' CH. MUHAMMAD ARIF, J.---Through this common judgment we intend to dispose of the above appeals with leave of this Court which. In their own turn, had arisen out of a common judgment dated 31-8-1994 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh at Karachi Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-1748, D-1837 and D-1838 of 1993.
2. Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-1748, D-1837 and D-1838 of 1993 were resorted to by the appellants objecting to the insistence of respondent-Employees Old-Age Benefit Institution in asking the appellants-Mills . To make contribution for their workers as computed on the basis of enhanced wages w,e,f, 1-7-1992 under the West Pakistan Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers (Amendment)
Act, 1993 (Act No,IX of 1993)--enacted on 10-4-1993-Amending the West Pakistan Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers Ordinance, 1969 (Ordinance XX of 1969) enhancing the minimum wages of unskilled workers from Rs,140 to Rs,1,500 per month.
3. The learned Members of the Division Bench of the High Court observed that a joint reading of the prayer clause and the Grounds of challenge to Act No,IX of 1993 shows that their case can be divided into the following 4 propositions:-- "(A) That the amending Act of 1993 could not have been passed by the Majlis-e-Shoora as the same subject is not contained in the Federal Legislative List but appears in concurrent legislative list.
"(B) That the enactment of said law is not in accordance with the Injunctions of Islam and, therefore, are in violation of Article 2A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
"(C&D) That the (Appellant-Mills) had paid wages to his workers under a contract; and that all fiscal benefits are to be given prospectively and not retrospectively.
4. Last 3 paragraphs of the impugned judgment of the High Court make the following reading:- "As regards the first point, the learned counsel has referred us to Item No,26 of the Concurrent Legislative List of the Constitution which, reads as under; "26. Welfare of labour; conditions of labour, provident funds; employees' liability and workmen's compensation, health insurance including invalidity pensions, old-age pensions: "A plain reading of this (Item) shows that the provisions made (therein) include welfare of the workers as well as their compensation etc., which in general terms would mean that the same item governs the terms and conditions of the employment of the workers. From this it can safely be assumed that the wages of the workers would be covered by this item and, therefore, being in concurrent list, the Majlis-e-Shoora was competent to pass such Act."
"As regards the other three points raised by the learned counsel, it may be observed that all these points were considered by their Lordships of Supreme Court in order passed on 2-3-1994 in Civil Petitions Nos.523/524-K of 1993, Al-Noor Textile Mills Ltd., and Star Textile Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan. The Supreme Court in the said judgment has observed as under; 'It may be a premium, a favour of a liberal increase to persons working or for the work performed or as an incentive for better results and creating good working conditions. When any person in his personal capacity makes such favourable concession, it becomes a gift, kindness or liberality, but when it is given by a legislation, it is based on certain valid considerations and acquires legality conferring a legal right on the person to whom it is to be paid and a liability and duty of the person who is required to pay. The justification in the present case seems to be reasonable as for more than two decades the minimum wages of unskilled workers had remained static at Rs,140 p.m.
Which as compared to other workers was even much low than the base line. The retrospective operation can be given by the legislature and merely because a particular party is burdened with certain liability in consequence of the operation of law, does not mean that any of his rights has been illegally infringed'
"There are two limitations imposed by law which structure and control the discretion of the.
Government in this behalf. The first is in regard to the terms on which largess is granted and the other is in regard to persons who may be recipients of such largess. There can be no cavil with the above proposition as in the present case firstly, the benefit conferred on the unskilled workers is not a largess, and secondly the Government by legislation his fixed the criteria for the persons to whom the benefit is to be given, its extent and also the time from which it is to be conferred. In the circumstances, there is no room for interference. We, therefore, find no force in the petition and refuse to grant leave."
"The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the Verses of Holy Qur'an wherein it has been held that no penalty could be imposed on past and closed transactions. However, that is not the case here as held above by the Supreme Court. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the cases of Kohinoor Chemical Co-, Ltd. And another v. Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution and another (PLD 1977 SC 197), Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan (PLD 1993 SC 473), and Province of the Punjab v. Amin Jan Naeem and 4 others (PLD 1994 SC 141).
"In the first case the point involved was that alternate arrangement by the employer had been made and, therefore, it was held that burdening the employer with the fees will be imposing double liability on him. This is not the case involved in the present matter. In the second case also the facts are different and the matter pertained to dissolution of Parliament and not the imposition of any liability. As against this in the above-cited judgment of the Supreme Court, it has been clearly held that the amending Act passed by the Parliament is quite in accordance with the procedure and the provisions of the Constitution and the same was upheld. In the third case, the question involved was requisition of building for use of an officer and the facts of that case are also quite different than the present case. It may be observed that a precedent can only be applied to a case of similar nature and the same would not be of a universal application. In the present cases all the points raised by the learned counsel have been thoroughly discussed and answered in the above said judgment of the Supreme Court. We may also observe that on the same grounds another Constitutional petition being C.P. D-2011 of 1993 was dismissed in limine by a Division Bench of. This Court on 28-7-1993 wherein also the same points were raised and the vires of the said amending Act was challenged. In these circumstances, we find no force in these petitions, which are accordingly dismissed in limine alongwith Miscellaneous Applications. "
' Para. 2 of leave granting order, dated 6-8-1995 reads thus:-- T' he learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the judgment of the Supreme Court relied upon could not be cited as a precedent in the present case as the question in that judgment was completely different than the one raised by him before the learned Judges of the Division Bench.
The learned counsel further contended that considering the nature and provisions of Employees Old-Age Benefit Act, 1976 (Act XIV of 1976) particularly section 22 and the Schedule made thereunder and Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance (West Pakistan Ordinance No,10 of 1965) particularly section 20 and Provincial Employees Social Security (Benefit) Regulations 1967, the impugned Act could not be given retrospective effect. It was contended that as the contribution is charged for the benefit of the employees and to render service and assistance to them, therefore, unless such assistance or benefit had been provided to an employee, retrospective operation cannot be given. In support of this contention it was pointed out that where the employees who had retired or left the service after collecting their dues and have severed connection with the employer or where other agencies like Sindh Employees Social Security Institution and Employees Old-Age Benefit Institution have already provided financial benefits keeping in view the then wage level of the workers before the amendment, it was nor possible to make retrospective increase in wages with no corresponding benefits to the workers including those who have left the service. Leave is granted."
' Hence these Appeals.
7. Mr. Akhlaq Ahmad Siddiqui, learned Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record has generally reiterated the four facets of the case of his clients before the High Court, as quoted in para. 3 above and submitted that......................................
(1) "..The judgment of the Supreme Court relied upon could not be cited as a precedent in the present case as the question in that judgment was completely different than the one raised by him before the learned Judges of the Division Bench.".... ..And (ii) "...Where the employees who had retired or left the service after collecting their dues and have severed connection with the employer or where other agencies like Sindh Employees Social Security Institution and Employees Old-Age Benefits Institution have already provided financial benefits keeping in view the then wage level of the workers before the amendment, it was not possible to make retrospective increase in wages with no corresponding benefits to the workers including those who have left the service. ' do support their case to that extent. He relied upon Adnan Afzal v. Capt. Sher Afzal (PLD 1969 SC 187), Kohinoor Chemical Co. Ltd. And another v. Sindh Employee's Social Security Institution and another (PLD 1977 SC 197) and the Collector, Customs and Central Excise, Peshawar and others v.
Messrs Rais Khan Limited through Muhammad Hashim (1996 SCM R 83) in support of his plea that his clients could not be subjected to payment of the disputed contribution with effect from 1-7-1992 in that (Amendment) Act (No,IX of .1993) was enacted by Majlis-e-Shoora/Parliament on 10-4-1993 and should have been applied to their extent front the latter date. The plea was that the deeming clause of Act (No,IX of 1993), giving retrospective effect to Act No,IX of 1993, is illegal, ultra vires of the Constitution and the precepts in the Holy Qur'an. Moreso, when it is violative of Article 2A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as well. Mr. Siddiqui concluded his arguments with the assertion that in the case of his clients there is a number of employees whose services had been terminated and who had ceased to be in service before the 10th of April, 1993, therefore, to say the least, these ex-employees were not entitled to any benefits under Act No,IX of 1993.
8. Contrarily, Mr. Khalid Habibullah, learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of respondent No,2 Sindh Employees Social Security Institution in all the appeals has controverted the pleas raised by Mr. Akhlaq Ahmad Siddiqui. According to him, the High Court was not in error in observing that all the pleas raised before it by the appellant-Mills stood duly noticed and repelled in Annoor Textile Mills Ltd. And another v. Federation of Pakistan and another (PLD 1994 SC 568). He referred to Muhammad Akhtar Hussain and 4 others v. Government of West Pakistan through the Chief Secretary to Government of West Pakistan, Lahore and 454 others (PLD 1970 SC 146) to contend that when the Legislature itself provides for retrospective operation of the legislation in question, the Courts have no right/authority whatsoever to direct its prospective operation. His precise plea was that according to the normal principles of interpretation of statutes, an enactment does take effect from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette. However, if retrospective operation of an enactment is enshrined in the legislation under consideration, the said general principle of interpretation of statutes gives way to the within mentioned specific intent of the Legislature. As regards the plea of Mr. Akhlaq Ahmad Siddiqui that Majlis-e-Shoora was incapable of enacting Act No,IX of 1993 in that the subject-matter therein does not find mention in the Federal Legislature List but appears in the Concurrent List, it was submitted by Mr. Khalid Habibullah that the learned Members of the Division Bench of the High Court have placed correct interpretation on Item No,26 of the Concurrent Legislative List of the Constitution which reads thus:-- "26. Welfare of labour; conditions of labour, provident funds; employees' liability and workmen's compensation, health insurance including invalidity pensions, old-age pensions."'
' In this behalf, he placed implicit reliance on the findings recorded by the High Court in the judgment under appeal that: "A plain reading of this Article shows that the provisions made in this Article including welfare of the workers as well as their compensation etc. Which in general terms would mean that the same item governs the terms and conditions of the employment of the workers. From this it can safely be assumed that the wages of the workers would be covered by this item and, therefore, being in concurrent list, the Majlis-e-Shoora was competent to pass such Act."
He concluded his arguments by submitting that the learned Members of the Division Bench of the High Court duly considered the reports in the cases of Kohinoor Chemical Co., Ltd. And another v.
Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution and another (PLD 1977 .SC 197), Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan (PLD 1993 SC 473), and Province of the Punjab v. Amin Jan Naeem and 4 others (PLD 1994 SC 141) and were quite right in observing: "...That a precedent can only be applied to a case of similar nature and the same would not be of a universal application". Same is the position with regard to the observations made by the High Court towards the end of the last paragraph that: "In the present cases all the points raised by the learned counsel have been thoroughly discussed and answered in the above said judgment of the Supreme Court." (Reference is to Annoor Textile Mills Ltd. (supra)).
9. We have considered the arguments addressed at the Bar and also gone through the available material with the help of the learned counsel for the parties.
10. A careful perusal of the leave granting order brings it to the fore that at that stage the case of the appellants was that neither Annoor Textile Mills Ltd. (supra) is on all fours with their case nor retractive operation of Act No,IX of 1993 with effect from 1-7-1992 could be countenanced in law.
1 I. The pleas raised on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellant-Mills (In C.A. 1122 of 1995) can be considered together. We find that the arguments addressed at the Bar on behalf of respondent- Sindh Employees Social Security Institution, Karachi stand supported by the impugned judgments when it ruled that:-- "...By the Amending Act two steps have been taken which adversely affect the petitioners; (1) raising the minimum wages from Rs,140 per month to Rs,1,500 per month and (2) making the Amending Act applicable with retrospective effect from 1-7-1992. It seems that the minimum wages of unskilled workers was fixed by the Ordinance in the year 1969 whereafter there does not seem to have been any revision although in all labour legislation the wages and other emoluments have been increased to the benefit of the workers. The revision was made in the year 1993 i,e, after more than two decades during which salaries and minimum wages of workers and employees had been increased several times. Therefore, mere increased in the rate of wages cannot in the circumstances of the case, be treated as violation of any law or any fundamental right, which the petitioners may possess. Article 4 provides that every citizen has a right to enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law which is an inalienable right. In particular no action detrimental to life, liberty or property can be taken except in accordance with law. In order to bring the case under Article 4 the 'petitioners must satisfy that the increase in the minimum wages was not in accordance with law. Considering this aspect of the case the petitioners placed reliance on Article 12 which does not apply to the present case as imposition of any rate or fixing wages with retrospective effect will not amount to inflicting a party with retrospective punishment nor prima facie the freedom of trade as contemplated by Article 18 is infringed. The right to acquire, hold and dispose of the property is also not infringed because the petitioners have to pay higher wages retrospectively for work performed by the unskilled workers."
' Further, this Court also ruled in Annoor Textile Mills Ltd, (supra) as below:-- "The contention that the increase in wages or burdening the petitioners to pay with retrospective effect is bestowing a bounty is not correct. The learned counsel has referred to the meaning of the word 'bounty', which has been defined as 'a gratuity or an unusual or additional benefit conferred upon or compensation paid to a class of persons' (Black's Law Dictionary), 'a gift or favour bestowed as expression of liberty or kindness, money paid or a premium offered to encourage or promote act object, an amount offered for services performed or to be performed.' (Ballentine's Law Dictionary and Mokal's Law Terms and Phrases Judicially interpreted). The word 'bounty' has', thus varied meaning according to the circumstances or as denied under the legislation. It may be a premium, a favour or a liberal increase to persons working or for the work performed or as an incentive for better results and creating good working conditions. When any person in his personal capacity makes such favourable concession, it becomes a gift, kindness or liberality, but when it is given by a legislation, it is based on certain valid considerations and acquires legality conferring a legal right on the person to whom it is to be paid and a liability and duty of the person who is required to pay. The justification in the present case seems to be reasonable as for more than two decades the minimum wages of unskilled workers had remained static at Rs,140 p.m. Which as compared to other workers was even much lower than the base line. The retrospective operation can be given by the legislature and merely because a particular party is burdened with certain liability in consequence of the operation of law, does not mean that any of his rights has been illegally infringed. The learned counsel has referred to Messrs Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy and others v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir and another (AIR 1980 SC 1992) where it was observed that 'where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet-will.
There are two limitations imposed by law which structure and control the discretion of the Government in this behalf. The first is in regard to the terms on which largess is granted and the others is in regard to person who may be recipients of such largess.' There can be no cavil with the above proposition as in the present case firstly, the benefit conferred on the unskilled workers is not largess, and secondly the Government by legislation has fixed the criteria for the persons to whom the benefit is, to be given, its extent and also the time from which it is to be conferred. In the circumstances, there is no room for interference. We, therefore, find no force in the petition and refuse to grant leave."
12. We further find that the learned counsel for respondent Sindh Employees Social Security Institution was quite right in contending that when the intention of the Legislature is clear in relation to giving retrospective operation to an enactment then the Courts are bound to give effect to the same. See Syed Phul Shah v. Muhammad Hussain and 10 others (PLD 1991 SC 1051), I.A. Sharwani and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division, Islamabad and others (1991 SCM R 1041 at pp. 1086, 1088 and 1093), Annoor Textile Mills Ltd. (supra), National Embroidery Mills Ltd. And others v. Punjab Employees' Social Security Institution (1993 SCM R 1201) and Messrs Volkervam (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Sindh Employees Social Security Institution (1991 SCM R 2361).
13. Looked at in the above perspective, we are of the considered view that leave to appeal should not have been granted against judgment dated 31-8-1994 passed by the High Court of Sindh at Karachi.
14. The above are the reasons for our short order of even date which reads thus:-- "For reasons to be recorded later, the order granting leave to appeal in these appeals is recalled and the petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs."