' This is tenant's second appeal under section 15 (4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 calling in question orders of his eviction passed on grounds of default, damage to the property, personal requirement and reconstruction.
2. The respondent (landlord) was employed at Karachi and then at Islamabad. He gave up job and wanted to settle in Sahiwal and thus, according to him his requirement for personal use was bona fide. With regard to default in payment of rent, it was asserted by him that since July, 1975 to February, 1976 the appellant had defaulted in sending the rent through money-order at the respondent's Karachi address. Otherwise too, the rent, allegedly, was not tendered. The respondent further alleged that the appellant had caused damage to the property which had impaired its value and that he required the house in dispute for repairs and construction of an additional room.
The appellant denied that he had committed default. On the other hand, his assertion was that he used o send money-order at the respondent's Karachi address but for some in he came to Sahiwal and the appellant sent him money-orders at the Sahiwal address. The respondent refused to receive the money-orders which compelled the appellant to deposit the rent with the Rent Controller. On questions of damage and reconstruction, the assertions of the respondent were repelled. As regards personal requirement, the appellant's case was that the respondent had no intention of settling at Sahiwal.
3. The learned Rent Controller accepted the respondent's pleas on all the four issues and ordered eviction of the appellant. His first appeal having failed, this is the second appeal.
4. Three money-order coupons Nos. 1263, 1297 and 2348 show that the appellant did make efforts to send the rent to the respondent at his then existing address. There is nothing in the evidence to show that the appellant had any ulterior motive for sending the money-order at a wrong address nor is it possible to give a positive finding that he intended to harass the respondent. On the other hand, there is proof of clear intention on his part that be wanted to part with the money so that it may reach the respondent. This assumption is further supported by the fact that when the respondent refused the money-orders, he made several deposits after getting permission from the Rent Controller. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the deposits with the Rent Controller were not regular and that each time there was a delay of a month or so. No proof has been led on this file that at the relevant time the tenancy was governed by any formal agreement. Thus, there is some scope for argument on behalf of the appellant that he was entitled to take sixty days for remitting rent each time that it became due. Be that as it may, the non- payment of rent on time does not appear to be on account of any malice nor was it wilful. The exercise of discretion in such like circumstances against the tenant was not justified. The findings in the impugned orders on the question of default, therefore, are reversed.
5. There is no evidence on the file that the appellant by his act caused such damage to the property which reduced its value or utility. The controversy was only with regard to repairs. The respondent did admit that for about four years he did not do anything to effect the repairs. On the other hand, it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that he spent money from his own pocket to effect the repairs. Thus, there is nothing certain to hold the appellant responsible for any real damage to the property. Indeed, there is no evidence that any damage reducing its value or utility, has been caused. Thus, the appellant was not liable to be ejected on ground of damage either. The findings in this behalf are also set aside.
6.
6. It would suffice to observe with regard to reconstruction that the respondent did obtain sanction for addition of a room and changing the place of stairs and a plan in this behalf was sanctioned.
But it has not been shown that asked the permission of the appellant to add the room in the courtyard as shown in the site plan and alter the staircase and that the appellant refused any such facility. If the respondent had requested the appellant and he had refused such a facility, it could have been assumed that the claim of the respondent in this behalf is in good faith. Learned counsel for the respondent frankly conceded that the addition of one room and alteration of the staircase is only for the purpose of the respondent's own residence. Otherwise, in so far as the structural needs of the house are concerned, according to him, it might not be necessary so long as the house remains with a tenant. Keeping in view all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the respondent in fact required the house for reconstruction reasonably and in good faith, The impugned findings in this behalf are accordingly reversed.
7. On the question of personal requirement of the respondent and his bona fides in this behalf, there is nothing on record to doubt his statement that he had given up job and that thereafter he had settled in Sahiwal where he owns a house (the one in dispute). The appellant could collect evidence from Karachi and Islamabad to show that the claim made by the respondent in this behalf was false. Nothing was done on these lines. On the other hand, it appears that even in February, 1976 may be, before the service of the appellant in the ejectment proceedings, he sent a money order to the respondent at Sahiwal address. Earlier, on two occasions, money orders were sent to the respondent at Sahiwal address. This also shows that whenever the respondent is either out of job or otherwise wants to spend a longer period than for purely temporary stay, he comes back to Sahiwal. It will not be wrong to presume, after he has given up job, that he would go back to Sahiwal his home place, to settle there. There nothing in the evidence produced from the appellant side to show that it would not be a valid assumption. The respondent has made a statement on oath. It has been believed by the learned Rent Controller and the learned lower appellate Court.
The evidence led from the appellant side is not enough to set aside the concurrent findings. The findings on the question of bona fide requirement of the respondent for personal use, are upheld.
Consequently, this appeal on this ground, is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. The appellant is allowed one month time to vacant the premises.