owned by respondents Nos.3 to 5 was leased out by their predecessor-in-interest, namely, Sh. Masood Sadiq in favour of Messrs Pakistan Burma Shell (PBS). The said company installed a petrol pump, service and filling station on the said land. It is alleged that while installing the pump, the appellants had also incurred expenditure in pursuance of an agreement entered into between the appellants and the PBS and thereafter the appellants had been carrying on the business on the said petrol pump as dealers of the PBS. It is alleged that respondents 3 to 5 started pressing upon the appellants as well as the PBS to vacate the land on the plea that the same was required for the personal use of and occupation by the respondents. It is further alleged that with a view to harassing the appellants, an ejectment petition was tiled before the Rent Controller, Lahore, against the PBS without impleading the appellants as party to the said proceedings knowing fully well that in fact the appellants were the dealers on behalf of the PBS and were in possession of the land. The ejectment petition was filed on the grounds of the expiry of the lease period, bona fide personal use, occupation and default in payment of rent. That ejectment petition was contested by the PBS and the same was dismissed vide order dated 8-7-1991. An appeal filed against the said order by the respondents was also dismissed by the Additional District Judge vide order dated 9-1-1996. The said judgment was not further challenged.
3. It is alleged that after dismissal of the ejectment petition, respondents Nos.3 to 5 colluded with the Lahore Development Authority (LDA) and manoeuvred the acquisition of the site under the petrol pump by the LDA for extension of Kashmir-Egerton Road, Lahore. In fact exemption had been sought by the respondents in respect of the land under the petrol pump. It is further alleged that on 25-7-1995, the appellants came to know about the said exemption in favour of respondents Nos.3 to 5 when a notice was issued by the LDA directing the appellants and the PBS to deliver possession of the site to respondents Nos. 3 to,5. It was further indicated in the notice that in case the demand in the notice was not complied with, the petrol pump would be demolished at the site forthwith.
This notice was contested by the appellants as well as the PBS.
4. On 14-3-1997, the appellants challenged the propriety and legality of the said notice by way of instituting a civil suit and a temporary injunction was sought. Initially temporary injunction was granted, but respondents Nos.3 to 5 filed an application, which was contested and the plaint was ultimately rejected vide orders dated 20-6-1996. After the rejection of the plaint, the petrol pump was demolished. The employees were given beating and cash was also allegedly snatched away.
In these circumstances, a Constitutional petition was filed, which was dismissed vide the impugned orders. The learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court noticed that PBS had got the disputed property on lease and the period whereof had already expired and, therefore, the appellant had got no direct nexus either with respondents Nos. 3 to 5, or with the property in dispute. In this context, reference was made to clause 5 of the agreement. The learned Judge in Chambers then observed that the property under dispute had already been acquired and the exempted plots Nos.37 and 38 had been given to respondents Nos. 3 to 5 for which they had already deposited the requisite fee but the PBS had failed to challenge this action. According to the learned Judge, the land had since been acquired by the LDA and there being no restraint order after the rejection of the plaint of the appellant as such the High Court was not inclined to interfere in the matter in exercise of the Constitutional jurisdiction involving the resolution of factual controversies, particularly when no action whatsoever had been taken by the PBS against the notice of eviction dated 25-6-1995. As a cumulative effect of these findings, the writ petition was dismissed.
5. Leave to appeal was granted in this case in para. 6 of the leaving granting order which reads as under:-- "After hearing the learned counsel at some length, we are of the view that the order of the High Court and the facts and circumstances of the case require further probes as to the nature of the possession of the petitioners and the exemption of the plots by the LDA on which the petrol pump is situated and further as to whether in the circumstances of the case when the ejectment petition had been dismissed action could have been taken to seek ejectment of the petitioners otherwise than in accordance with law. Leave is granted to consider the above questions. Meanwhile, possession of the petitioners shall not be disturbed."
6. Ch. Mushtaq Ahmad, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court contended that the appellants were in admitted and undisputed possession of the site as bona fide dealers after investment of huge amount in construction thereon, therefore, without formal determination of the lease agreement, PBS as well as the relationship between the appellants and the PBS, respondent No,1 had absolutely no lawful authority to join hands with and respondents Nos.3 to 5 in demolition of the Petrol Pump when the ejectment petition filed by the respondents against the PBS had been dismissed which order had been affirmed in appeal and had not been challenged any further and had attained finality. It was also reiterated that when findings of learned Single Judge to the effect that PBS having not come forward to file writ petition, the appellant had no locus standi to file the Constitution petition and the approach was erroneous in law inasmuch as a person who is in possession on behalf of a lessee is duty bound to protect structure and possession of the premises/site whereat he had entered into possession in pursuance of the agreement between the original lessee and himself.
7. Mr. Gul Zarin Kiani, learned Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Mr. Mahfuz-ul-Haq, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing on behalf of respondents Nos.3 to 5 contended that the appellants had filed Suit No,139/1 against LDA and respondents Nos.3 to 5 in the Court of Mr. Nasir Awan, Civil Judge, Lahore. The plaint in this suit was rejected. In this context, reference was made to the photo copy of the decree-sheet at page 43 of Paper Book Part-II, Mr. Gul Zarin Kiani, learned Advocate Supreme Court has also brought to our notice that the appellant had preferred an appeal in the "Court of District Judge, Lahore and had referred to the memorandum of their appeal against the rejection of their plaint which has been placed at pp.55--63. From these facts, the learned counsel submitted, the appellant could not have simultaneously invoked the writ jurisdiction and also filed a suit, the plaint whereof having been rejected and the appeal thereagainst is pending.
8. The learned counsel for the answering respondents also maintained that PBS had instituted another suit against respondents Nos.2 to 5 for damages amounting to Rs,10 million and referred to pp.101 to 111 and have claimed Rs,Six million by the appellants against respondents Nos.1 to 3. Again the respondents had filed a suit against the appellants seeking permanent injunction the plaint whereof is available at pp.41 to 46 of Paper Book Part II. It was further contended that factual inquiry touching the proposition in the appeal filed by the appellants and as stated earlier is pending decision. The learned counsel then urged that notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, had been issued as far back as 26-7-1968 and award wherein has been announced on 23-6- 1976 with reference to page 26 of the Paper Book No,II and, therefore, neither the writ petition was competent nor this appeal merits any consideration by this Court.
9. We have also heard Mr. M. Rashid Ahmad, learned Advocate Supreme Court for LDA and Mr. Muhammad Saleem Shahnaazi, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the PBS.
10. It is a settled law that the scope of the Constitutional jurisdiction is very limited and is confined to ascertain as to whether the Tribunal or the Appellate Authority as in his case, the Civil Court had the jurisdiction and whether after rejection of the plaint, the pendency of appeal against the disputed question of fact would not confer the jurisdiction on the High Court to entertain the petition in writ jurisdiction. Invoking of Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court instead of availing of remedy provided for under the relevant law would only be justified when the impugned order/action was palpably without jurisdiction as to force an aggrieved person in such a case to approach the forum provided under the relevant statute may not be just and proper. In the instant case the suits and an appeal are pending decision between the parties before the Civil Courts and, therefore, bypassing the remedy provided under, the plenary jurisdiction of the Civil Courts would not be justified and to press into service the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court by the appellants can only be deprecated. The writ petition can be filed if an aggrieved person has no remedy under the statute against the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. In the instant case, as stated earlier, the parties are locked in civil litigation in three suits and one appeal and, therefore, invocation of the Constitutional jurisdiction by the appellant is certainly an act which cannot be accorded credence in the appeal before us.
11. It may also be mentioned here that the appellants are not themselves aggrieved persons inasmuch as they were not the signatory to the lease agreement between respondents Nos. 3 to 5 and the PBS. The PBS themselves after rejection of the plaint have not gone into appeal and instead the appellants have taken that responsibility on their shoulder. We are inclined to refrain from making any observation in the case lest it should adversely affect the respective stance of the parties before the Courts in civil jurisdiction and in the appeal pending before the learned District Judge, Lahore.
12. Similarly we do not find it appropriate at this stage 'to make any observations one way or the other on the point of acquisition of land by the Lahore Development Authority under the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894).
13. For the foregoing reasons we find that the instant appeal is without substance and is hereby dismissed.